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Cyberattacks are inevitable and widespread. Existing scholarship on cyber-
espionage and cyberwar is undermined by its futile obsession with preventing 
attacks. This Article draws on research in normal accident theory and complex 
system design to argue that successful attacks are unavoidable. Cybersecurity must 
focus on mitigating breaches rather than preventing them. First, this Article 
analyzes cybersecurity’s market failures and information asymmetries. It argues that 
these economic and structural factors necessitate greater regulation, particularly 
given the abject failures of alternative approaches. Second, this Article divides 
cyberthreats into two categories: known and unknown. To reduce the impact of 
known threats with identified fixes, the federal government should combine funding 
and legal mandates to push firms to redesign their computer systems. Redesign 
should follow two principles: disaggregation—dispersing data across many loca-
tions—and heterogeneity—running those disaggregated components on variegated 
software and hardware. For unknown threats—“zero-day attacks”—regulation 
should seek to increase the government’s access to markets for these exploits. 
Regulation cannot exorcise the ghost in the network, but it can contain the damage 
it causes. 
 Maelcum produced a white lump of foam slightly smaller than Case’s head, 
fished a pearl-handled switchblade on a green nylon lanyard out of the hip pocket of 
his tattered shorts, and carefully slit the plastic. He extracted a rectangular object 
and passed it to Case. “Thas part some gun, mon?” 
 “No,” said Case, turning it over, “but it’s a weapon. It’s virus.”  
William Gibson 
Neuromancer (1984) 
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INTRODUCTION 
Begin with a tale of two specters. 
The first invaded the computer systems of the Dalai Lama in Dharamsala, 
India, sometime in 2008.1 As the leader of Tibet’s government in exile, the 
Dalai Lama has long attracted the interest and suspicion of the People’s 
Republic of China.2 The Dalai Lama and the government in exile depend 
heavily on Internet communications technologies—a dependence exploited 
by their adversaries.3 
 
1 INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, TRACKING GHOSTNET: INVESTIGATING A CYBER ESPIO-
NAGE NETWORK 14 (2009). 
2 Profile: The Dalai Lama, BBC NEWS (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-
pacific-12700331. 
3 SHISHIR NAGARAJA & ROSS ANDERSON, THE SNOOPING DRAGON: SOCIAL-MALWARE 
SURVEILLANCE OF THE TIBETAN MOVEMENT 4 (2009), available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ 
techreports/UCAM-CL-TR-746.pdf. 
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The initial hint of trouble came from diplomacy. The Dalai Lama’s staff 
contacted a diplomatic official by email to arrange a meeting.4 Before they 
could arrange a telephone conversation, the diplomat received a warning 
from the Chinese government not to undertake the meeting.5 Fearing that 
its systems had been compromised, the government in exile turned to the 
OpenNet Initiative (ONI), an academic research consortium that studies 
Internet censorship.6 ONI dispatched two affiliated security researchers to 
analyze the Dalai Lama’s computer systems.7 
What they found was GhostNet: a sophisticated software program capable 
of covertly capturing keystrokes, copying files, and even activating cameras 
and microphones attached to infected computers.8 GhostNet was a near-
perfect spy: powerful, flexible, and almost invisible. It had infected computers 
used by the Dalai Lama, the government in exile, diplomatic offices in the 
United States and Europe, and a Tibetan activist organization.9 ONI 
researchers watched GhostNet steal secret information from computers in 
the Dalai Lama’s personal office, including a document outlining negotiat-
ing positions in discussions with the Chinese government.10 They deter-
mined through their investigation that computers located in three different 
Chinese provinces (and one server rented from a U.S. Internet service 
provider (ISP)) controlled GhostNet.11  
The specter was widespread: researchers found that GhostNet had infected 
nearly 1300 computers in more than 100 countries, including computers in the 
foreign affairs ministries of Iran and Indonesia; embassies of India, South 
Korea, and Taiwan; intergovernmental organizations; news organizations; 
and Tibetan exile groups.12 Determining attribution—learning who operated 
GhostNet—was not possible from the data ONI could obtain.13 The likely 
answer, though, is that China’s security services introduced the ghost into 
the network.14 
 
4 Id. at 5. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. Disclosure: The author worked for the OpenNet Initiative as a research fellow from 
2004–2006. 
7 Id. 
8 INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, supra note 1, at 5-6. 
9 Id. at 5; NAGARAJA & ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 5-7. 
10 INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, supra note 1, at 25 & 26 fig.5. 
11 Id. at 24-25, 30; John Markoff, Vast Spy System Loots Computers in 103 Countries, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 29, 2009, at A1. 
12 INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, supra note 1, at 5, 22. 
13 Id. at 48. But see NAGARAJA & ANDERSON, supra note 3, at 11 (describing “how agents of 
the Chinese government compromised the computing infrastructure of the Office of His Holiness 
the Dalai Lama”). 
14 See INFO. WARFARE MONITOR, supra note 1, at 48. 
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The second specter infiltrated the computers controlling Iran’s nuclear 
enrichment program, likely in 2007.15 Stuxnet, a joint project of the United 
States and Israel, is the most advanced cyberweapon built to date.16 It 
performed two clever tasks: it sped up the centrifuges that enrich uranium, 
damaging some irreparably, and it concealed the acceleration from the 
engineers monitoring the system.17 Stuxnet recorded data from normal 
centrifuge operations and, while sabotaging the centrifuges, replayed the 
normal data to the engineers, falsely reassuring them.18 One piece of 
sophisticated malware succeeded where diplomacy and threats of military 
force failed—it set back Iran’s attempts to craft a nuclear weapon by at least 
a year, and likely longer.19 
Stuxnet both spied on and changed data, and did so invisibly for years.20 
Iran could not determine the cause of the centrifuge failures.21 The country’s 
nuclear engineers tried helplessly to solve the problem, even shutting down 
whole complexes of centrifuges at the first sign of trouble.22 Stuxnet not 
only damaged Iran’s physical infrastructure, it sapped the confidence of its 
nuclear experts. It crossed the “air gap” that separated Iran’s nuclear com-
puter network from the public Internet, breaching a precaution widely 
viewed as impenetrable.23 Stuxnet is the first computer-based attack to 
cause physical damage; its deployment marks the opening salvo of a new era 
of cyberwar.24 
GhostNet was a thief; it stole information from Tibet’s exiled government 
to benefit its masters—probably China’s government. Stuxnet was a vandal; it 
fed false data to Iranian nuclear engineers while it slowly destroyed their 
equipment. In combination, these ghosts demonstrate cybersecurity’s most 
 
15 David E. Sanger, Obama Order Sped Up Wave of Cyberattacks Against Iran, N.Y. TIMES, June 
1, 2012, at A1. 
16 Kim Zetter, How Digital Detectives Deciphered Stuxnet, the Most Menacing Malware in History, 
WIRED (July 11, 2011), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/07/how-digital-detectives-deciphered-
stuxnet/all/1. 
17 William J. Broad et al., Israel Tests Called Crucial in Iran Nuclear Setback, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 
2011, at A1; Christopher Williams, Stuxnet: Cyber Attack on Iran ‘Was Carried Out by Western Powers and 
Israel,’ TELEGRAPH (London) (Jan. 22, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/8274009/Stuxnet-
Cyber-attack-on-Iran-was-carried-out-by-Western-powers-and-Israel.html. 
18 Sanger, supra note 15. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 Zetter, supra note 16; see also, e.g., Eric Knapp, Bridging the Air Gap: Examining Attack Vec-
tors into Industrial Control Systems, SECURITYWEEK (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.securityweek.com/ 
bridging-air-gap-examining-attack-vectors-industrial-control-systems (“[T]he ideal of the air gap 
is valid and . . . true separation is a viable goal.”). 
24 Sanger, supra note 15. 
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profound legal and technical challenge—to craft a system that keeps unin-
vited users from accessing or altering data. This Article proposes an ap-
proach to address that challenge. Cybersecurity cannot prevent the ghost in 
the network; instead, it should seek to cabin its depredations. Mitigation—
not prevention—is the key. This Article employs the insights from studies 
of complex system design, such as normal accident theory, to propose a 
mixture of legal and technical strategies to deal with both known vulnerabil-
ities and unknown, “zero-day attack[s].”25 
This proposal builds on my prior work that established a theoretical, 
information-based approach to cybersecurity.26 In brief, this methodology 
approaches cybersecurity as comprising three issues: access, alteration, and 
integrity of data.27 Access involves whether a user may reach a given 
datum.28 Alteration describes whether she may change it.29 Integrity asks 
whether one may determine whether a given piece of information reflects 
the latest authorized changes.30 Access and alteration have both positive and 
negative aspects.31 The positive range, which I explored in earlier work, 
considers how authorized users may obtain and update information.32 This 
Article explores the negative range of access and alteration: How can 
regulation reduce attackers’ ability to access and alter information stored in 
networked computer systems? 
It leads a new wave of scholarship on cybersecurity that breaks free from 
extant, poorly fitting models such as criminal law, international law, and the 
law of armed conflict.33 This second wave of research develops new models 
for the unique challenges of information security in a computer environment 
 
25 See Leyla Bilge & Tudor Dumitras, Before We Knew It: An Empirical Study of Zero-Day 
Attacks in the Real World 1 (Oct. 18, 2012) (paper presented at the 19th ACM Conference on Comp. 
& Commc’ns Sec.), available at http://users.ece.cmu.edu/~tdumitra/public_documents/bilge12_zero_ 
day.pdf (“A zero-day attack is a cyber attack exploiting a vulnerability that has not been disclosed 
publicly. There is almost no defense against a zero-day attack . . . .”). 
26 See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Conundrum, 96 MINN. L. REV. 584 (2011). 
27 Id. at 587.  
28 Id. at 628.  
29 Id. at 630.  
30 Id. at 632-33.  
31 Id. at 628, 630.  
32 Id.  
33 See id. at 588-90 (explaining the distinct nature of cybersecurity and scholars’ unsuccessful 
attempts to fit it into preexisting frameworks—especially those involving intent); Michael J. 
Glennon, State-Level Cybersecurity, POL’Y REV., Feb.–Mar. 2012, at 85, 86-87 (explaining that 
issues of cybersecurity do not fit into existing categories); see also Hans Brechbühl et al., Protecting 
Critical Information Infrastructure: Developing Cybersecurity Policy, 16 INFO. TECH. FOR DEV. 83, 85 
(2010) (“Responding to current and past incidents and attacks requires knowledge of what has 
happened, methods of preventing similar incidents from being successful in the future, and 
possible legal or other remedial actions against the perpetrators.”). 
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of ubiquitous connectivity and minimal attribution.34 Scholars have explored 
ways that the President, states, and administrative agencies can combat 
cyberattacks, using models ranging from public health to environmental law.35 
Most important, there is a nascent realization that since it is impossible to 
completely solve cybersecurity problems, “[w]e must learn to live with the 
disease.”36 However, this insightful literature identifies a variety of new 
approaches without offering concrete proposals to augment cybersecurity. 
This Article fills that gap. 
I use an information-based methodology to make a counterintuitive set 
of arguments about how law can concretely address cybersecurity. My 
approach begins with the core normative claim that cybersecurity is under-
regulated. For the past fifteen years, the principal methods of addressing 
cybersecurity problems have concentrated on voluntary measures through 
self-regulation37 and on process-based methodologies to tailor precautions to 
each organization’s requirements.38 These approaches disdain regulatory 
mandates. Not coincidentally, all have failed to improve security. Legal 
 
34 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012) (requiring most publicly traded companies to certify the 
effectiveness of internal controls for financial reporting, implementing section 404 of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act); Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3541 
(2006) (creating a framework for cybersecurity on federal networks and recognizing the unique 
challenges created by these networks); see also Lawrence A. Gordon et al., The Impact of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act on the Corporate Disclosures of Information Security Activities, 25 J. ACCT. & PUB. 
POL’Y 503, 528-29 (2006) (reviewing empirical evidence suggesting the Sarbanes–Oxley Act is 
leading to greater focus on corporate information security activities). 
35 See L. Jean Camp, Reconceptualizing the Role of Security User, DAEDALUS, Fall 2011, at 93, 
100-02 (engaging end users in creating a secure online environment); Glennon, supra note 33, at 
100-02 (arguing that states should play a prominent role in securing computing infrastructure); 
Deirdre K. Mulligan & Fred B. Schneider, Doctrine for Cybersecurity, DAEDALUS, Fall 2011, at 70, 
75-78 (conceptualizing cybersecurity as a public health challenge); David W. Opderbeck, 
Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 795, 812-29 (2012) (assessing the scope of 
the President’s constitutional authority to combat cyberattacks); Nathan A. Sales, Regulating 
Cybersecurity, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1550-51 (2013) (using administrative law concepts to analyze 
how regulation can address underlying externality problems in cybersecurity); David Thaw, The 
Efficacy of Cybersecurity Regulation, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 61-
70), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/id=2241838 (evaluating the relative merits of top-down 
regulation, administrative rulemaking, and delegation to regulated entities in improving cyber-
security through empirical analysis of security breaches).  
36 Simson L. Garfinkel, The Cybersecurity Risk, COMM. ACM, June 2012, at 29, 32. 
37 See generally, e.g., N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., CYBER SECURITY—ELECTRONIC 
SECURITY PERIMETER(S) (2012), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/CIP-005-5.pdf (describ-
ing the steps taken by a private entity to protect itself from cybersecurity threats). 
38 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012) (providing guidelines for “management assessment of 
internal controls”); AWS ISO 27001 FAQs, AMAZON WEB SERVICES, http://aws.amazon.com/ 
compliance/iso-27001-faqs (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (describing Amazon Web Services’ 
compliance with an international standard for private entities to protect themselves from 
cybersecurity threats). 
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regulation has far more potential to remedy cybersecurity weaknesses than 
scholars or legislators appreciate. Legal mandates are likely to be costly in 
places, and to generate substantial political opposition, but they are both 
possible and desirable.  
Next, this Article argues that there are two core problems related to unau-
thorized access to and alteration of data: attacks with available countermeasures 
and zero-day attacks without extant defenses (or at least defenses unavaila-
ble to anyone other than the attacker).39 These two categories can be more 
easily understood as the “known unknowns” and the “unknown un-
knowns.”40 The key to combating both sets of unknowns is to concentrate on 
mitigation rather than prevention. Effective mitigation can helpfully reduce 
attacks in the first place: hackers are less likely to test defenses when success 
will not bear fruit.41  
For the known unknowns, such as the Structured Query Language (SQL) 
injection attack against Yahoo!, two mitigation measures are vital: (1) dispersing 
information widely and in partial form, and (2) storing it under varying 
conditions.42 This Article refers to these goals as disaggregation and hetero-
geneity, or, more colloquially, “divide and differ.” This practice reduces the 
effects of inevitable intrusions and protects against catastrophic failure. To 
effectuate the “divide and differ” approach, regulation should come in two 
parts: the carrot and the stick. First, firms that transact business with the 
government should be required to undertake meaningful steps to achieve 
disaggregation and heterogeneity. Second, Congress should require that a 
core set of industries implement measures to divide and differentiate their 
data stores, with the palliative of federal funding to assist their efforts.  
The United States should attempt to convert the unknown unknowns, 
such as the Stuxnet attack on Iran, to known unknowns.43 The best, and 
perhaps only, strategy concentrates on the growing trade in zero-day attacks 
 
39 See generally Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 628-32. 
40 These terms are borrowed from former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, who said, 
“[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known 
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” U.S. Dep’t of Def., DOD News 
Briefing—Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers (Feb. 12, 2002), http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/ 
transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2636. 
41 See, e.g., Huseyin Cavusoglu, Economics of IT Security Management (“Security invest-
ments . . . act as a deterrent for attackers by making attacks less attractive.”), in ECONOMICS OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY 71, 79 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004). 
42 See, e.g., Gery Menegaz, SQL Injection Attack: What Is It, and How to Prevent It, ZDNET (July 
13, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/sql-injection-attack-what-is-it-and-how-to-prevent-it-7000000881. 
43 Cf. Derek E. Bambauer & Oliver Day, The Hacker’s Aegis, 60 EMORY L.J. 1051, 1061-62 
(2011) (noting a sharp increase in the incidence of zero-day vulnerabilities). 
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on the private market. Congress should adopt two statutory rules: mandatory 
participation in such markets by the federal government and required 
confidential reporting by firms who trade in these cyberweapons. In addi-
tion, Congress should fund a reward program—a “bug bounty”—for 
researchers who discover zero-day vulnerabilities and agree to sell this 
information exclusively to the U.S. government.44  
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I explains why focusing efforts 
principally on preventing cyberattacks is misguided: perfect security is 
impossible, and even attaining good security is extraordinarily difficult. 
Instead, cybersecurity regulation should concentrate on mitigating the 
damage that successful attacks cause. Part II sets out the case for regulatory 
intervention. It explains the core problem of security externalities, dem-
onstrates the failure of alternative approaches, and builds the case for a 
greater role for law in cybersecurity. Part III elucidates how to address the 
known unknowns via disaggregation and heterogeneity. Part IV evaluates 
how best to mitigate the challenges of zero-day attacks that use unknown 
vulnerabilities and have no known defenses, arguing that the federal gov-
ernment should seek to acquire information in this area. This Article 
concludes by assessing the challenges of regulating cybersecurity and 
sketching the next phase of research. 
I. KING CANUTE’S CYBERSECURITY 
Perfect cybersecurity is folly. Pursuing it risks forgetting the lesson of 
King Canute, who commanded the tides to halt and, when they ignored 
him, pointed out his order’s futility.45 Scholars and analysts bemoan the 
ubiquity of cybersecurity problems such as malware, software flaws, and 
data breaches.46 Like the poor, though, these problems will ever be with 
us.47 This Part makes three points. First, the complexity of information 
 
44 Cf. Thomas Claburn, Google Ups Bug Bounties Amid Booming Exploit Market, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/security/management/google-ups-bug-bounties-
amid-booming-exp/240005721 (noting that Google has increased its payments to people who report 
vulnerabilities in their products); About, ZERO DAY INITIATIVE, http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/about 
(describing a program designed to promote software-vulnerability reporting via monetary incentives). 
45  E.g., Kathryn Westcott, Is King Canute Misunderstood?, BBC NEWS MAG. (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-13524677. 
46 See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Carol M. Hayes, Mitigative Counterstriking: Self-Defense and Deter-
rence in Cyberspace, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 438 (2012) (“Cyber intrusions can be devastating 
and can come from sources ranging from unsophisticated teenagers, to high-tech cyber criminals, 
to military officials.”); How the Experts Would Fix Cyber Security, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 
2, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2012-08-02/how-the-experts-would-fix-cyber-security 
(“Cyber crime is increasing in frequency and severity.”). 
47 See Matthew 26:11 (King James) (“For ye have the poor always with you . . . .”). 
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technology and the limited testing cycle available to vendors mean vulnera-
bilities are inevitable. Second, exposure to the Internet means that attackers 
will locate and exploit those flaws. Thus, failure is inevitable. Finally, and 
most important, complex system design studies—in particular, research on 
normal accident theory—show that the right approach to such inevitable failure 
is to limit the damage caused. Mitigation is a topic almost entirely ignored by 
legal scholars and legislators, yet vital to meeting cybersecurity threats.  
A. It’s Complicated 
Modern software and hardware are simply too complex for flaws to be 
eliminated completely. The sheer size of programs confounds efforts to 
detect and remove bugs, and the size is ever-increasing. Microsoft Windows 
NT 3.1 (the more secure version of Microsoft’s two Windows operating 
systems in 1993) had four to five million lines of code; Windows XP, 
released eight years later, had thirty-five to forty million.48 Windows Vista 
likely had fifty million.49 As the size of the code base and the number of 
developers who work on it grow, coordination costs increase.50 It becomes 
more difficult for programmers to ensure that different parts of the software 
interoperate effectively and securely.51 Even as a theoretical matter, it is 
difficult to demonstrate that software above a small size (in terms of lines of 
code) can be completely secure.52 As a practical matter, it is impossible.  
In addition, the complicated interactions among applications, operating 
systems, and hardware present opportunities for attacks.53 The Windows 
ecosystem includes applications, drivers, and firmware—all of which change on 
an irregular schedule and must remain “compatibl[e] with legacy hardware and 
 
48 E.g., Larry O’Brien, How Many Lines of Code in Windows?, KNOWING.NET (Dec. 6, 2005), 
http://www.knowing.net/index.php/2005/12/06/how-many-lines-of-code-in-windows; see also Steve 
Lohr & John Markoff, Windows Is So Slow, but Why?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2006, at C1 (stating that 
Microsoft is slow to develop new versions of Windows because of its large and onerous code base). 
49 Lohr & Markoff, supra note 48. 
50 See, e.g., Caryn A. Conley & Lee Sproull, Easier Said than Done: An Empirical Investigation of 
Software Design and Quality in Open Source Software Development 2 (Jan. 7, 2009) (paper presented at the 
42nd Haw. Int’l Conference on Sys. Scis.), available at http://www.computer.org/csdl/proceedings/ 
hicss/2009/3450/00/09-14-05.pdf (“As the number of components increases in more modular 
software, functionality becomes more specialized and isolated . . . and each component contains 
less functionality on average.” (citations omitted)). 
51 See, e.g., Claire Le Goues et al., The Case for Software Evolution 206 (Nov. 7, 2010) (paper 
presented at the 18th FSE/SDP Workshop on the Future of Software Eng’g Res.), available at 
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~clegoues/docs/legoues-foser10.pdf (explaining that software can be thought 
of as a complex, evolving system, similar to a biological organism). 
52 E.g., Mulligan & Schneider, supra note 35, at 72-73. 
53 E.g., Le Goues et al., supra note 51, at 207. 
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software.”54 Standard programming responses to this problem, such as modu-
larity (ensuring that components are independent of one another such that 
failures are not concatenated), have mixed results at best. An empirical study 
of Java-based programs available from the popular open-source repository 
SourceForge found, counterintuitively, that greater software modularity is 
associated with an increase in the number of bugs.55 This contradicts the 
conventional wisdom that modularity enhances software quality.56 Similarly, 
despite a wealth of methods including improved testing suites, coding best 
practices, enhanced specifications, and specific techniques for combating 
errors such as buffer overflows, “software today remains, in many ways, far 
less reliable and more prone to bugs than in the past.”57  
Software is thus structurally prone to failure, despite significant efforts 
to remediate it. Maintenance, including bug fixes, can consume “up to 90% 
of the cost of a typical software project, at a total cost of up to $70 billion 
per year in the [United States].”58 These costs result not only from software 
complexity, but also from the challenges of organizational change (and 
concomitant changes in demands on software) and from poor software 
design.59 Further, it is far more costly to fix bugs late in the development 
cycle.60 Yet even companies such as Microsoft, which take software security 
design seriously, suffer from bugs and attacks.61 The firm delayed the release 
of Windows Vista to improve security, yet the operating system still 
shipped with vulnerabilities that were rapidly exploited by hackers.62 
Eliminating bugs completely is simply impossible. 
 
54 Lohr & Markoff, supra note 48. 
55 See, e.g., Conley & Sproull, supra note 50, at 9-10. 
56 Id. 
57 Le Goues et al., supra note 51, at 205. 
58 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
59 See, e.g., Kenneth C. Laudon & Jane P. Laudon, Securing Information Systems, in ESSEN-
TIALS OF MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SECURITY 1, 2 (8th ed. 2008). 
60 Id. 
61 E.g., John Markoff, Stung by Security Flaws, Microsoft Makes Software Safety a Top Goal, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at C1. 
62 See, e.g., Philip Bethge, Microsoft Development Head: ‘The Whole Room Will Be the Computer,’ 
SPIEGEL ONLINE INT’L (Oct. 24, 2012), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/microsoft-
development-leader-craig-mundie-on-the-future-of-computers-a-863103.html (interviewing Microsoft’s 
development director Craig Mundie); Ryan Naraine, Remote Exploit Released for Windows Vista SMB2 
Worm Hole, ZDNET (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/remote-exploit-released-
for-windows-vista-smb2-worm-hole/4350 (discussing a “team of exploit writers” who attacked a 
vulnerability in Windows Vista); Ryan Naraine, Vista Exploit Surfaces on Russian Hacker Site, EWEEK 
(Dec. 22, 2006), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Vista-Exploit-Surfaces-on-Russian-Hacker-Site 
(stating that Microsoft was monitoring and fixing a vulnerability in Windows Vista that was 
identified on a Russian website). 
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B. Exposure 
The Internet makes securing code much harder by exposing the inevita-
ble bugs in software to sustained scrutiny and attack. Many—if not most—
computers are connected to the Internet directly or indirectly. This provides 
a path for attack and enables hackers to test and then compromise systems 
that were never designed for public networks. Such systems include utility 
companies’ Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) controllers, 
many of which employ hard-coded passwords.63 GarrettCom, which claims 
to provide equipment to seventy-five percent of the top one hundred power 
companies in North America, built a hidden account with a hard-coded pass-
word into a switch management application accessible online.64 RuggedCom’s 
Rugged Operating System had both a “hard-coded RSA SSL private key” 
and a “factory account” that could be exploited by attackers.65 Administra-
tive conveniences transform into critical weaknesses when connected to the 
Internet, which exposes devices and programs designed for networks 
protected by physical safeguards to worldwide scrutiny. 
Moreover, attackers—those who seek to locate and exploit vulnerabilities 
in software—have considerable informational advantages over defenders. 
Attackers have more time; software vendors are profit-driven and must 
release code to the public under the constraints of release cycles and 
quarterly earnings statements.66 Once software is publicly available, however, 
attackers can test it at their leisure.67 This raises the second advantage: 
 
63 See Kelly Jackson Higgins, SCADA Security in a Post-Stuxnet World, DARK READING (Nov. 6, 
2012), http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerability/scada-security-in-a-post-stuxnet-world/240049917. 
64 Advisory (ICSA-12-243-01): GarrettCom—Use of Hard-Coded Password, ICS-CERT, https:// 
ics-cert.us-cert.gov/advisories/ICSA-12-243-01 (last updated Apr. 30, 2013); see also Richard Chirgwin, 
Insecure SCADA Kit Has Hidden Factory Account, Password, REGISTER (Sept. 5, 2012), http:// 
www.theregister.co.uk/2012/09/05/more_insecure_scada (describing the ICS-CERT advisory and its 
impact). 
65 Lucian Constantin, ICS-CERT Warns of SSL Security Flaw in RuggedCom Industrial Networking 
Devices, COMPUTERWORLD (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9230516/ICS_ 
CERT_warns_of_SSL_security_flaw_in_RuggedCom_industrial_networking_devices (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
66 See William Yurcik & David Doss, CyberInsurance: A Market Solution to the Internet Security 
Market Failure (May 17, 2002) (paper presented at the 2d Workshop on Econ. and Info. Sec.), available at 
http://www2.sims.berkeley.edu/resources/affiliates/workshops/econsecurity/econws/53.pdf (explaining 
that market pressures practically guarantee the existence of exploitable software flaws); cf. Mike Sutton 
& Tym Moore, 7 Ways to Improve Your Software Release Management, CIO (July 30, 2008), 
http://www.cio.com/article/440101/7_Ways_to_Improve_Your_Software_Release_Management (noting 
time constraints and other market pressures affecting the release of companies’ software projects). 
67 Cf. JOHN VIEGA, THE MYTHS OF SECURITY 139-44 (2009) (“There are many, many 
more vulnerabilities than are publicly disclosed. Some are found and fixed, but there will always be 
many securities that are never found.”). 
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attackers have greater numbers.68 Software companies and security research 
firms have limited staff. Hackers operate worldwide and benefit from 
widespread distribution of automated cracking tools such as fuzzers, as well as 
from the results of employing those tools.69 Third, hackers have a lead-time 
advantage: once a vulnerability is discovered, it takes the vendor time to 
understand the problem (assuming they learn about it simultaneously, which 
is rare) and to patch it.70 Thus, there is an inevitable window during which 
systems are insecure.  
Lastly, even perfect security against external attacks cannot guard 
against turncoats and mistakes. Cybersecurity cannot prevent those who are 
authorized to access information from sharing it with those who are not.71 
One cybersecurity survey found that insiders launched one in every five 
attacks.72 For instance, even if Private Bradley Manning had not been able 
to download data from the Department of Defense’s SIPRNet intelligence 
network, Manning could have revealed memorized information to others.73 
Systems disconnected from the Internet are still vulnerable to insider 
attack: Stuxnet compromised an air-gapped system.74 Someone in Iran’s 
nuclear program either deliberately or inadvertently infected its computer 
systems with the virus. And even secure software can be misconfigured. 
Incorrect security settings on shared network drives, for example, left 
sensitive data for over 350,000 University of North Carolina at Charlotte 
 
68 Cf. ERIC RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL & THE BAZAAR 36-38 (1999) (noting that the 
greater number of testers for open source software increases bug detection). 
69 See Scott Lambert, Fuzz Testing at Microsoft and the Triage Process, SECURITY DEV. 
LIFECYCLE BLOG (Sept. 20, 2007), http://blogs.msdn.com/b/sdl/archive/2007/09/20/fuzz-testing-
at-microsoft-and-the-triage-process.aspx (demonstrating how information from fuzzers can be 
widely disseminated). 
70 VIEGA, supra note 67, at 221-22. 
71 See, e.g., Steven R. Chabinsky, Cybersecurity Strategy: A Primer for Policy Makers and Those on 
the Front Line, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 27, 34-35 (2010) (“Current employees, contrac-
tors, and trusted business partners have a unique opportunity to do . . . harm because they have 
been provided authorized access to . . . physical and digital spaces.”); Alan Joch, Why You Can’t Stop 
Insider Threats, FCW (Feb. 28, 2011), http://fcw.com/articles/2011/02/28/feat-cybersecurity-insider-
threats.aspx (“Some of the most damaging security breaches originate from inside an agency’s 
firewalls.”).  
72 Joch, supra note 71. 
73 David Leigh, How 250,000 US Embassy Cables Were Leaked, GUARDIAN (Nov. 28, 2010), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/nov/28/how-us-embassy-cables-leaked. See generally Yochai 
Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: Wikileaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311 (2011). Private Manning now identifies as Chelsea. Adam Gabbatt, “I Am 
Chelsea Manning,” Says Jailed Soldier Formerly Known as Bradley, GUARDIAN (Aug. 22, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/22/bradley-manning-woman-chelsea-gender-reassignment. 
74 Sanger, supra note 15. 
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students and employees exposed for nearly fifteen years.75 A survey of 
attendees of the hacker conference, DEFCON 18, revealed that 73% found 
misconfigured networks in three out of every four clients with whom they 
worked.76 Thus, “88% believe the biggest threat to organizations lies inside 
the firewall.”77 This sets a limit on how effective cybersecurity can be: the 
human element cannot be completely eliminated. 
The combination of vulnerabilities and Internet exposure means that 
failures of seemingly invulnerable systems are legion. RSA’s SecurID 800 
tokens, which are widely used to safeguard authentication credentials, were 
cracked using an attack against the tokens’ encryption algorithm.78 RSA 
itself suffered a breach that revealed the “seeds” used with its cryptographic 
algorithm to generate the numbers employed by the SecurID tokens for 
authentication.79 Google, Adobe, and other software firms suffered intellec-
tual property theft in 2010 when attackers—likely based in China—used a 
zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Internet Explorer to break into their 
networks.80 Telvent, which makes control hardware and software for 
utilities, had its systems penetrated, probably by hackers based in China.81 
The attackers not only gained access to Telvent’s code and left behind 
malware on its network, but may have had access to Telvent customers’ 
project files and networks.82 Attackers based in China used a USB drive–
based vector to obtain data from India’s navy, even though the navy’s 
network was not connected to the Internet.83 Two weeks after Microsoft 
triumphantly released a new tool designed to reduce exploitation of security 
 
75 Anne Saita, UNC–Charlotte Data Breaches Expose 350,000 Social Security Numbers and Much 
More, THREATPOST (May 11, 2012), http://threatpost.com/unc-charlotte-data-breaches-expose-350000-
social-security-numbers-and-much-more-051012/76552. 
76 Misconfigured Networks Main Cause of Breaches, HELP NET SECURITY (Aug. 31, 2010), 
http://www.net-security.org/secworld.php?id=9801. 
77 Id. 
78 Dan Goodin, Scientists Crack RSA SecurID 800 Tokens, Steal Cryptographic Keys, ARS TECH-
NICA (June 25, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/06/securid-crypto-attack-steals-keys. 
79 Peter Bright, RSA Finally Comes Clean: SecurID Is Compromised, ARS TECHNICA (June 6, 
2011), http://arstechnica.com/security/2011/06/rsa-finally-comes-clean-securid-is-compromised. 
80 Dan Goodin, IE Zero-Day Used in Chinese Cyber Assault on 34 Firms, REGISTER (Jan. 14, 
2010), http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/01/14/cyber_assault_followup. 
81 Kim Zetter, Maker of Smart-Grid Control Software Hacked, WIRED (Sept. 26, 2012), 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/scada-vendor-telvent-hacked. 
82 Brian Krebs, Chinese Hackers Blamed for Intrusion at Energy Industry Giant Telvent, KREBS 
ON SECURITY (Sept. 26, 2012), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/09/chinese-hackers-blamed-for-
intrusion-at-energy-industry-giant-telvent. 
83 Sean Gallagher, Chinese Hackers Steal Indian Navy Secrets with Thumbdrive Virus, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 2, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/07/chinese-hackers-steal-indian-navy-
secrets-with-thumbdrive-virus. 
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vulnerabilities, an independent researcher demonstrated code that bypassed it.84 
Of the 200,000 most popular websites that use Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)—
the encryption protocol users have been trained to look for on e-commerce 
sites—fewer than 10% had properly implemented patches to remedy known 
SSL weaknesses.85 No matter how secure a system seems, the combination 
of complexity and exposure puts it at risk. 
Inevitably, there will be more security failures.  
C. Plan for the Crash 
Prevention, while worthwhile, is imperfect. Security failures are inevitable. 
This Article draws upon the burgeoning literature that examines why 
accidents occur, even in expert organizations that stress competence, 
prevention, and learning. These studies go by different names in different 
fields—normal accident theory, high reliability theory, and error manage-
ment—but regardless of the rubric, their findings hold lessons of critical 
importance for cybersecurity. Most important, complex system design 
principles suggest that, under conditions of inevitable failure, regulation 
should seek to limit the effects of that failure, rather than prevent it.86 This 
reduces the effects of successful cybersecurity attacks by impeding the 
attacker’s ability to use information once accessed or to alter data without 
detection. Such efforts also augment prevention: hackers are less likely to 
launch attacks as their payoff from such attacks declines. 
Studies of complex systems in disparate areas—aviation,87 nuclear power,88 
medicine,89 and space exploration90—demonstrate that failures are inevitable. 
 
84 Dan Goodin, Microsoft Defense That Fetched $50,000 Prize Bypassed in Just 2 Weeks, ARS 
TECHNICA (Aug. 8, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/security/2012/08/microsoft-defense-bypassed-in-
2-weeks. 
85 Dan Goodin, 90% of Popular SSL Sites Vulnerable to Exploits, Researchers Find, ARS TECH-
NICA (Apr. 26, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/04/90-of-popular-ssl-sites-vulnerable-
to-exploits-researchers-find.  
86 See generally CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR VULNER-
ABILITIES TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST DISASTERS (2007). 
87 See generally Robert L. Helmreich, Managing Human Error in Aviation, SCI. AM., May 
1997, at 62 (“[W]ell-trained and technically proficient crews could crash airworthy craft because of 
failures of human interaction and communication . . . .”). 
88 See, e.g., CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS 15-61 (1984) (discussing the Three 
Mile Island accident and generally discussing nuclear power as a high-risk system). 
89 See, e.g., Elise C. Becher & Mark R. Chassin, Improving Quality, Minimizing Error: Making 
It Happen, HEALTH AFF., May/June 2001, at 68, 71 (“[E]ven the most highly trained and proficient 
[medical] professionals occasionally make mistakes.”). 
90 See generally DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY TECH-
NOLOGY, CULTURE AND DEVIANCE AT NASA 389 (1996) (noting that “complex structural 
causes” led to the crash of the Challenger). 
  
1026 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1011 
 
Efforts to reduce them are worthwhile; but complete prevention is impossible, 
and “[t]he best that organisations can hope for is to manage error effectively, 
decreasing the probability of errors and minimising their consequences.”91 This 
Article, unlike other cybersecurity scholarship, focuses on managing error 
effectively, rather than on eliminating it. This approach is aligned with 
approaches taken to address problems in other complex, technical systems. 
In particular, social scientists have begun to study critical infrastructure, 
where a means of managing error effectively would be a welcome innova-
tion.92 Such infrastructure, unfortunately, tends to be difficult to operate 
without error: its systems are networked, it is composed of multiple inter-
dependent entities, and it has heterogeneous technical characteristics due to 
growth over time.93 Furthermore, it faces increasingly numerous challenges, 
from hostile actors to resource limitations to the potentially devastating 
consequences of failure.94 
For example, nuclear power plants involve complicated technology that 
carries significant risk: failures such as those at Three Mile Island and 
Chernobyl are extremely rare, but potentially catastrophic. As sociologist 
Charles Perrow has documented, the problems are exacerbated by the 
combination of imperfect information, regulatory capture, and simple bad 
luck.95 Indeed, the recent disaster at Japan’s Fukushima plant demonstrated all 
three attributes.96 But at base, there is an irreducible risk of failure in complex 
systems that are tightly coupled, where failure in one area creates a cascade. To 
prevent these “normal accidents,” one must redesign the system: architecting 
the system to loosen its coupling and reduce its complexity.97 Unfortunately, 
with the Internet, network effects mean that redesign is improbable at best, 
and impossible at worst.98 There will always be accidents. 
 
91 Robert L. Helmreich, Error Management as Organisational Strategy, in PROCEEDINGS OF 
THE IATA HUMAN FACTORS SEMINAR 1, 1 (1998). 
92 “Critical infrastructure” is a vexed and nearly formless term in cybersecurity. One research 
group defines it pragmatically as “core technical capabilities, along with the organizations that 
provide them, that enable the provision of a wide variety of social activities, goods, and services.” 
EMERY ROE & PAUL R. SCHULMAN, HIGH RELIABILITY MANAGEMENT 6 (2008). 
93 Id. 
94 Todd R. LaPorte, Critical Infrastructure in the Face of a Predatory Future: Preparing for Untoward 
Surprise, 15 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 60, 61-62 (2007) (listing the myriad challenges 
that face first and second responders to catastrophic events). 
95 Charles Perrow, Fukushima and the Inevitability of Accidents, 67 BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 
44, 50-51 (2011). 
96 Id. at 45-50. 
97 Id. at 51. 
98 See Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 598-601 (discussing barriers to Internet redesign 
that arise from network effects). 
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Two competing theories dominate the study of error, particularly in critical 
infrastructure. The first, normal accident theory, builds on the work of James 
Reason,99 Barry Turner,100 and Charles Perrow.101 This theory characterizes 
technical systems along two dimensions: coupling and interactivity.102 A 
tightly coupled system is highly efficient, but has little backup capacity, 
tolerance for delay, or flexibility in the sequence in which tasks must be 
performed.103 Loosely coupled systems have greater reserves, the ability to 
reorder production activities, and slack capabilities.104 Systems with little 
interactivity—which Perrow calls “linear systems”—may have many compo-
nents, but each component has a single function, and the effects from its 
behavior on other segments are easily predicted.105 For these systems, even 
unplanned events are readily visible to operators.106 Complex systems, by 
contrast, have components with multiple uses, and these components interact 
with multiple other components.107 Such systems tend to result in unexpected 
events that are less visible and more difficult to understand.108 Tightly coupled 
and complex systems inevitably have accidents: unplanned events develop 
quickly from underlying design risks and evade remediation techniques.109 
The second complex system design theory, called “high reliability theory,” 
accepts normal accident theory’s framework, but not its conclusions.110 High 
reliability theory studies tightly coupled and complex systems, where 
certain catastrophic events cannot be allowed to occur. According to this 
theory, they do not occur—otherwise, system failure would result.111 A 
nuclear power plant cannot permit a reactor-core meltdown, and air-traffic-
control systems cannot allow plane crashes. A key goal of high reliability 
theory is to identify and elucidate the characteristics that enable such 
 
99 See generally JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR (1990). 
100 See generally BARRY A. TURNER, MAN-MADE DISASTERS (1978). 
101 See generally PERROW, supra note 88. 
102 Id. at 72. 
103 Id. at 89-94. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 72-79. 
106 Id. at 78-79. 
107 Id. at 72-79. 
108 Id. at 78-79. 
109 ROE & SCHULMAN, supra note 92, at 54. 
110 See, e.g., Todd R. La Porte, High Reliability Organizations: Unlikely, Demanding and at Risk, 4 
J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 60, 60-61 (1996) (introducing the approach taken by the 
High Reliability Organization Project). 
111 Todd R. LaPorte & Paula M. Consolini, Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical 
Challenges of “High-Reliability Organizations,” 1 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 19, 20 (1991). 
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organizations and systems to operate without error.112 These characteristics 
include the following: defined states that indicate the system is moving 
toward a catastrophic event, organizational culture that prizes watchfulness 
and error reporting, and flexible organizational relationships during crises.113 
These two theories are eternally at war. High reliability theory claims to 
solve the problem that normal accident theory believes is unsolvable. 
Normal accident theory views “high reliability organizations” as lucky in 
time: their catastrophes simply have not happened yet. Yet both theories 
suffer from internal flaws and ungrounded assumptions.114  
This Article adopts normal accident theory as its approach for four rea-
sons. First, the high-reliability-theory approach is untenable for cyber-
security. For cybersecurity purposes, “catastrophic” states lack coherent, 
precise definitions. The definitional ambiguities are linked to the fuzzy, 
apocalyptic rhetoric about cybersecurity threats.115 Not all cybersecurity flaws 
or errors are created equal, and conditions to be avoided are variegated: 
preventing an attacker from accessing the network, reading data, or shutting 
down the electrical grid are possible responses to pending attacks of very 
different magnitudes. This stratification means that organizations cannot 
develop succinct procedures to avoid a catastrophic state, or indicators that 
warn of its approach.116  
Second, few if any organizations involved in cybersecurity can adopt the 
single-minded focus on preventing crises that holds for nuclear aircraft 
carriers or for the electrical grid. High reliability organizations are charac-
terized by close regulatory oversight and significant investment in precau-
tions.117 Unfortunately, there is already massive resistance to cost and 
regulation on the cybersecurity front, and security is at best a secondary 
goal for most organizations.118  
Third, because many cybersecurity errors occur without significant adverse 
consequences, organizations can engage in iterative learning through 
 
112 See, e.g., David P. Baker, Rachel Day & Eduardo Salas, Teamwork as an Essential Compo-
nent of High-Reliability Organizations, 41 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 1576, 1585-90 (2006) (arguing 
that teamwork is one such characteristic). 
113 ROE & SCHULMAN, supra note 92, at 54-56 & fig.4.1. 
114 Id. at 57-58. Roe and Schulman also argue that both theories neglect management’s role as 
a mechanism for preventing and then buffering error. Id. 
115 See generally Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 603-20. 
116 JAMES REASON, MANAGING THE RISKS OF ORGANIZATIONAL ACCIDENTS 192-99 (1997). 
117 ROE & SCHULMAN, supra note 92, at 54. 
118 See, e.g., VIEGA, supra note 67, at 141-44 (discussing software developers’ lackluster commit-
ment to security); Chris Strohm, Napolitano Counters Industry on Cost of Cybersecurity Bill, BLOOMBERG 
(Feb. 16, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-16/napolitano-counters-industry-on-cost-of-
cybersecurity-measure.html. 
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experimentation.119 By contrast, high reliability theory forbids trial-and-
error learning because it is simply too risky that errors will arise.120  
Finally, errors—including critical ones—occur constantly in the cyber-
security arena, even in entities with a strong focus on security.121 Thus, high 
reliability theory does not accurately describe any known cybersecurity 
entities or practices. There is no role model to which to aspire. Mitigation—
not prevention—must become the guiding principle. 
Strangely, however, current cybersecurity proposals—in particular, pro-
posed legislation—concentrate almost exclusively on reducing vulnerabili-
ties rather than mitigating problems.122 Most proposed bills (none of which 
have been adopted) include information sharing between firms and the 
government about vulnerabilities, subsidizing research into more secure 
technology, and monitoring networks for traffic indicative of an attack.123 
The Cybersecurity Act of 2012, for example, focused almost entirely on 
prevention via measures such as risk assessments, information sharing, 
network monitoring, and designation of critical infrastructure.124 There 
were, at best, hints of efforts to reduce effects rather than prevent attacks. 
The bill discussed mitigation and remediation in the context of reducing 
vulnerabilities rather than limiting the effects of their exploitation.125 There 
were no provisions whatsoever treating resilience and recovery. Similarly, 
the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, which passed in the 
House of Representatives in 2012, focuses entirely on sharing information 
about threats and risks between the public and private sectors.126  
Executive action has similarly focused on prevention: the joint cyber-
security efforts between the United States and Canada, for example, 
concentrate on incident management, information sharing, and public–private 
partnerships.127 President Obama’s Executive Order on cybersecurity, issued 
 
119 VIEGA, supra note 67, at 141. 
120 Todd R. La Porte, On the Design and Management of Nearly Error-Free Organizational Con-
trol Systems (recognizing the need for “trials without error” in fields involving nuclear materials), in 
ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND: THE HUMAN DIMENSIONS 185, 187 (David L. Sills, C.P. 
Wolf & Vivien B. Shelanski eds., 1982). 
121 VIEGA, supra note 67, at 141-44. 
122 Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 607-12. 
123 Id. at 606-12. 
124 Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012). Neither this version, introduced in July 
2012, nor its predecessor, introduced in February of the same year, S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012), were 
enacted by Congress. S. 3414 (112th): CSA2012, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 
112/s3414 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
125 S. 3414 § 103(b)(2)(A). 
126 Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012). 
127 US, Canada Launch Joint Cybersecurity Plan, SECURITYWEEK (Oct. 27, 2012), http:// 
www.securityweek.com/us-canada-launch-joint-cybersecurity-plan. 
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after Congress failed to pass legislation addressing the issue, contemplates 
improving cybersecurity resilience generally.128 However, it also concentrates 
entirely on vulnerability reduction, via information sharing and a voluntary 
best-practices framework.129  
Finally, cybersecurity scholarship concentrates on prevention. Nathan 
Sales, for example, notes the importance of increasing resiliency, but focuses 
primarily on ways to harden systems against attacks.130 Similarly, Deirdre 
Mulligan and Fred Schneider propose a public cybersecurity doctrine that 
considers recovery from attacks, but they concentrate on adopting a public-
health model to reduce initial failures.131 Jennifer Granick promotes infor-
mation sharing as the key element to block attacks.132 Seeking to reduce 
security vulnerabilities is sensible. However, failure to address mitigation 
precludes success, as attackers will continue to access and alter data. Thus, 
cybersecurity must concentrate on reducing the harm that occurs when they 
do so. This Article next explores why, for reducing and mitigating harms, 
regulation through legal mandates is necessary. 
II. THE EASY CASE FOR CYBERSECURITY REGULATION 
Cybersecurity is a puzzle. It has been recognized by presidential admin-
istrations of both parties as a national policy priority for fifteen years, yet 
there has been little progress.133 The confluence of externalities and market 
failure make cybersecurity the classic case for public law regulation, but 
there has been little regulatory action. Why? 
Cybersecurity suffers from a perfect storm of five interrelated challenges 
that impede regulation. First, cybersecurity regulation must confront the 
regulatory challenge of externalities.134 Insecure information technology 
(IT) users and providers do not suffer the full costs of the harms they gener-
ate.135 Conversely, secure users and providers do not internalize all the 
 
128 Exec. Order 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 12, 2013) (responding to the demonstrated 
“need for cybersecurity”). 
129 Id. §§ 4, 7. 
130 See generally Sales, supra note 35, at 1544-67.  
131 See generally Mulligan & Schneider, supra note 35, at 80-88. 
132 Jennifer Granick, How to Build Effective Cyber Defenses, CNN (Aug. 13, 2012), http:// 
globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/13/how-to-build-effective-cyber-defenses. 
133  Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 591-92 (characterizing recent government efforts 
to define cybersecurity as “overbroad” and “expansive”). 
134 See generally Hal Varian, System Reliability and Free Riding, in ECONOMICS OF INFOR-
MATION SECURITY, supra note 41, at 1. 
135 See Sales, supra note 35, at 1518-19 (suggesting that governments should subsidize firms 
that invest in cyberdefenses). 
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benefits they create. Insecurity is overproduced; security is underproduced.136 
Second, information asymmetries undercut market forces that would 
otherwise push vendors to offer more secure products. Consumers have 
difficulty detecting whether firms have made improvements to cyber 
defenses, leading to reluctance to pay a security premium.137 Third, cyber-
security exemplifies the difficulties of public choice theory: burdened 
parties have a concentrated interest in diluting or blocking regulation, while 
benefited ones have an amorphous interest that leads to their political 
disengagement.138 Fourth, cybersecurity suffers from a collective-action 
problem. Benefited parties cannot coordinate effectively to compensate 
burdened ones, even though doing so would increase social welfare.139 
Finally, regulators have demonstrated an ingrained reluctance to impose 
mandates on the technology sector140 except where such mandates allow law 
enforcement authorities access to communications platforms.141 This 
attitude derives from concerns about information asymmetry between 
regulators and regulated entities,142 the risk of regulation quickly becoming 
obsolete, and the cost burdens of poorly tailored mandates.143  
This Part performs four tasks. First, it highlights the immense scope of 
the cybersecurity problem by demonstrating that many security challenges 
 
136 See L. Jean Camp & Catherine Wolfram, Pricing Security: A Market in Vulnerabilities, in 
ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 41, at 17, 17-22. 
137 See Carl E. Landwehr, Improving Information Flow in the Information Security Market: DOD 
Experience and Future Directions, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 41, at 
155, 162-63. 
138 See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 43-52 (1965). 
139 See Guy Halfteck, Legislative Threats, 61 STAN. L. REV. 629, 700 (2008) (advocating organi-
zations’ role in eliminating this collective-action problem by “ensuring group-wide compliance”). 
140 See, e.g., Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 607-09 (describing the Obama Adminis-
tration’s position that regulatory mandates related to cybersecurity are a “last resort”); Jeffrey A. 
Eisenach, Spectrum Reallocation and the National Broadband Plan, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 87, 90-94 
(2011) (noting benefits of flexibility and market forces in telecommunications policy); Ira S. 
Rubinstein, Privacy and Regulatory Innovation: Moving Beyond Voluntary Codes, 6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y 
FOR INFO. SOC’Y 355, 360-65 (2010) (discussing the FTC’s evolving stance on regulatory efforts 
aimed at protecting privacy over the Internet).  
141 See Declan McCullagh, FBI: We Need Wiretap-Ready Web Sites—Now, CNET (May 4, 2012), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57428067-83/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites-now (discussing 
FBI efforts to obtain even greater leeway to monitor websites and Internet service providers). 
142 See REASON, supra note 116, at 171-75; Alan Devlin, Michael Jacobs & Bruno Peixoto, 
Success, Dominance, and Interoperability, 84 IND. L.J. 1157, 1194-95 (2009) (noting problems created 
by information asymmetries between regulators and market participants when regulators attempt 
to impose “reasonable” prices). See generally Jeffrey T. Macher, John W. Mayo & Jack A. Nicker-
son, Regulator Heterogeneity and Endogenous Efforts to Close the Information Asymmetry Gap, 54 J.L. & 
ECON. 25 (2011). 
143 See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, 5 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & 
COM. L. 49 (2011). 
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remain unsolved. Second, it builds the case for regulation of cybersecurity 
via public law. Third, it delves into the failure of existing models of regula-
tion, such as voluntary certification, self-regulation, information sharing, 
designation of critical infrastructure, and education. Finally, it argues that 
law must step into the breach. 
A. A Series of Porous Tubes 
Cybersecurity is a significant, unsolved problem for lawyers and com-
puter scientists alike. In 2011 and 2012 alone, the Dutch certificate authority, 
DigiNotar, and the American certificate authority, Comodo, were hacked, 
and the attackers were able to create fake cryptographic certificates for 
domains such as google.com and skype.com.144 The false credentials were 
likely used to spy on Iranian political dissidents.145 In 2011, Sony’s 
PlayStation Network was hacked, exposing the personal information of 77 
million users.146 While Sony reported that users’ credit card data was encrypt-
ed, their passwords were not, placing customers who reused passwords on 
other sites at risk.147 The Flame malware targeting Iranian computers and 
networks employed a previously unknown cryptographic attack to generate 
false digital certificates that let it masquerade as a security update from 
Microsoft.148 Google’s Chrome browser, which attempts to operate within a 
secure “sandbox,” limiting its interaction with a user’s computer, was 
successfully hacked three times by coders who employed zero-day vulnera-
bilities against the software.149 A server configuration error allowed an 
attacker from Eastern Europe to gain access to personal information for 
 
144 Jeremy A. Kaplan, Could DigiNotar Hack Lead to a Cyberattack on You?, FOX NEWS (Sept. 
6, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2011/09/06/hacked-turkish-business-diginotar-could-spell-
disaster-for; Steve Schultze, DigiNotar Hack Highlights the Critical Failures of Our SSL Web Security 
Model, FREEDOM TO TINKER (Sept. 6, 2011), https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/sjs/diginotar-hack-
highlights-critical-failures-our-ssl-web-security-model; Report of Incident on 15-MAR-2011, COMODO 
http://www.comodo.com/Comodo-Fraud-Incident-2011-03-23.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
145 See sources cited supra note 144. 
146 Shane Richmond & Christopher Williams, Millions of Internet Users Hit by Massive Sony 
PlayStation Data Theft, TELEGRAPH (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/ 
8475728/Millions-of-internet-users-hit-by-massive-Sony-PlayStation-data-theft.html; Sony Faces Legal 
Action over Attack on PlayStation Network, BBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 2011), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
technology-13192359. 
147 Ned Potter, Sony PlayStation Network Hacked Again, Closes 93,000 Accounts, ABC NEWS 
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/technology/2011/10/sony-playstation-network-hacked-
again-closes-93000-accounts. 
148 See Mathew J. Schwartz, Flame Malware Tapped World Class Crypto, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(June 8, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/management/240001763. 
149 Dan Goodin, At Hacking Contest, Google Chrome Falls to Third Zero-Day Attack, ARS TECH-
NICA (Mar. 9, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/business/2012/03/googles-chrome-browser-on-friday. 
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780,000 Utah residents, at least 280,000 of whom had their Social Security 
numbers stolen.150 The hacking collective Anonymous broke into local law 
enforcement systems and posted sensitive information (e.g., Social Security 
numbers and bank account numbers) to the Internet.151 Payment processor 
Global Payments suffered a data breach that exposed 1.5 million credit card 
numbers and account details.152 A New York State utility suffered unauthor-
ized access to the records of up to 1.8 million customers, including payment 
data and Social Security numbers.153  
These examples of recent attacks are merely representative; cybersecurity 
problems are legion. Networked computer systems are massively insecure. 
This insecurity is neither negligence nor accident; it is a systemic problem 
of information technology. Why has cybersecurity remained so lax, and why 
have efforts to pass legislation to address its challenges consistently failed? 
B. Root Causes 
Cybersecurity presents four characteristics that challenge regulation: 
externalities, information asymmetries, public choice problems, and techno-
logical timidity. 
1. Externalities 
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities persist not merely because networked 
computing is complex, but because cybersecurity is a classic example of how 
externalities challenge regulation.154 Google, Microsoft, and even end users 
fail to internalize the insecurity costs they create, thereby generating a 
negative externality.155 Even industries such as the retail-payments sector, 
 
150 See Nicole Lewis, Utah’s Medicaid Data Breach Worse than Expected, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(Apr. 11, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/news/healthcare/security-privacy/232900128. 
151 See Damon Poeter, Anonymous Hack of Texas Police Contains Huge Amount of Private Data, 
PCMAG (Sept. 6, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2392522,00.asp; Ujala Sehgal, 
Anonymous Retaliates Against Arrests with Massive Police Hack, ATLANTIC WIRE (Aug. 6, 2011), 
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/technology/2011/08/anonymous-retaliates-against-arrests-massive-
police-hack/40924. 
152 Global Payments Says Data Breach Is “Contained,” REUTERS (June 12, 2012), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/us-globalpayments-breach-idUSBRE85B1IC20120612. 
153 Mike Lennon, New York State Electric & Gas and Rochester Gas and Electric Suffer Data 
Breach, SECURITY WEEK (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.securityweek.com/new-york-state-electric-
gas-and-rochester-gas-and-electric-suffer-data-breach. 
154 See Ross Anderson & Tyler Moore, The Economics of Information Security, 314 SCIENCE 
610, 610 (2006) (noting that most Internet users “do not bear the full consequences” of joining the 
network); Sales, supra note 35, at 1519-21 (conceding that most companies do not consider the cost 
of externalities). 
155 See Sales, supra note 35, at 1519-21. 
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where firms face significant financial and legal risk for cybersecurity failures, 
are characterized by pervasive externalities.156 Consider two examples: the 
vendor and the user. The vendor produces software employed by users. If 
there is a security flaw in that software, and if the flaw is exploited, the user 
is likely to suffer harm in the form of compromised data or improper 
software functioning.157 A Windows vulnerability could permit an attacker 
to view financial data stored on a user’s computer or enlist that computer in 
a botnet158 that sends spam to others. Microsoft—the vendor—is virtually 
immune from liability for these failures, even if the flaw existed due to the 
company’s negligence.159 End-user license agreements typically disclaim all 
liability on the vendor’s part, and tort law has failed to impose a duty of care 
on software manufacturers.160 Indeed, software is unusual in this regard.161 
Thus, Microsoft causes harm for which it does not bear the cost; conse-
quently, the company does not factor those harms into its investment 
decisions regarding security precautions.162 
Similarly, a user may fail to take adequate security precautions (such as 
by continuing to use an out-of-date web browser or neglecting to install 
patches for her computer’s operating system).163 These failures create risks 
to others: her computer may become part of a botnet that sends spam or 
launches denial-of-service attacks, or a virus may send copies of itself to 
everyone in her email program’s address book.164 Those affected have little 
redress: their relationships with the users may not have contractual bases for 
allocating risk; it may be difficult to quantify their harms for recovery in 
tort; tort doctrine may not impose a duty to third parties; or, it may be 
 
156 See Mark MacCarthy, Information Security Policy in the U.S. Retail Payments Industry, 2011 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 22-24 (describing various costs associated with security breaches). 
157 See Camp & Wolfram, supra note 136, at 18-22; Sales, supra note 35, at 1519-21. 
158 A botnet is a set of computers that have been infected with malware and that are con-
trolled by someone other than their users. Botnets are often used for crimes such as spamming and 
denial of service attacks. Mindi McDowell, Security Tip (ST06-001): Understanding Hidden Threats: 
Rootkits and Botnets, US-CERT, http://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST06-001 (last revised Feb. 6, 2013). 
159 See Michael D. Scott, Tort Liability for Vendors of Insecure Software: Has the Time Finally 
Come?, 67 MD. L. REV. 425, 426-27 (2008). 
160 Id. at 450-57. 
161 Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: Product Liability and Other Issues, 
5 PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 88-89 (advocating liability for vendors of flawed software). 
162 Scott, supra note 159, at 484. 
163 See, e.g., Cybersecurity Must Focus on Users, Not Just Attackers, TECHJOURNAL (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.techjournal.org/2011/11/cyber-security-must-focus-on-users-not-just-attackers (suggesting 
that educating users about risks and defense strategies could aid prevention of future attacks). 
164 See Richard Clayton, Might Governments Clean-up Malware?, 81 COMM. & STRATEGIES 87, 
89-90 (2011). 
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difficult to identify the insecurity’s source.165 Like the vendor, the user will 
underinvest in security, because she does not bear the full costs of insecurity. 
Conversely, those who are secure fail to internalize the benefits of oper-
ating safely. Secure users and vendors create positive externalities for which 
they cannot charge beneficiaries.166 This is similar to the “herd immunity” 
effect observed in populations vaccinated for diseases: an immunized person 
benefits personally by not contracting the malady and benefits others by not 
acting as a vector for their infection.167 Positive externalities may lead to 
underinvestment in the relevant behavior. One can view cybersecurity as a 
public good: secure firms create a boon that benefits all other connected 
users (making it nonrivalrous), since those users do not suffer attacks 
launched from those companies’ computers, and it is practically impossible to 
confine those benefits only to paying customers (making it nonexcludable).168 
Security precautions are costly, and positive externalities diminish the 
benefit to offset these costs. Thus, both positive and negative externalities 
cause cybersecurity to be underproduced.  
2. Information Asymmetries 
Information asymmetries also impede achievement of greater cyber-
security. Users have difficulty evaluating the veracity of companies’ claims 
regarding security in their products.169 Partly, this is because firms do not 
know the full extent of their software’s vulnerabilities, as demonstrated by the 
growing wave of zero-day attacks.170 Also, firms have pecuniary incentives to 
send inaccurate signals to consumers regarding security.171 Claims about 
 
165 Camp & Wolfram, supra note 136, at 18-22. 
166 Id. at 19. 
167 Neal Katyal, Community Self-Help, 1 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 33, 64 (2005); Sales, supra note 
35, at 1540-41. 
168 See generally Michel van Eeten & Johannes M. Bauer, Emerging Threats to Internet Security: 
Incentives, Externalities and Policy Implications, 17 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 221, 230 
(2009). For background on nonrivalrous and nonexcludable goods, see Public Goods, U. PITTS-
BURGH, http://www2.pitt.edu/~upjecon/MCG/MICRO/GOVT/Pubgood.html (last visited Mar. 
22, 2014). 
169 See Anderson & Moore, supra note 154, at 610 (“Insecure software dominates the market 
for the simple reason that most users cannot distinguish it from secure software; thus, developers 
are not compensated for costly efforts to strengthen their code.”). 
170 See generally Kim Zetter, Sleuths Trace New Zero-Day Attacks to Hackers Who Hit Google, 
WIRED (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/google-hacker-gang-returns 
(discussing “the Elderwood Gang” of hackers and the “remarkable . . . number of zero-day 
vulnerabilities they have burned through in the last three years”). 
171 Landwehr, supra note 137, at 162-63. 
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software security are difficult to verify or disprove.172 Rational vendors will 
accordingly skimp on security investments, at least at the margins, since 
they will likely not be able to recover those costs via higher prices that 
correlate with higher quality.173 Thus, consumers face a problematic infor-
mation asymmetry when deciding on software purchases. 
A common response to this information gap is to rely on trusted third 
parties as certifiers.174 Unfortunately, certifiers are vulnerable to capture. 
Harvard Business School professor Ben Edelman showed that websites 
certified by TRUSTe were twice as likely to be insecure as uncertified 
sites.175 TRUSTe’s inspections were not rigorous, leading to adverse selec-
tion: less secure sites were more likely to seek certification, generating a 
false signal to consumers.176 Since TRUSTe’s revenues derived from sites 
applying for certification, the company had an incentive to grade security 
generously. This risk applies to software as well: firms could even set up 
sockpuppet certifiers that they control—a result similar to “greenwashing” 
and environmental certification.177 Security thus embodies a market failure 
driven by two information problems: the difficulty of ascertaining an 
accurate reading of software’s security, and incentives to fill this gap with 
false signals.178 
 
172 See Ragnar Schierholz & Kevin McGrath, Security Certification—A Critical Review 3 (paper 
presented at the 2010 Indus. Control Sys. Joint Working Grp. Fall Conference), available at 
ftp://ftp.sei.cmu.edu/pub/pruggiero/ics-cert/1/Security_Certification-A_critical_review_2010-10-06-
ICSJWG_Remediated.pdf (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (“Security properties of a software product are 
a quality dimension which is difficult to assess . . . prior to purchase, at least not at justifiable cost.”). 
173 See, e.g., Douglas A. Barnes, Note, Deworming the Internet, 83 TEX. L. REV. 279, 292-93 
(2004) (discussing the “lemons equilibrium,” where “sellers can produce low-quality goods that 
buyers cannot distinguish from high-quality goods”). 
174 See generally Lesley K. McAllister, Regulation by Third-Party Verification, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1, 
47-52 (2012) (discussing third-party verification schemes including accreditation rules, verification 
performance rules, and reporting and disclosure rules). 
175 See Benjamin Edelman, Adverse Selection in Online “Trust” Certifications, ELECTRONIC COM. 
RES. & APPLICATIONS, Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 17, 20 (“Only 94.6% of TRUSTe-certified sites are actually 
trustworthy[,] . . . whereas 97.5% of non-TRUSTe sites are trustworthy.”).  
176 See id. at 20 (indicating that TRUSTe’s results confirm the adverse selection posited, 
where a trust authority produces a favorable initial reputation, but later “untrustworthy firms can 
profit from certification”). 
177 See generally Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 440 (2009) (“Green-
washing . . . occurs when companies recognize that reputation in an area such as environmental 
practices motivates economic decisions by consumers.”); Miriam A. Cherry & Judd F. Sneirson, 
Beyond Profit: Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility and Greenwashing After the BP Oil Disaster, 85 
TUL. L. REV. 983, 999-1009 (2011) (discussing BP’s efforts to “green its image”). 
178 See generally Schierholz & McGrath, supra note 172 (listing various “[s]hortcomings of 
[e]xisting [s]ecurity [c]ertifications,” including “[c]ertification criteria,” “[a]dverse selection,” and 
“[m]oral [h]azard”). 
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3. Public Choice Problems 
Cybersecurity also presents a classic public choice problem.179 Firms 
facing potential burdens of regulation have a concentrated pecuniary interest 
in avoiding such regulation.180 These companies possess the resources to 
lobby legislators and regulators: they are politically sophisticated and are 
repeat players in the regulatory game.181 By contrast, while consumers 
benefit from increased cybersecurity in regulated firms, they have diffuse, 
uncertain interests that impede advocating for change.182 The benefits to 
each individual vary. Some people, such as those who avoid identity theft as 
a result of enhanced security, would receive significant utility from the 
change, while others would receive little or none. It is difficult, if not 
impossible, for individuals to know ex ante how much benefit they would 
derive from greater cybersecurity.183 This makes them less likely to press for 
regulation that could benefit them: lobbying or political action would impose 
real, predictable costs for an ephemeral future benefit. This imbalance pushes 
them toward inaction. 
Organizations that would have to expend resources to comply with cyber-
security regulation have a significant, immediate incentive to resist it, and 
they possess the knowledge and finances to do so. They are counterbalanced 
weakly, if at all, by those who would benefit. The pattern of American 
(in)action on cybersecurity legislation fits this model perfectly. Even bills 
that have been proposed in Congress have been minimalist in their mandates, 
focusing on information sharing, allocation of responsibility among federal 
agencies, and voluntary measures or self-regulation.184 Indeed, the only bill 
with any substantive regulatory provisions—the Cybersecurity Act of 2012—
failed due to opposition to its requirement that operators of critical infrastruc-
ture implement government-generated security standards.185 The revised 
 
179 See generally OLSON, supra note 138, at 43-52 (explaining how different-sized groups relate 
differently to collective goods). 
180 See generally James J. Park, Rules, Principles, and the Competition to Enforce the Securities 
Laws, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 115, 127 (2012) (“When private interests capture public enforcers the 
result might be underenforcement.”). 
181 See generally Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 
TEX. L. REV. 873, 883-90 (1987) (describing interest groups’ behavior in the political process). 
182 See id. at 892 (“The ‘free rider’ problem suggests that it should be nearly impossible to 
organize large groups of individuals to seek broadly dispersed public goods.”). 
183 See generally supra subsection II.B.2. 
184 See Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 607-09 (noting that “proposals to use law to 
improve cybersecurity have been strikingly minimalist”). 
185 Ellen Nakashima, Senate Ready to Take Up Cybersecurity Bill that Critics Say Is Too Weak, 
WASH. POST, July 25, 2012, at A2 (noting how “business interests, which have powerful influence 
in the Senate,” opposed the Act). 
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version, introduced in the summer of 2012, made those standards optional but 
still faced industry opposition.186 The public choice dynamic of cybersecurity 
makes regulation less likely and, if it does occur, less comprehensive. 
4. Technological Timidity 
Regulators have been reluctant to engage in substantive IT regulation.187 
Legislative mandates for IT can be grouped roughly into two camps: 
generalized goals and process requirements. First, legislation specifies a 
general goal and leaves implementation details to the regulated entity. For 
example, the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act of 1994 
(CALEA) requires that telecommunications service providers and equip-
ment manufacturers provide a means for law enforcement to monitor 
information that travels across their networks or equipment.188 This is a 
narrow, specific, and manageable goal: telecommunications providers and 
vendors must give law enforcement a single point for wiretapping.  
Second, the legal rules set a process-based requirement: the regulated 
entity must engage in analysis, detail its method for addressing the problem, 
and undergo periodic assessment of its implementation of a solution.189 One 
example is the requirements for publicly traded companies of section 404 of 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.190 Firms must document their internal 
controls for financial reporting, including those reliant on information 
technology, and then demonstrate to their auditors’ satisfaction that they 
have implemented those controls.191 Auditors must document the controls 
and make that documentation publicly available.192 Further, corporate 
officers must attest to the accuracy of the auditors’ documentation or face 
 
186 See generally Megan Geuss, Senate Introduces Revised Version of Cybersecurity Act of 2012, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 19, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/senate-introduces-revised-
version-of-the-cybersecurity-act-of-2012 (describing the July 2012 revisions to the Act); Nicole 
Henderson, Noise Filter: Revised US Cybersecurity Act Still Has Problems, WHIR (July 24, 2012), http:// 
www.thewhir.com/web-hosting-news/noise-filter-revised-us-cybersecurity-act-still-has-problems (noting 
opposition to the Cybersecurity Act from Computing.co.uk and the Electronic Frontier Foundation). 
187 See, e.g., Rob Frieden, Without Public Peer: The Potential Regulatory and Universal Service 
Consequences of Internet Balkanization, 3 VA. J.L. & TECH. 8, paras. 30-48 (1998) (discussing the 
government’s limited responses to problems of Internet access). 
188 47 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2006). 
189 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2012) (requiring annual reports and assessments from public 
accounting firms); 44 U.S.C. § 3543 (2006) (detailing functions that the Director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency must assume in monitoring others’ information-security measures). 
190 See 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (requiring, inter alia, an annual “internal control report”). 
191 Id. 
192 Id. § 7262(b). 
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criminal penalties.193 The Sarbanes–Oxley Act sets no substantive guide-
lines for the sufficiency of internal controls. Rather, it defers to the private 
information of traded companies and their auditors to ensure that appropri-
ately tailored safeguards are in place. 
Similarly, the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999 (commonly 
known as the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA)) and its implementing 
regulations, which apply to financial institutions, mandate that regulated 
firms adopt measures to protect customers’ personal information.194 Rather 
than specify what measures suffice, the GLBA requires that firms assess the 
risks they face, design a set of countermeasures, implement it, test it, and 
adjust the countermeasures as circumstances change.195 While regulators 
such as the Federal Trade Commission provide suggestions and guidance on 
best practices, GLBA requirements focus on a process that tailors safe-
guards to each firm, rather than specifying top-down mechanisms.196 The 
GLBA is widely considered the success story of federal cybersecurity 
regulation, but it too is deferential to individualized judgments by each 
firm.197 The GLBA, like section 404 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, places its 
faith in process-driven solutions, and expresses skepticism toward regula-
tors’ ability to specify what measures firms should take to accomplish 
legislative goals.  
Both approaches evince regulatory wariness regarding specific security 
commands. This technological timidity has at least three roots. First, 
scholars note the asymmetry in information between the regulators and the 
regulated.198 This can make regulation inefficient, and perhaps ineffective: it 
fails to adjust for the individual circumstances, risks, and requirements of 
 
193 Id. § 7241(a); see also Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission Proposes 
Amendments Regarding CEO, CFO Certification Under Sarbanes–Oxley (Mar. 21, 2003), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-39.htm. 
194 See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2012) (outlining provisions of the Act); 15 U.S.C. § 6805 
(listing the various financial institutions governed by the Act); 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–314.5 (2013) 
(setting forth implementing regulations for the Act). 
195 See 16 C.F.R. § 314.3 (“You shall develop, implement, and maintain a comprehensive 
information security program.”). 
196 See Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards Rule, BUREAU 
OF CONSUMER PROTECTION BUSINESS CENTER (Apr. 2006), http://business.ftc.gov/documents/ 
bus54-financial-institutions-and-customer-information-complying-safeguards-rule (outlining require-
ments for compliance with the Act). 
197 See generally Sales, supra note 35, at 1538-39 (“[F]inancial institutions will tend to priori-
tize defense against the one form of intrusion singled out by their regulators . . . .”). 
198 See, e.g., Paul Rosenzweig, Making Good Cybersecurity Law and Policy: How Can We Get 
Tasty Sausage?, 8 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 388, 400 (2012) (discussing the potential for 
individuals to compete with established institutions); Howard A. Shelanski, Justice Breyer, Professor 
Kahn, and Antitrust Enforcement in Regulated Industries, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 487, 490-91 (2012) 
(“[T]he information necessary . . . is in the hands of the very companies being regulated.”). 
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targeted firms.199 Thus, firms may waste resources complying with mandates 
when they could achieve the same ends at a lower cost if not limited by 
government regulation. Second, on a less generous accounting of firms’ 
motives, regulated entities may engage in strategic behavior, revealing 
information to regulators only when it benefits them and concealing it 
otherwise.200 Telecommunications regulation is replete with cautionary tales 
of this sort, such as the dialectic between the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) and carriers who were required to provide access to 
parts of their networks to competitors at cost, but where that cost infor-
mation was under the control of the carriers.201 Unsurprisingly, carriers 
manipulated the information to increase apparent cost.202 Finally, there are 
regulatory costs. Requirements need to be updated, and regulators must 
expend efforts to accumulate information and adjust mandates.203 This set of 
worries explains the strong preference for standards rather than rules in 
regulating technology.204 Regulators fear the pace of technological change 
and face protests from regulated entities that specific mandates will be rapidly 
outdated, costly, and inefficient. This pushes them either to specify goals but be 
agnostic about means, or to enshrine process over ends—neither of which is 
effective for cybersecurity. 
In short, for all of these reasons, the structural dynamic of cybersecurity 
is tilted heavily against regulation. 
C. Failed Patches 
Alternatives to regulatory mandates have failed to improve cybersecurity.205 
Thus far, moves to improve cybersecurity have relied principally on using 
code to fight code, educating the public about cybersecurity precautions, 
sharing information about threats and weaknesses, and creating market 
 
199 Shelanski, supra note 198, at 491 (“[R]egulation is . . . usually slow to adapt to new market 
conditions.”). 
200 See John D. Graham, Saving Lives Through Administrative Law and Economics, 157 U. PA. L. 
REV. 395, 510-11 (2008) (“There are well-documented cases where . . . overstatement has occurred.”). 
201 Howard A. Shelanski, The Case for Rebalancing Antitrust and Regulation, 109 MICH. L. 
REV. 683, 722-25 (2011) (discussing the FCC’s experience with access regulation). 
202 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 486 (2002) (discussing how an infor-
mation advantage allowed utilities to “manipulate the rate base and renegotiate the rate of return 
every time a rate was set”). 
203 See Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, supra note 143, at 52-53 (discussing the admin-
istrative costs of rule-based regulation). 
204 Id. 
205 Cf. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 675-76 (1998) (arguing 
that “a series of methodological gaps . . . must be filled” to understand regulatory interventions 
and “order the architecture of cyberspace”). 
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incentives for security. Few of these methods have had any effect. And the 
ones that have worked have not worked well. 
1. Fighting Code with Code 
Since vulnerabilities in software code are the heart of the cybersecurity 
problem, current efforts concentrate heavily on improving code in four 
primary ways: to improve the security of software and hardware with secure 
development efforts,206 to block attacks with firewalls and antivirus sys-
tems,207 to spot attacks with intrusion detection systems,208 and to recover 
from such attacks with backup and recovery software.209 While each has 
helped, none has succeeded completely. Moreover, even when code-based 
solutions exist, they require deployment to function.210 This problem recalls 
the issues with cybersecurity externalities discussed above: users and firms 
have inadequate incentives to implement patches and other security measures. 
Reconfiguring those externalities requires measures outside of code.  
One controversial code-based proposal would aid private-sector efforts 
by having the government monitor for attacks.211 This plan faces an under-
appreciated conflict of interest. The National Security Agency (NSA) has 
developed an intrusion detection system named “Einstein” to monitor 
government networks for intrusion.212 The first two Einstein versions 
concentrated on disseminating security information and detecting malicious 
code such as viruses.213 Version 3 is broader in two dimensions. First, it 
offers active capabilities—Einstein 3 can interdict malicious activity, not just 
 
206 See, e.g., BASTILLE LINUX, http://www.bastille-linux.org (last visited Mar. 22, 2014); Microsoft 
Security Dev. Lifecycle, MICROSOFT, http://www.microsoft.com/security/sdl/default.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014). 
207 See, e.g., VIEGA, supra note 67, at 55-63; Tony Northrup, Firewalls, MICROSOFT TECH-
NET, http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc700820.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
208 See, e.g., Damiano Bolzoni & Sandro Etalle, Approaches in Anomaly-Based Network Intru-
sion Detection Systems, in INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 1 (Roberto Di Pietro & Luigi V. 
Mancini eds., 2008). 
209 See generally W. CURTIS PRESTON, BACKUP & RECOVERY (2007). 
210 VIEGA, supra note 67, at 221-22. 
211 See Mark D. Young, United States Government Cybersecurity Relationships, 8 I/S: J.L. & 
POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 277, 310-12 (2012) (describing the public–private partnership between the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the NSA). 
212 Marc Ambinder, Cyber Security: Einstein and the Privacy Debate, ATLANTIC (Sept. 21, 2009), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2009/09/cyber-security-einstein-and-the-privacy-debate/ 
26906. 
213 Ben Bain, DHS Releases New Details on Einstein 3 Intrusion Prevention Pilot, FCW (Mar. 19, 
2010), http://fcw.com/articles/2010/03/19/einstein-3-test-intrusion-prevention-system.aspx. 
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monitor it.214 Second, the government has suggested deploying Einstein 3 
to private network operators, such as AT&T, to monitor government traffic 
on their systems.215  
This proposal has raised concerns about privacy and civil liberties.216 
Even casting those concerns aside, however, allowing the NSA to monitor 
civilian networks will likely offer fewer cybersecurity benefits than expected. 
To understand why, recall the story of the attack on Coventry, England. On 
the night of November 14, 1940, the German Air Force raided this British 
industrial city.217 Over 400 bombers dropped 500 tons of bombs on the city, 
destroying much of it and killing 568 people.218 Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill may have known about the attack ahead of time.219 The cryptog-
raphers at Bletchley Park had broken the German cipher implemented via 
the famous Enigma machines.220 A British intelligence officer claims to have 
delivered information that Coventry would be the target of the raid to 
Churchill several hours before the attack.221 Churchill, on this theory, made 
an agonizing choice: he sacrificed Coventry’s citizens to protect Britain’s 
codebreaking ability. If he had evacuated Coventry, or augmented its air 
defenses, the Germans might have suspected that their communications 
were compromised.222  
 
214 DHS to Begin Deployment of Einstein 3 System This Year, INFOSECURITY (Jan. 28, 2011), 
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/15536/dhs-to-begin-deployment-of-einstein-3-system-
this-year. 
215 Kim Zetter, NSA Shields Government Networks with More AT&T Secret Rooms, WIRED (July 
6, 2009), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/07/einstein. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF HOME-
LAND SECURITY, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE INITIATIVE THREE EXERCISE (2010), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_nppd_initiative3.pdf (discussing 
an exercise to demonstrate the Einstein technology suite). 
216 See generally Steven M. Bellovin et al., Can It Really Work? Problems with Extending EIN-
STEIN 3 to Critical Infrastructure, 3 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1 (2011) (discussing the various 
technical and policy concerns with extending Einstein 3). 
217 15 November, 1940: Germans Bomb Coventry to Destruction, BBC: ON THIS DAY, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/november/15/newsid_3522000/3522785.stm. 
218 See generally F.W. WINTERBOTHAM, THE ULTRA SECRET 60 (1974); Tony Rennell, Did 
Churchill Annihilate Coventry to Protect an Even Bigger Prize?, DAILY MAIL, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/ 
home/article-1004223/Did-Churchill-annihilate-Coventry-protect-bigger-prize.html (last updated 
Apr. 1, 2008). 
219 Ian Shoesmith & Jon Kelly, The Coventry Blitz ‘Conspiracy,’ BBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11486219. See generally Anthony D’Amato, Legal and Moral Dimensions 
of Churchill’s Failure to Warn, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 561 (1998) (arguing against Churchill’s decision 
not to provide Coventry early warning of the attack). 
220 See SIMON SINGH, THE CODE BOOK 160-89 (1999). 
221 Shoesmith & Kelly, supra note 219. 
222 See SINGH, supra note 220, at 184-85 (discussing the precautions taken by the Allies before 
putting decoded intelligence to use). 
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Other historians dispute this allegation and argue that Churchill knew of 
the raid, but not its target.223 Regardless whether it accurately describes the 
night of November 14, the Coventry story illustrates the difficulties with 
NSA monitoring of civilian networks. If the NSA detects traffic that demon-
strates a zero-day attack, it faces a quandary. Should the NSA help the target 
deflect the attack, the attacker will know that the defenders, too, know of that 
vulnerability.224 They will suspect—probably correctly—that the United 
States has tools to exploit the vulnerability. Thus, the NSA must choose 
between offense and defense—between the two halves of its organization.225 
If they help ward off the attack, they may sacrifice a cyberweapon in their 
arsenal. But if they choose to preserve their own exploit code, the government 
must allow the malicious traffic to pass—even revealing that it is an attack could 
compromise their secret. It is likely that the NSA will, at times, choose offense. 
This tension between protecting computing resources and maintaining the 
capacity to exploit others’ vulnerabilities is inescapable and likely explains the 
muted calls from the NSA and other Department of Defense (DOD) branches 
for greater cybersecurity precautions.226 
While code-based efforts are useful, they have plainly proven insuffi-
cient. The effort to improve cybersecurity using code itself is an arms race, 
and one in which the attackers have significant advantages. 
2. Educating the Targets 
Education and norm-based efforts have been deployed to build a culture 
of cybersecurity. These have come principally in two forms. The first 
focuses on educating users about proper computing hygiene, with particular 
attention to online safety.227 The second concentrates on encouraging key 
entities such as Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and software vendors to 
 
223 Shoesmith & Kelly, supra note 219. 
224 Cf. SINGH, supra note 220, at 184. 
225 See Mission, NAT’L SECURITY AGENCY / CENT. SECURITY SERVICE, http://www.nsa.gov/ 
about/mission/index.shtml (last modified Apr. 15, 2011). 
226 See Noah Shachtman, Security Watch: Beware the NSA’s Geek-Spy Complex, WIRED (Mar. 
22, 2010), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/03/st_essay_nsa (calling for the NSA to be 
bifurcated between the “locked-down spy division and [the] relatively open geek division”). 
227 See, e.g., Robert LaRose, Nora J. Rifron & Richard Enbody, Promoting Personal Responsibility 
for Internet Safety, COMM. OF ACM, Mar. 2008, at 71, 74-76 (discussing the prevalence and effective-
ness of individual involvement in cybersecurity); NAT’L INITIATIVE FOR CYBERSECURITY EDUC. 
(NICE), http://csrc.nist.gov/nice/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (teaching personal cybersecurity); 
STAYSAFEONLINE, http://staysafeonline.org/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2013) (same). 
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share information about threats with each other and with the federal 
government.228 Neither has proven effective.229 
Inculcating norms of safe computing protects some people, but not nearly 
enough to make an appreciable difference for cybersecurity. Even careful 
Internet use may not provide sufficient protection. Security researcher 
Charlie Miller demonstrated how to “pwn”—gain unauthorized control 
over—an iPhone merely by persuading the phone’s owner to browse a 
webpage containing malicious code.230 While Apple has fixed that particular 
flaw, Internet users are defenseless against zero-day attacks. Precautions 
such as personal firewalls may not provide sufficient information for users to 
make decisions about permitting access to programs, and protections such as 
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) encryption may give a false sense of security.231 
Users who take precautions pay an immediate cost (e.g., avoiding desirable 
websites or applications) for an uncertain payoff (i.e., remaining secure). 
Behavioral economics demonstrates that people heavily discount risks of 
future harm when avoiding those risks imposes present disutility.232 Lastly, 
as Internet access becomes increasingly ubiquitous with the wider availabil-
ity of broadband and of mobile Internet devices such as smartphones, there 
is a constant influx of new, uneducated users, who present an attractive 
target for attackers.233 Many cyberattacks, from botnets to spam, require 
only a small fraction of individual attacks to succeed for the larger scheme 
 
228 See, e.g., Department of Defense (DOD)–Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Voluntary 
Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA) Activities, 32 C.F.R. pt. 236 (2013) (protecting 
classified DOD information transmitted by the defense industry); About Us, MULTI-STATE INFO. 
SHARING & ANALYSIS CENTER, http://msisac.cisecurity.org/about (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) 
(describing cooperation among the states and local governments to share and analyze security 
information); About Us, US-CERT INCIDENT REPORTING SYS., https://www.us-cert.gov/about-
us (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (describing a cybersecurity-incident reporting system). 
229 See, e.g., Van Eeten & Bauer, supra note 168, at 229 (“Until now, government policies have 
focused on user awareness campaigns, better international collaboration among law enforcement 
agencies, public–private information sharing and better data collection on security problems. While 
useful, these measures have proven to be ineffective to reduce the threats posed by botnets.”). 
230 Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Cyberspace: The Fragile Frontier, WASH. POST, June 3, 2012, at A1. 
231 VIEGA, supra note 67, at 59-63, 171-74. 
232 See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law 
and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538-39 (1998) (discussing how individuals “often behave in 
ways at odds with conventional economic analysis, due to problems of self-control”). 
233 See Steven Furnell, Valleria Tsaganidi & Andy Phippen, Security Beliefs and Barriers for 
Novice Internet Users, 27 COMPUTERS & SECURITY 235, 236-39 (2008) (examining the lack of 
insight typical Internet users have regarding online security). 
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to work.234 As security expert John Viega notes, “[Getting 0wned] is a lot 
easier than most people would expect.”235 
The second educational effort concentrates on sharing information about 
known threats and vulnerabilities. Information-sharing efforts have been popular 
among policymakers and scholars alike. President Obama’s Cybersecurity Policy 
Review—the cornerstone of his cybersecurity program—depends heavily upon 
public–private partnerships and information sharing.236 The Review contem-
plates “developing tailored incentives for information sharing” that could 
“include, as a last resort, regulatory measures as part of an integrated 
approach.”237 Scholars such as Gus Coldebella and Brian White worry about 
“structural disincentives” that create barriers to information sharing among 
private firms, and between private and public sector entities.238 Economists 
have assessed how to structure sharing of information about security breaches 
given interfirm competition and heterogeneous firm characteristics.239 Even 
accounting scholars seek to create incentives to bolster efficient information 
sharing.240 
Legislatively, the most recent version of the Cyber Intelligence Sharing 
and Protection Act (CISPA), passed by the House of Representatives in 
April of 2013, mandates that “[t]he Director of National Intelligence . . . 
establish procedures to . . . share cyber threat intelligence with private-
sector entities.”241 CISPA authorizes providers such as ISPs to share 
cybersecurity information with the government and other private enti-
ties.242 CISPA also grants blanket immunity from liability to providers who 
share such information in good faith.243 Similarly, the Senate’s failed 
Cybersecurity Act of 2012244—introduced in February of 2012, but not 
 
234 See, e.g., Justin M. Rao & David H. Reiley, The Economics of Spam, J. ECON. PERSP., 
Summer 2012, at 87, 91-93 (describing the botnet method of producing spam). See generally Van 
Eeten & Bauer, supra note 168. 
235 VIEGA, supra note 67, at 9. 
236 See CYBERSPACE POLICY REVIEW: ASSURING A TRUSTED AND RESILIENT INFORMATION 
AND COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE 17-29 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/ 
documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf. 
237 Id. at 26-27. 
238 Gus P. Coldebella & Brian M. White, Foundational Questions Regarding the Federal Role in 
Cybersecurity, 4 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 233, 236-37 (2010). 
239 See generally Esther Gal-Or & Anindya Ghose, The Economic Consequences of Sharing Secu-
rity Information, in ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 41, at 95. 
240 Lawrence A. Gordon, Martin P. Loeb & William Lucyshyn, Sharing Information on Com-
puter Systems Security: An Economic Analysis, 22 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 461, 479-81 (2003). 
241 Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act, H.R. 624, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013). 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 S. 2105 (112th): Cybersecurity Act of 2012, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bills/112/s2105 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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enacted—included provisions that would have established mechanisms for 
submitting reports regarding “cybersecurity threats, vulnerabilities, risks, 
and incidents” affecting government networks or critical infrastructure;245 set 
up incentives for government employees to share information effectively;246 
authorized private entities to share “cybersecurity threat indicators” with 
one another;247 directed the founding of cybersecurity threat information 
exchanges248 and permitted private parties to disclose such information to 
the exchanges;249 and immunized entities from liability for information 
sharing authorized under the Act.250 The SECURE IT Act of 2012—
introduced in March of 2012 and also not enacted251—contained even 
broader provisions that would have authorized private entities to disclose 
“cyber threat information” to any other entity,252 exempted private entities 
from civil and criminal liability for such sharing,253 and mandated that the 
federal government develop procedures for sharing this information with 
the private sector.254 The DOD also moved to establish voluntary infor-
mation sharing with defense contractors.255 While none of these bills passed, 
the frequency with which they are introduced demonstrates that infor-
mation sharing is resolutely popular. But, information-sharing norms have 
not worked and are not likely to. Firms have significant incentives not to 
disclose breaches or attacks. Revealing lapses could have reputation-related 
market effects. Publicly traded companies, for instance, suffer drops in share 
price immediately after revealing security breaches.256 Disclosing vulnerabil-
ity information risks further dissemination (even if inadvertent) that could 
lead to additional attacks.257 If data is shared with the government, regula-
tors may employ it when setting rules for, or monitoring, the firm that 
 
245 Cybersecurity Act of 2012, S.2105, 112th Cong. § 107(d)(1). 
246 Id. § 408. 
247 Id. § 702(a). 
248 Id. § 703. 
249 Id. §§ 704–705. 
250 Id. § 706. 
251 H.R. 4263 (112th): SECURE IT Act of 2012, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bills/112/hr4263 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
252 SECURE IT Act of 2012, H.R. 4263, 112th Cong. § 102(a). 
253 Id. § 102(g). 
254 Id. § 103. 
255 Department of Defense (DOD)–Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Voluntary Cyber Security 
and Information Assurance (CS/IA) Activities, 32 C.F.R. pt. 236 (2013). 
256 See Huseyin Cavusoglu, Birendra Mishra & Srinivasan Raghunathan, The Effect of Internet 
Security Breach Announcements on Market Value: Capital Market Reactions for Breached Firms and 
Internet Security Developers, 9 INT’L J. ELECTRONIC COM. 69, 94 (2004) (finding a 2.1% average 
decrease in market value for firms announcing Internet security breaches). 
257 Gal-Or & Ghose, supra note 239, at 96-97. 
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revealed the information.258 Finally, firms may not want to aid competitors 
either by reducing their information security costs or by protecting them 
from the same attack.259 
More important, faith in information sharing is overdue for some skep-
ticism. Efforts to increase information sharing assume that the information 
will be valuable—an often unfounded assumption. For example, the fusion 
centers established after the attacks of September 11, 2001, to promote 
information sharing about security threats have grappled continuously with 
an overload of inaccurate, inapposite, and generally poor-quality Suspicious 
Activity Reports (SARs).260 The fusion centers have shared information 
that was “oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, [and that] sometimes endan-
ger[ed] citizens’ civil liberties.”261 The U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommit-
tee on Investigations found that the fusion centers “often produced 
irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting[,] . . . and many 
produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever.”262 Further, the Subcommit-
tee was unable to identify a single instance where fusion-center reporting 
either identified a terrorist threat or contributed to disrupting an active 
terrorist plot.263 This result occurred despite the fusion centers’ allegedly 
central role in counterterrorism strategy.264 The lesson for cybersecurity is 
clear: garbage shared is still garbage. Information-sharing efforts are 
popular with regulators and scholars alike; they are cheaper than technologi-
cal mandates, they comport with the basic assumption that more accurate 
information helps markets function better, and they require little political 
capital. But, as with many easy things, they are not worth much.  
3. Markets 
Finally, though there are robust markets for cybersecurity,265 market-
driven efforts have not succeeded. Software vendors, IT consulting firms, 
 
258 Id. at 95-96. 
259 Id. at 96-97. 
260 See Priscilla M. Regan & Torin Monahan, Beyond Counterterrorism: Data Sharing, Privacy, 
and Organizational Histories of DHS Fusion, INT’L J. E-POLITICS, July–Sept. 2013, at 1, 8, available 
at http://torinmonahan.com/papers/IJEP.pdf. 
261 U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR 
AND INVOLVEMENT IN STATE AND LOCAL FUSION CENTERS 1 (2012). 
262 Id. at 2. 
263 Id. 
264 See id. (quoting Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano as describing 
the centers as “one of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy”). 
265 Global Cybersecurity Market to Reach $61 Billion This Year, INFOSECURITY (Jan. 30, 2012), 
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/23548/global-cybersecurity-market-to-reach-61-
billion-this-year. 
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accountants, and others offer products and services intended to make 
information more secure. However, there are at least three structural 
problems with cybersecurity markets that suggest such measures are 
insufficient. First, externalities lead to underinvestment. Firms neither 
realize the total benefits of security, nor are they penalized fully for insecu-
rity. Second, reputational effects are weak. The negative effect of data 
breaches upon firms’ market valuation, for example, fades quickly with 
time.266 And finally, markets cut both ways: there are markets for 
cyberweapons as well as cyberdefenses. Entities such as Vupen sell zero-day 
exploits on the open market (but only to friendly governments, according to 
Vupen).267 There are also well-developed black markets for such infor-
mation.268 Thus, markets cannot solve the cybersecurity problem alone: 
informational and structural defects cause private incentives to lead to 
suboptimal security levels, and markets operate for attackers as well. 
Nonregulatory approaches to cybersecurity simply have not worked. As 
Section D argues, legal mandates are necessary to fill the gap. 
D. The Need for Law 
When law specifies cybersecurity measures, security improves. While 
the United States has relatively few cybersecurity regulations, it does 
impose requirements on firms in the financial sector.269 Banks and other 
financial institutions must meet the security mandates of the GLBA and 
regulations promulgated under it.270 Under the GLBA, federal regulators 
issued joint interagency guidance on what security measures banks must 
adopt, and how examiners would assess compliance with them.271 Institutions 
 
266 Alessandro Acquisti, Allan Friedman & Rahul Telang, Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An 
Event Study 11, 13 (Dec. 2006) (paper presented at the 27th Int’l Conference on Info. Sys.), available at 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download;jsessionid=DD673F8D73246D11989046267AA29893
?doi=10.1.1.207.1470&rep=rep1&type=pdf. 
267 See Vupen Exclusive and Sophisticated Exploits for Offensive Security, VUPEN SECURITY, 
http://www.vupen.com/english/services/lea-index.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
268 Bambauer & Day, supra note 43, at 1067. 
269 Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–314.5 (2013); see 
also J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting Privacy in 
Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 127-28 (2008) (discussing the Safeguards Rule, 16 
C.F.R. pt. 314, under the GLBA that regulates financial institutions). 
270 See generally Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Infor-
mation Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129, 157-58 (2005) (discussing 
institutions’ obligations under the GLBA). 
271 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (2012) (codifying § 501(b) of the GLBA); see also Proper Disposal of 
Consumer Information, 69 Fed. Reg. 77,610 (Dec. 28, 2004) (codified in scattered parts of 12 
C.F.R.) (implementing § 216 of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681w); Interagency Guidelines Establishing Information Security Standards, 66 Fed. Reg. 8616 
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must undertake a risk assessment, evaluate compliance with their infor-
mation security program, and review the assessment regularly.272 The 
Guidelines set forth measures that financial institutions must implement, if 
doing so would protect customer information.273 These include access 
restrictions on information systems and physical locations storing customer 
data, data encryption, safeguards against physical damage, monitoring to 
detect intrusions and response programs to mitigate unauthorized access, 
and procedures to ensure changes do not undercut security.274 Some of these 
measures are explicitly mitigation-focused. The GLBA is designed to be 
flexible; it is a standard, not a rule.275 Nonetheless, it imposes greater 
cybersecurity obligations on financial institutions than most firms face, and 
backs those requirements with federal oversight and, potentially, penalties 
for noncompliance. 
Available empirical evidence suggests that even the GLBA’s dilute mandate 
increases cybersecurity for financial institutions. In a study by WhiteHat 
Security, banking websites had the fewest average serious security vulnera-
bilities of any industry at 43, compared to 79 across all industries and 121 for 
retail sites (the industry sector with the most vulnerabilities).276 Moreover, 
banks fixed the largest percentage of serious vulnerabilities of any sector, and 
their sites had the fewest average days of exposure to such weaknesses.277  
Similarly, analysis of breach data from three years (2005–2007) of reports 
to the Identity Theft Resource Center showed that the finance and insurance 
industries had the lowest rate of processing errors and demonstrated a 
statistically significant difference in the number of breach incidents from 
the number expected under a random distribution.278 Interestingly, these 
industries showed by far the greatest rate of misconduct by insiders leading 
 
(Feb. 1, 2001) (codified in scattered parts of 12 C.F.R.) (implementing § 501(b) of the GLBA). See 
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Global Privacy and E-Transactions Law, 16 MICH. ST. J. INT’L L. 1, 34 (2007) (describing a “process 
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272 Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.4 (2013). 
273 Id. § 314.3. 
274 Id. § 314.4. 
275 See Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, supra note 143, at 49, 53-54 (explaining how the 
GLBA operates as a “purposive regulatory standard”). 
276 JEREMIAH GROSSMAN, WHITEHAT SECURITY WEBSITE STATISTICS REPORT 15 
(2012), available at https://www.whitehatsec.com/assets/WPstats_summer12_12th.pdf. 
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1050 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 162: 1011 
 
to data breaches.279 This reinforces the idea that cybersecurity is always 
partial—it is not technologically possible to prevent those authorized to 
access data from misusing it, and other methods (such as deterrence) are 
imperfect as well.280 
Finally, financial firms appear to make greater investments in security 
than companies in other sectors. Nathan Sales notes that banks typically 
invest 6%–7% of their information technology budgets in security measures.281 
He also lists specific investments that financial institutions are more likely 
to make than their nonfinancial counterparts, including intrusion detection 
systems (IDS) and smart cards.282 
The financial sector is more secure than other industries and operates 
under specific cybersecurity mandates embedded in law. This correlation is 
no coincidence. Cybersecurity needs law. If we seek to meaningfully increase 
cybersecurity, we must increase legal regulation. Part III examines what legal 
regulation must do to address cybersecurity’s negative range of access and 
alteration—in short, how the law can address espionage and hacking. 
III. THE KNOWN UNKNOWNS 
Known security bugs are everywhere. 
Most hackers exploit known vulnerabilities. Examples are legion. The 
massive breach of Heartland Payment Systems occurred because the 
payment processor’s website was vulnerable to an SQL injection attack—a 
widely known flaw.283 Heartland is in good company: a study by Hewlett-
Packard (HP) found that 86% of tested web applications were vulnerable to 
such injection attacks.284 Sony’s PlayStation Network was hacked because 
the company used an outdated, unpatched version of the Apache web server 
software.285 Wyndham Hotels lost data on 500,000 accounts to hackers in 
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Russia because their servers used default credentials and passwords and 
because the chain stored credit card data in plain text.286 The SCADA 
systems that control many public utilities’ operations often use default 
passwords287—in fact, one study found 7200 SCADA systems connected to 
the Internet with default passwords.288 A significant fraction of SAP 
enterprise resource planning (ERP) servers are exposed to the Internet, 
even though the software is increasingly targeted by attacks that exploit 
known weaknesses.289 The average website examined in the 2011 study 
contained 79 serious security vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting 
weaknesses; this was actually a dramatic improvement from 2010, when the 
average number of flaws was 230.290  
Remediation is slow. Companies often take nearly a year to apply patches 
supplied by software vendors, leaving them open to attacks.291 Experts 
estimate that firms using SCADA software—including many in critical 
infrastructure areas such as energy utilities—only apply 10%–20% of availa-
ble patches.292 The availability of the patches indicates that solutions to 
these security problems are known and available to firms. Though imple-
menting those solutions may be expensive, time consuming, or complex, it 
is possible. To a significant degree, users of information technology remain 
insecure to known unknowns—attacks against previously described and 
 
Software: Testimony, EWEEK (May 6, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Sony-Networks-
Lacked-Firewall-Ran-Obsolete-Software-Testimony-103450. 
286 Paul Roberts, FTC Sues Wyndham over Breaches Linked to $10M in Fraud, THREATPOST (June 
26, 2012), https://threatpost.com/ ftc-sues-wyndham-over-breaches-linked-10m-fraud-062612/76735. 
287 See, e.g., Roger A. Grimes, Doomed by Default Passwords, INFOWORLD (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.infoworld.com/d/security/doomed-default-passwords-180214 (explaining that SCADA 
systems are particularly vulnerable because they have long depreciation schedules and run 
outdated versions of operating systems with publicly known exploits). 
288 John E. Dunn, Important SCADA Systems Secured Using Weak Logins, Researchers Find, CSO 
(Jan. 15, 2013), http://www.csoonline.com/article/726875/important-scada-systems-secured-using-weak-
logins-researchers-find. 
289 See Alexander Polyakov & Alexey Tyurin, ERPSCAN, SAP SECURITY IN FIGURES: A 
GLOBAL SURVEY 2007–2011, at 31, http://erpscan.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SAP-Security-
in-figures-a-global-survey-2007-2011-final.pdf (finding that roughly ten percent of companies 
worldwide are exposed, most of which are in China). 
290 See GROSSMAN, supra note 276, at 2 (noting that this figure is down from 1111 in 2007). 
291 Cf. Sales, supra note 35, at 1508, 1517 (explaining this to be the case because firms do not 
bear the full costs of their vulnerabilities and hence have weaker incentives to fix them, and further 
noting that a recent study found that the electric companies surveyed took “an average of 331 days 
to implement security patches”). 
292 See Kelly Jackson Higgins, The SCADA Patch Problem, DARK READING (Jan. 15, 2013), http:// 
www.darkreading.com/advanced-threats/167901091/security/vulnerabilities/240146355/the-scada-patch-
problem.html (acknowledging the risk that a newly installed patch could cause an outage of the 
entire security system and noting that “[t]he likelihood that customers will apply patches to their 
SCADA systems is low”). 
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patched vulnerabilities—by choice. As described above, this choice may be 
rational for each actor in purely economic terms, but it results in unaccepta-
ble levels of insecurity for society. 
Building on prior work in information-based cybersecurity,293 and applying 
insights from normal accident theory, this Article proposes a pair of design 
principles to guide regulation of the known unknowns: disaggregation and 
heterogeneity (or, more colloquially, “divide and differ”). The regulatory 
goal is for organizations to implement these principles in their computer 
systems. Disaggregation splits information into multiple, separated data 
stores. The loss of any single store, or perhaps several of them, does not 
confer all of an organization’s information upon an attacker. Heterogeneity 
requires that organizations use multiple types of hardware and software: 
UNIX with Windows Server for operating systems, MySQL with IBM 
DB2 for databases, or Juniper equipment with Cisco for routers. A successful 
attack on any variant of hardware or software will not compromise the entire 
infrastructure (and hence information) for an organization.294 In concert, 
these principles seek to reduce the effect of a cybersecurity failure rather 
than to prevent it. In normal accident theory’s terms, they seek to make the 
system less tightly coupled.295 They operate in parallel with efforts to reduce 
the likelihood of such a failure by making systems less vulnerable and by 
detecting and interdicting attacks when they occur. This aspect of cyber-
security—resilience—is significantly underaddressed by both scholars and 
policymakers.  
A. Resilience 
Disaggregation and heterogeneity increase resilience.296 Spreading in-
formation across multiple data stores and using multiple versions of operat-
ing systems, hardware, and applications does little to prevent cyberattacks. 
Indeed, it may provide hackers with a greater attack surface: there are more 
 
293 See generally Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 587-88 (delineating an information-
based, theoretical framework for cybersecurity requirements). 
294 See generally, e.g., DANIEL GEER ET AL., COMPUTER & COMMC’N IND. ASS’N, 
CYBERINSECURITY: THE COST OF MONOPOLY (2003), available at http://www.schneier.com/ 
essay-318.html (discussing cybersecurity risks resulting from the dominance of Microsoft 
operating systems). 
295 See PERROW, supra note 88, at 94-96 (discussing how coupling affects recovery from 
component failure). 
296 See Kishor S. Trivedi, Dong Seong Kim & Rahul Ghosh, Resilience in Computer Systems and 
Networks (defining “resilience” in the context of computer systems as “the ability of [a ]sys-
tem/person/organization[] to recover/defy/resist from any shock, insult, or disturbance”), in 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2009 INT’L CONF. ON COMPUTER-AIDED DESIGN 74, 74-77 (2009), 
available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=05361311. 
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locations for weaknesses such as misconfiguration to occur, and there are 
more lines of code to comb for exploits.297 For cybersecurity scholars and 
policymakers fixated on stopping attacks, such an approach is anathema.  
This risk-spreading approach, however, is perfectly in line with normal 
accident theory.298 Inevitably, software bugs occur, and hackers discover how 
to exploit them.299 There will be attacks—successful ones—against infor-
mation technology systems. The key is to reduce the effects of these attacks. 
This lessens the harm they cause and makes hacking less attractive by 
reducing its payoff. Charles Perrow cites marine shipping as a similar 
instance where the configuration of incentives (as with cybersecurity’s 
externalities problems) leads inexorably to accidents.300 The approach this 
Article proposes, by analogy, is not to increase the vigilance of captains or 
the accuracy of nautical maps. It is to ensure that ships are built with 
watertight compartments so that an accident does not sink the vessel.301 
The divide-and-differ strategy reduces the effects of successful attacks or 
breaches. The two pillars of the strategy also reinforce one another. Parti-
tioning information into multiple repositories forces an attacker to com-
promise several systems to gain access to all of an organization’s data.302 
This approach is particularly effective if related files—such as the plans for 
the Joint Strike Fighter or elements of a bank customer record—are dispersed 
 
297 See, e.g., Roger Grimes, Don’t Fall for the Monoculture Myth, INFOWORLD (Apr. 24, 2009), 
http://www.infoworld.com/d/security-central/dont-fall-monoculture-myth-882 (explaining the flaws 
of the notion that one should use less-popular software because it is less likely to be attacked). But see 
Marcus J. Ranum, The Monoculture Hype, RANUM.COM http://www.ranum.com/security/computer_ 
security/editorials/monoculture-hype/index.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (analogizing the 
security of modern computer networks to that of communities of genetically diverse organisms, 
but noting that the analogy is not perfect—computers are not “biological entities,” and several 
characteristics may actually lessen the danger of “monoculture”). 
298 See PERROW, supra note 88, at 94-95 (noting that “[s]ince failures occur in all systems, 
means to recovery are critical,” and “[i]n loosely coupled systems there is a better chance that 
expedient, spur-of-the-moment buffers and redundancies and substitutions can be found”). 
299 See Aaron J. Burstein, Amending the ECPA to Enable a Culture of Cybersecurity Research, 22 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 167, 175-79 (2008) (noting that “[t]hreats constantly evolve to exploit newly 
discovered vulnerabilities” and providing several examples of such sophisticated attacks). 
300 See PERROW, supra note 88, at 173 (concluding that it is not a “single failure,” but “the 
combination of system components that promotes error inducement”). 
301 See Frances Wilson, Bad Management Helped Sink Titanic, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 14, 2012), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/speakeasy/2012/04/14/how-bad-management-helped-sink-the-titanic (describing 
how the Titanic’s builders deliberately failed to include watertight compartments in the ship’s 
design). 
302 See generally Bo Chen et al., Remote Data Checking for Network Coding-based Distributed 
Storage Systems 31, 31-42 (Oct. 8, 2010) (paper presented at the 17th ACM Conference on Computer & 
Comm. Sec.), available at http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1866842. 
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across the data stores.303 Then, an attacker must break into more than one 
system to gain access to one set of files. Employing different elements 
within an IT system, such as multiple operating systems, makes any single, 
successful attack less effective.304 If the files are dispersed across multiple 
locations, each with a different code base, the attacker will need multiple 
exploits to gain access to or alter the data. 
In normal accident theory terms, using heterogeneous systems (varie-
gated code and hardware) makes those systems less tightly coupled.305 A 
failure in one part of the system affects fewer of the other parts than if the 
system were homogeneous.306 This limits the spread, and therefore the 
effects, of such a failure. While introducing more components into the 
system could make it more interactively complex, which increases the risk of 
error, this possibility is mitigated by disaggregation.307 Under disaggrega-
tion, IT systems would be effectively partitioned, reducing the linkage 
between components in the different data stores. An exploit compromising 
a Windows-based computer in one data warehouse is less likely to have a 
spillover effect on a UNIX-based computer in a second warehouse when 
those two repositories are separated.308 Thus, heterogeneity decreases 
system coupling and increases the complexity of system interactivity. 
Nonetheless, the boost in interactivity is likely offset by the disaggregation 
part of the known-unknowns strategy. 
Splitting an organization’s information into multiple parts, storing them sep-
arately, and hosting them on different software and hardware may increase the 
risk of a successful attack, but it greatly decreases that attack’s payoff. 
B. Disaggregation: Divide and Conquer 
Disaggregation reduces the harm that accrues from a successful attack 
against a system by dividing data stores—information—into multiple, 
separate components. This reduces the payoff from a breach: a hacker gains 
only a fraction of the organization’s information from breaking into one data 
 
303 Cf. Siobhan Gorman et al., Computer Spies Breach Fighter-Jet Project, WALL ST. J., Apr. 21, 
2009, at A1 (discussing the devastating impact of information breaches on the U.S. Air Force’s fighter-jet 
project, but noting that the most sensitive information, stored separately, was not breached). 
304 See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL & NAT’L ACAD. OF ENG’G, TOWARD A SAFER AND 
MORE SECURE CYBERSPACE 107-10 (Seymour E. Goodman & Herbert S. Lin eds., 2007) 
(detailing techniques, including buffering and isolation, whereby information is separated from the 
Internet or compartmentalized to complicate attempts to breach). 
305 PERROW, supra note 88, at 92-93. 
306 Id. at 95. 
307 Id. at 73-76. 
308 See id. at 72-73. 
  
2014] Ghost in the Network 1055 
 
store. Disaggregation also increases the cost of the attack: the hacker must 
compromise multiple systems to access the entirety of the data. 
Though data storage is increasingly spread across multiple computers, 
such as in cloud computing, these systems are designed such that the 
information appears to be in one location.309 For example, even if a database 
is spread across several servers in Amazon’s310 or Google’s311 cloud compu-
ting platforms, it looks like a seamless whole to users. Each part of the 
database is linked to, and accessible by, every other part.312 Disaggregation 
breaks those links. Parts of the data store are isolated from one another, 
logically and perhaps physically.313 Gaining access to one part does not 
confer access to any other part.  
There are good examples of disaggregated systems currently in use, such 
as Mini-Sentinel. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must perform 
surveillance of prescription drugs after they are approved for marketing in 
the United States.314 The enabling legislation requires the FDA to avoid 
revealing individually identifiable health information when queries are 
made on the resulting data.315 To comply, the FDA built Mini-Sentinel.316 
Data sources, such as pharmaceutical companies, retain the postapproval 
data and structure it in standardized form.317 Both the FDA and the data 
sources use Mini-Sentinel’s software.318 Queries on the data are submitted 
from the Mini-Sentinel Center to the data sources, which return summary 
 
309 See Michael J. Miller, Storing Massive Data: Distributed Data and the noSQL Movement, PCMAG 
(May 4, 2012), http://forwardthinking.pcmag.com/none/297512-storing-massive-data-distributed-data-
and-the-nosql-movement. 
310 See generally Giuseppe DeCandia et al., Dynamo: Amazon’s Highly Available Key-Value Store 
205 (Oct. 16, 2007) (paper presented at the 21st ACM Symposium on Operating Sys. Principles), 
available at http://www.allthingsdistributed.com/files/amazon-dynamo-sosp2007.pdf. 
311 See generally Sanjay Ghemawat et al., The Google File System 29 (Oct. 20, 2003) (paper presented at 
the 19th ACM Symposium on Operating Sys. Principles), available at http://static.googleusercontent.com/ 
external_content/untrusted_dlcp/research.google.com/en/us/archive/gfs-sosp2003.pdf. 
312 Id. (describing a file system composed of thousands of computing instances as millions of 
file objects). 
313 See James Turner, Hadoop: What It Is, How It Works, and What It Can Do, O’REILLY STRATA 
(Jan. 12, 2011), http://strata.oreilly.com/2011/01/what-is-hadoop.html (describing Hadoop, a system 
where data is stored across “a large number of machines that don’t share any memory or disks” but 
where results are delivered in a “unified whole”). 
314 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3) (2012). I thank Leslie Francis for this example. 
315 Id. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(I). 
316 Leslie P. Francis & John G. Francis, Informatics and Public-Health Surveillance, in BIOINFOR-
MATICS LAW: LEGAL ISSUES FOR COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY IN THE POST-GENOME ERA 191, 
204-05 (Jorge L. Contreras & A. James Cuticchia eds., 2013). 
317 Id. 
318 Id. 
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responses to queries.319 Mini-Sentinel was designed to respond to privacy 
concerns, but it also provides a compelling model for security worries.320 A 
breach of any single data source compromises only that entity’s information. 
And, an attack against the querying computer at the Mini-Sentinel Center can 
only obtain summary information, rather than individually identifiable data.  
The benefit of disaggregation—reducing the payoff of an attack and 
forcing an attacker to gain control over more systems—comes at two costs. 
First, using the data (accessing it, altering it, or both) for authorized 
purposes requires that the isolated parts of the information are joined, at 
least in part or intermittently.321 Performing analysis on large datasets thus 
becomes computationally more expensive and depends on reliable connec-
tivity between the subsets.322  
Analysis of the divided data could occur in one of two ways. First, the 
system could send queries to each subset, which would process the query 
and return the results.323 Under this method, the querying system would 
merge results from each subset. Second, the system could dynamically 
merge the data from the subsets, perform the query, and then store only the 
results.324 While the querying entity can be a single point of failure, this risk 
is reduced (as with Mini-Sentinel) when it receives only summary infor-
mation.325 Under the second analytical method above, an attacker who 
compromises the querying computer can gain access to the entire data store. 
This weakness is problematic, but likely unavoidable. At a minimum, 
though, disaggregation can greatly reduce the number of vulnerable sys-
tems, perhaps allowing enhanced precautions to be taken with them.  
Second, the disaggregated data store is (by design) less efficient than a 
centralized data store.326 The system must perform more work to run tasks on 
the data—such as merging queries or merging parts of the information—than 
 
319 Id. 
320 Id.  
321 See generally Jeffrey Dean & Sanjay Ghemawat, MapReduce: Simplified Data Processing on 
Large Clusters 137 (Dec. 6, 2004) (paper presented at the 6th Symposium on Operating Sys. Design & 
Implementation), available at http://static.googleusercontent.com/external_content/untrusted_dlcp/ 
research.google.com/en/us/archive/mapreduce-osdi04.pdf. 
322 Ghemawat et al., supra note 311, at 30. 
323 Francis & Francis, supra note 316, at 204-05; Ghemawat et al., supra note 311, at 30. 
324 Amazon’s Simple Storage Service offers similar capabilities. AMAZON SIMPLE STORAGE 
SERVICE (AMAZON S3), http://aws.amazon.com/s3 (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
325 See Francis & Francis, supra note 316, at 204-05; cf. Dean & Ghemawat, supra note 321, at 
5 (discussing master failure and noting that since “there is only a single master, its failure is 
unlikely”); Ghemawat et al., supra note 311, at 33-36 (stating that a master computer could be a 
single point of failure due to sole control over namespace). 
326 See Dean & Ghemawat, supra note 321, at 5 (discussing efforts in MapReduce, a disaggre-
gated data storage system, to use local data whenever possible to improve efficiency). 
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would be necessary with seamless storage.327 This compromise is likely 
tolerable given high-speed networks, processors, and disks, but it is none-
theless real.328  
Private Manning’s actions provide a compelling example of the tradeoff 
between the ease of analysis and the risk of compromise. Manning was able 
to download a trove of documents from SIPRNet, a network of sensitive 
but unclassified information from the Departments of Defense and State, 
because boundaries between different data stores had been deliberately 
removed.329 After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the federal govern-
ment came under criticism for “stovepiping” useful information into 
multiple isolated systems.330 The intelligence community complained that 
these barriers prevented them from performing a comprehensive analysis to 
recognize patterns and from ensuring that different analysts could use 
relevant data and contribute insights.331  
Manning, though, was the counterpoint. Merging data stores allowed 
those with access to the system—reportedly, several hundred thousand 
people—to view all of it.332 Manning could thus download a massive 
amount of data onto an optical disc disguised as a Lady Gaga CD and then 
share it with the world via WikiLeaks.333 Had the SIPRNet information 
remained in multiple, isolated (stovepiped) systems, Manning would have 
needed greater access and more time to gather the same information. 
Cybersecurity is an exercise in balance. As data becomes more disaggre-
gated, the cost of analysis rises; as it becomes more joined, the potential loss 
from a successful attack on it rises. Exactitude in striking this balance is 
impossible. The disaggregation principle, though, posits that a shift toward 
reducing the effects of attacks by dividing data across multiple locations is a 
worthwhile one. And disaggregation’s benefits are increased by the second 
design principle—heterogeneity. 
 
327 See id. at 6. 
328 DeCandia et al., supra note 310, at 207-08. 
329 Massimo Calabresi, State Pulls the Plug on SIPRNet, TIME (Nov. 29, 2010), http:// 
swampland.time.com/2010/11/29/state-pulls-the-plug-on-siprnet. 
330 Id. 
331 See Michael Moran, Tilting at “Stovepipes?”, MSNBC (Sept. 9, 2003), http://www.today.com/ 
id/3071393. 
332 Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks and the Institutional Framework for National Security Disclosures, 
121 YALE L.J. 1448, 1519 (2012) (correlating merging data stores with access). 
333 Clark Boyd et al., Intelligence Sharing and the Danger of Leaks, PRI’S WORLD (Nov. 30, 
2010), http://www.pri.org/stories/2010-11-30/intelligence-sharing-and-danger-leaks. 
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C. Heterogeneity: The Benefits of Diversity 
To increase cybersecurity, organizations should increase the heterogeneity 
of their computing infrastructure. Put simply, heterogeneity is diversity.334 
As with an ecosystem, there are different niches or roles in information 
technology systems, including servers, workstations, operating systems, and 
applications. Currently, economies of scale push organizations to standard-
ize on a single product or vendor for each niche.335 This may improve 
efficiency, but it worsens security.336 Organizations should instead move in 
the opposite direction. For example, they should run Linux and Windows 
servers alongside one another and should purchase Juniper Networks 
routers in addition to Cisco boxes. Ideally, each part of an entity’s infra-
structure would be diverse—there would be no single point of failure for an 
attacker to exploit.  
Heterogeneity posits that diversity of software and hardware decreases 
the expected harm from a cyberattack. Such diversity makes it more 
difficult for a single vulnerability or successful hack to compromise an entire 
system or deliver access to a complete data store.337 Apple’s MacOS is a 
potent exemplar.338 Personal computers (PCs) overwhelmingly run versions 
of the Microsoft Windows operating system.339 This large population of 
potentially vulnerable PCs attracted copious hacker attention. Macs, 
though, which do not run Windows-based operating systems, so far have not 
been attacked by such Windows bugs.340  
 
334 See Justin Pope, Biology Stirs Software “Monoculture” Debate, BOSTON.COM (Feb. 16, 2004), 
http://www.boston.com/business/technology/articles/2004/02/16/biology_stirs_software_monoculture_ 
debate (discussing the contention of some that the pervasiveness of Microsoft’s “monoculture” 
allows a single flaw that can be exploited by a virus or the like to “wreak havoc”). 
335 Ryan Naraine, IT Wrestles with Microsoft Monoculture Myopia, EWEEK (Sept. 10, 2006), http:// 
www.eweek.com/c/a/Windows/IT-Wrestles-with-Microsoft-Monoculture-Myopia (“The economics of 
standardizing still trump security headaches.”). 
336 GEER ET AL., supra note 294 (“Security dangers [are] posed by software monopolies.”). 
337 Cf. Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 469 NATURE 
351, 353 (2011) (“[E]xcessive homogeneity within a financial system—all the banks doing the same 
thing—can minimize risk for each individual bank, but maximize the probability of the entire 
system collapsing.”). 
338 See VIEGA, supra note 67, at 105-07. 
339 See Seth Rosenblatt, Windows 8 Gains Market Share in December, CNET (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://reviews.cnet.com/8301-33642_7-57561974-292/windows-8-gains-market-share-in-december 
(reporting that the overall desktop market share for Windows operating systems was 91.74% at the 
end of 2012). 
340 See, e.g., Brian Krebs, Experts Warn of Zero-Day Exploit for Adobe Reader, KREBS ON SECURITY 
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/11/experts-warn-of-zero-day-exploit-for-adobe-reader 
(“[S]o far, they have only seen the attack work against Microsoft Windows installations of Adobe 
Reader.”). 
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Even flaws in applications available on Macs, such as Adobe Acrobat, 
might not trouble Apple users due to the differences in coding for the two 
platforms.341 Thus, an organization that uses both MacOS- and Windows-
based computers would be less vulnerable to a Windows exploit than a firm 
that had standardized solely on Microsoft. Similarly, having a computing 
ecosystem that runs different operating systems, applications, and network 
hardware provides a useful defense against a magic bullet, such as a zero-day 
attack that can compromise one particular component.342  
Heterogeneity’s benefits come with costs. First, it is more expensive to 
operate an IT environment with multiple types of each component: there 
are fewer economies of scale, and there is more information to track.343 
Organizations are likely to need more IT personnel, since employees often 
specialize in one operating system, hardware brand, or application.344 
Second, and more important, heterogeneity increases the odds that a 
vulnerability will be found in the overall ecosystem and that an attacker will 
be able to use it.345 With mixed operating systems, for example, an IT 
ecosystem is affected by both Windows and Mac bugs.  
Lastly, it is likely that organizations will have difficulty diversifying cer-
tain software—in particular, custom-coded applications and ERP programs.346 
Custom applications tend to respond to unique characteristics of an organi-
zation’s systems, data, and needs.347 These individualized needs are difficult 
to meet with off-the-shelf software, forcing the firm either to invest in a 
 
341 Cf. id. (noting possible limitations of the exploit). 
342 See, e.g., Ryan Naraine, Microsoft Issues Word Zero-Day Attack Alert, EWEEK.COM (Dec. 5, 
2006), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/security/microsoft-issues-word-zeroday-attack-alert (reporting a 
cyberattack that only targeted a single Microsoft software program). In addition, it should be 
noted that defenses against zero-day attacks are, by definition, impossible—a zero-day is an 
exploitable flaw that is unknown to defenders such as vendors or antivirus makers. 
343 Naraine, supra note 335 (noting that despite increased fears and instances of attacks tar-
geting its programs, Microsoft remains the dominant provider of operating systems because of the 
economic benefits of standardization); Fred B. Schneider & Kenneth P. Birman, The Monoculture 
Risk Put into Context, IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY, Jan.–Feb. 2009, at 14, 14 (summarizing some of 
the benefits afforded by using a “monocultural” network of computer programs). 
344 Schneider & Birman, supra note 343. 
345 See, e.g., id. at 15-16 (introducing some of the different forms a cyberattack may take). 
346 See MICHAEL H. HUGOS & DEREK HULITZKY, BUSINESS IN THE CLOUD 94 (2010) 
(“Once a company makes a commitment to use an ERP system and installs the software, there is a 
large degree of lock-in . . . . [I]t is very unlikely that a company will go through the expense of 
uninstalling that system and switching to a different ERP system.”). 
347 See Charl van der Walt, Assessing Internet Security Risk, Part 4: Custom Web Applications, 
SYMANTEC, http://www.symantec.com/connect/articles/assessing-internet-security-risk-part-4-custom-
web-applications (last updated Nov. 2, 2010) (discussing the variables considered when creating 
custom applications). 
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second custom software package, or to alter standard software to fit.348 
Similarly, organizations that use ERP software, such as SAP ERP, rely upon 
it as the core of their businesses—the application handles financial report-
ing, accounting, customer-relationship management, and other key tasks.349 
Duplicating ERP functionality increases costs by, for instance, sacrificing 
efficiency.350 Organizations with custom applications or ERP software are 
likely to protest heterogeneity requirements with special fervor because 
they have incurred a substantial fixed cost that they will resist duplicating. 
While ERP and custom applications are a nontrivial challenge for hetero-
geneity, several responses might mitigate the problem. First, for critical 
infrastructure, the federal government could defray part of the cost of 
diversifying over a period of years.351 If firms with such applications agreed 
to migrate to a heterogeneous infrastructure—say, over five years—the 
government could offer either direct grants or tax incentives to reduce the 
firms’ new technology and testing costs. The government operates similar 
programs to encourage change in other markets: for example, it will spend 
an estimated $7.5 billion to subsidize purchases of fuel-efficient vehicles 
from 2012 to 2019.352 Moreover, cost relief seems appropriate in light of the 
positive externalities that greater cybersecurity creates.  
Second, it may be possible to achieve partial heterogeneity. A firm that 
uses ERP software for finance, manufacturing, and customer-relations 
management may be able to move one function to a different platform more 
readily than it can migrate all three.353 Finally, greater heterogeneity in 
underlying hardware and operating systems and greater disaggregation of 
information can compensate partially for a single, monolithic application.  
As with increasing disaggregation, boosting IT heterogeneity comports with 
the tenets of normal accident theory. It reduces how tightly systems are coupled 
and may reduce interactivity.354 As a result, systems may be less vulnerable to 
errors and can recover from such errors more quickly. Heterogeneity loosens 
 
348 See, e.g., ROE & SCHULMAN, supra note 92, at 160-63 (describing custom energy-grid-
management software). 
349 ERP Solutions, SAP, http://global.sap.com/solutions/business-suite/erp/featuresfunctions/ 
operationalanalysis.epx (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
350 See HUGOS & HULITZKY, supra note 346, at 94. 
351 See Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 651-53 (proposing government subsidies to 
supplement investment in diversifying data systems). 
352 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EFFECTS OF FEDERAL TAX CREDITS FOR THE PURCHASE OF 
ELECTRIC VEHICLES, at iii (Sept. 2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ 
attachments/09-20-12-ElectricVehicles_0.pdf. 
353 See ERP Solutions, supra note 349. 
354 See PERROW, supra note 88, at 79, 93-94 (discussing the effect of interactivity on the 
control and management of a system). 
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coupling by introducing artificial breaks in the system.355 For example, an 
organization that uses Windows 8 as its only operating system has tightly 
coupled its computers: a successful Windows-based exploit would deliver 
control over all of its PCs. But when that organization introduces Macs, it 
decreases the coupling and a Windows attack would affect only some of the 
firm’s machines. Heterogeneity, therefore, acts as a firebreak. 
Increasing diversity may also decrease interactivity, which measures the 
degree to which a change in one part of the system affects other parts.356 
Here, heterogeneity has dichotomous effects. Increasing the number of 
components likely increases the chance that components will interact.357 
However, it also decreases the size of the effect if that interaction occurs. 
The net effect depends on which aspect of the change—likelihood or 
magnitude—dominates.  
Diversity is an investment. For instance, ecologists have shown that 
monoculture agriculture is highly efficient and effective: farmers who 
specialize in one crop can use the same fertilizer, pesticides, and harvesting 
techniques on all their land.358 However, it is also vulnerable. In an ecosys-
tem where pathogens evolve over time, a single successful attack (such as by 
parasites) can generate catastrophic failure.359  
Similarly, sensible investors purchase diversified assets. Index funds may 
underperform compared to particular stocks in the short term, but over 
longer periods, their returns are more stable.360 Investing in only a single 
vehicle is an all-or-nothing bet—a painful lesson many Enron employees 
learned.361 Thus, while spending on diversity incurs short-run costs, organi-
zations would be wise to hedge their bets against cybersecurity risks by 
doing so. 
 
355 See id. at 332 (“Accidents will be avoided if the system is . . . loosely coupled . . . because 
loose coupling gives time, resources, and alternative paths to cope with the disturbance and limits 
its impact.”) 
356 Id. at 72-79. 
357 See id. at 73-74 (providing an example in which introducing additional components to an 
independent subsystem led to an unexpected interaction with a separate, unrelated subsystem). 
358 See Miguel A. Altieri, Modern Agriculture: Ecological Impacts and the Possibilities for Truly 
Sustainable Farming, AGROECOLOGY IN ACTION, http://nature.berkeley.edu/~miguel-alt/modern_ 
agriculture.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (explaining that monoculture agriculture is “rewarded by 
economies of scale” and that increases in such systems means that “the whole agricultural support 
infrastructure . . . has become more specialized”). 
359 Id. (noting that a huge area with a single crop is vulnerable to a new “pathogen or pest”).  
360 See Mark Hulbert, The Index Funds Win Again, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2009, at BU5 (explaining 
the wisdom of investing in index funds). 
361 See 401(k) Investors Sue Enron, CNNMONEY (Nov. 26, 2001), http://money.cnn.com/ 
2001/11/26/401k/q_retire_enron_re (estimating that Enron employees lost a total of $850 million on 
stock held in their retirement accounts). 
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In short, heterogeneity in information technology systems helpfully re-
duces their vulnerability to a single, potentially catastrophic exploit. 
D. Driving “Divide and Differ” 
To facilitate the adoption of disaggregation and heterogeneity in the 
private sector, the federal government should employ a mixture of carrots 
and sticks. First, Congress should condition awards of government contracts 
upon an adequate showing of a firm’s efforts to re-architect its computer 
systems to embody these two principles. Second, Congress should enact 
legislation targeting key industries that mandates gradual implementation 
of these principles. Since resistance is likely, such a mandate should include 
carrots in the form of subsidies or tax credits to offset part of the cost of the 
changes. These measures overlap to some degree: some firms regulated by 
the stick will also partake of the carrots. This overlap is helpful because it 
reduces perceived and actual burdens of compliance. And it is likely neces-
sary, since passing regulatory mandates is nearly certain to take more time 
than passing spending bills with conditions attached. The following Sec-
tions describe both efforts. 
E. Carrot: Bribe 
The federal government should use bribes to lure firms to implement 
disaggregation and heterogeneity—to divide and differ. Federal contracts 
can create a substantial incentive. The federal government spends roughly 
14% of its annual budget—over $500 billion—on purchases of private-sector 
goods and services.362 Small businesses receive nearly one-quarter of that 
largesse.363 Some large firms, such as defense contractors Lockheed Martin, 
SAIC, and Raytheon, depend upon government contracts for more than half 
of their annual revenues.364 As a condition of eligibility for government 
contracts, firms should be required to certify, under penalty of perjury and 
disqualification from contracting for a period of years, that they have 
 
362 Robert Brodsky, Contracting Spending Dips for the First Time in 13 Years, GOV’T EXECU-
TIVE (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2011/02/contracting-spending-dips-for-the-
first-time-in-13-years/33238; Jeanne Sahadi, Cutting Washington Could Hit Main Street, CNNMONEY 
(July 23, 2012), http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/23/news/economy/federal-spending/index.htm. 
363 Sahadi, supra note 362. 
364 See Kim Bhasin, 15 Companies that Will Get Crushed When the Government Stops Spending, 
BUS. INSIDER (June 3, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/top-federal-government-contractors-
2011-5?op=1. 
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implemented these principles in their computing infrastructures.365 Alterna-
tively, if firms outsource IT functions, they should be required to certify 
that their contracts with those providers mandate implementing similar 
requirements, and to identify what steps they have taken to ascertain the 
providers’ compliance. To give this requirement teeth, the government 
should condition the contract on the firm’s documenting its compliance.366 
In addition, the government should have the ability, under the contract, to 
audit compliance; a finding of more than token noncompliance should 
disqualify the contractor from bidding on contracts for a number of years.367 
This “audit with bite” seeks to drive compliance through the power of the 
purse while avoiding the overhead costs incurred through more formal 
documentation of controls, as required under the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.  
The federal government has contemplated using its purchasing power for 
security purposes before. During the encryption debates of the 1990s, the 
Clinton Administration issued a proposed specification for a cryptosystem that 
would have allowed the government to access escrowed encryption keys with a 
court order.368 While the specification was not formally binding, the govern-
ment sought to purchase only telecommunications equipment using this 
“Clipper Chip” system and sweetened the deal by exempting Clipper gear 
from export restrictions.369 Though Clipper ultimately failed due to opposition 
based on concerns about privacy and civil liberties, its opponents initially 
feared its adoption because of the government’s massive spending influence.370 
Similarly, the federal government has used its spending capabilities to 
influence IT infrastructure. Section 508 of the Workforce Investment Act of 
1998 mandates that federal agencies ensure their IT systems afford individuals 
 
365 Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2012) (requiring that certain corporations certify their compliance 
with internal controls). 
366 Cf. id. § 7262 (requiring that certain corporations submit an annual internal-control report). 
367 See generally Carol Dinkins & Sean Lonnquist, The Belt and Suspenders Approach: The 
Advantages of a Formalized Environmental Compliance Program, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1129, 1143-45 
(2009) (discussing the EPA’s imposition of a general business ethics–compliance program for its 
government contractors, the violation of which could lead to debarment from future contracts). 
368 See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the Clipper Chip, and the 
Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 764-72 (1995) (discussing the doubtful legal authority of the 
Escrowed Encryption Proposal, an expansive administrative project to make substantive security 
policy). 
369 Id. at 770-71 (demonstrating the practical effect of the program in coercing public compliance). 
The government also would have benefited from network effects: private firms and individuals 
would likely purchase telecommunications equipment that could interoperate with Clipper-
enabled devices, further embedding the standard. Id. 
370 Id. at 773-76; see also A. Michael Froomkin, It Came from Planet Clipper: The Battle over 
Cryptographic Key “Escrow,” 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 15, 32-33 (explaining the popular backlash to 
the executive’s plan to use the government’s power as a major consumer to influence the market). 
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with disabilities access to information comparable to that available to 
nondisabled individuals.371 The requirement covered both the use and the 
procurement of systems.372 Accordingly, vendors and government contrac-
tors moved quickly to ensure that their systems rendered information 
accessible to those with disabilities.373 As software vendor Adobe put it, 
“[C]ompanies will no longer be able to sell federal agencies any software or 
hardware that fails to meet accessibility standards.”374  
And in 2008, Congress passed the Higher Education Opportunity Act 
(HEOA) as part of its economic stimulus package.375 One set of HEOA 
provisions imposes requirements upon institutions of higher education.376 For 
their students to be eligible for federal financial aid, schools must implement 
technological deterrents to unlawful file sharing. The legislation gives schools 
several options for compliance, but conditions indirect governmental funding 
on adjusting computer networks to reduce copyright infringement.377 
Schools have moved rapidly to comply.378 
The federal government can use the lure of lucrative contracts to push 
private companies to voluntarily adopt the design principles of disaggrega-
tion and heterogeneity. This creates two issues. First, how much must 
companies divide and differ to be eligible? Congress should set equal 
requirements in both the contracting and the regulatory contexts, which 
would ease the overall regulatory burden as some regulated firms would 
already meet the new criteria. Thus, contracting eligibility should depend 
upon meeting the standards described below. Second, what should be done 
to augment cybersecurity in companies that are not government contractors, 
but whose systems are critical to national security? Section F addresses 
these questions. 
 
371 29 U.S.C. § 794d (2006). 
372 Id. 
373 See, e.g., Accessibility Standards, ADOBE, http://www.adobe.com/accessibility/508standards.html 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
374 Id. 
375 Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 
U.S.C.).  
376 20 U.S.C. § 1094(a)(29) (2012). 
377 H.R. REP. NO. 110-803, at 548 (2008) (Conf. Rep.). 
378 Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 887-89 (2012) (describing 
the University of Dayton’s efforts to use a technology deterrent to meet HEOA requirements and 
maintain federal financial aid eligibility). 
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F. Stick: Regulation 
The federal government must require firms in key industries to address 
the known unknowns. It should mandate that companies in a few critical 
sectors—and all government entities—implement disaggregation and 
heterogeneity in their computer systems. It should set an aggressive dead-
line for compliance, and alleviate the burden with funding for re-
architecture efforts. Congress should pass legislation setting statutory 
defaults for these principles while authorizing regulators to impose either 
more stringent or more lax requirements after notice-and-comment rule-
making. Finally, the new regime should permit affected private-sector 
entities to seek partial waivers if they can demonstrate either equal mitiga-
tion through other techniques or the need for greater time due to special 
circumstances. These regulatory measures are likely to be expensive and 
politically unpopular; however, they are also vital if America is serious about 
improving cybersecurity. 
1. Defining the Regulated 
The first question regarding regulation is scope: Who should be covered 
by the divide-and-differ requirements? To date, presidential and congressional 
cybersecurity proposals have sought expansive coverage, with the number of 
industries and firms constituting “critical infrastructure” metastasizing over 
time. For example, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 establishes a 
National Monuments and Icons Sector for critical infrastructure, which is 
overseen by the Department of the Interior.379 Something has gone awry 
when the Grand Canyon is designated as critical infrastructure. Cybersecu-
rity’s ambit is thus ever-widening. To succeed—politically as well as techno-
logically—cybersecurity legislation must be far more focused. This requires 
taking a hard look at what elements of industry are genuinely at risk and 
indispensable to national security.  
Regulation should focus on six key sectors: finance and banking, defense 
contracting, transportation, utilities, government (federal, state, and local), 
and hospitals and medical centers. The importance of the financial sector is 
straightforward. Banks and financial firms have been targeted frequently for 
 
379 Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: Directive on Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioriti-
zation, and Protection, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1739, 1741 (Dec. 17, 2003), available at http://www.gpo.gov/ 
fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1739.pdf; Understanding the National Monuments 
and Icons Sector, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS860b/ 
CIRC/natMonument1.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
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cyberattacks and espionage.380 Defense contractor security directly impli-
cates national security—these companies have been targeted repeatedly for 
espionage by China and other countries.381  
Transportation is critical to America’s economy. The economic effects of 
disruption can be extrapolated from case studies. For instance, when transit 
workers for New York City’s subway system went on strike for three days in 
2005, the city’s economy lost an estimated $1 billion.382 In 2002, the closure of 
twenty-nine West Coast ports for eleven days due to a labor dispute generated 
economic costs between $6 billion and $20 billion.383 Even the collapse of a 
single interstate highway bridge in Minneapolis cost Minnesota $17 million in 
2007 and $43 million in 2008 (until the bridge was replaced that year).384  
Similarly, utilities are economically vital and pose a significant cyberse-
curity risk. They are often local monopolies and represent a single point of 
failure in key infrastructure such as power, water, waste treatment, and 
communications.385 Further, utility operators increasingly attach their systems 
to networks that pass Internet traffic—often without sufficient precautions.386 
 
380 See, e.g., Federal Reserve Hacked, GUARDIAN (Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
business/2013/feb/06/federal-reserve-anonymous (describing the attack by Anonymous that 
allegedly resulted in the theft of information of over 4000 bankers); Nicole Perlroth & Quentin 
Hardy, Bank Hacks Were Work of Iranians, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 2013, at B1 (covering a 
denial-of-service attack against major banks); Michael Riley, U.S. Spy Agency Is Said to Investigate 
Nasdaq Hacker Attack, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-
30/u-s-spy-agency-said-to-focus-its-decrypting-skills-on-nasdaq-cyber-attack.html (describing the 
breach of Nasdaq computers).  
381 See China Under Suspicion in U.S. for Lockheed Hacking, REUTERS (June 2, 2011), http:// 
www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/02/us-lockheed-china-idUSTRE7517B120110602; Michael Riley & John 
Walcott, China-Based Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-13/china-based-hacking-of-760-companies-reflects-undeclared-
global-cyber-war.html (discussing the tendency of Chinese cyberspies to attack U.S. companies). 
382 See Chris Dolmetsch & Josh P. Hamilton, Transit Workers Agree to End Strike; Talks Continue 
(Update11), BLOOMBERG (Dec. 22, 2005), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive& 
sid=aFC2LP.c9cro&refer=us.  
383 See Andrew Leonard, The Costs of a Port Shutdown, SALON (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.salon.com/2011/12/13/the_costs_of_a_port_shutdown. 
384 Economic Impacts of the I-35W Bridge Collapse, POSITIVELY MINN. (Minn. Dep’t of 
Transp., St. Paul, Minn.), available at http://www.dot.state.mn.us/i35wbridge/rebuild/municipal-
consent/economic-impact.pdf. 
385 See, e.g., Cuomo: Utilities Have Failed in Aftermath of Sandy; Suggests They Could Lose Monopolies, 
CBS NEW YORK (Nov. 5, 2012), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/11/05/cuomo-says-utilities-
failed-during-sandy-suggests-they-could-lose-monopolies (demonstrating the ramifications of disruptors 
to single companies that hold a monopoly over utilities); Lakis Polycarpou, What Is the Benefit of 
Privatizing Water?, COLUMBIA U. EARTH INST. (Sept. 2, 2010), http://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2010/ 
09/02/what-is-the-benefit-of-privatizing-water (noting the benefits and drawbacks of the trend of 
municipalities to privatize utility supply in local monopolies). 
386 See James R. Koelsch, Web-Based SCADA Gathers More Fans, AUTOMATION WORLD (Dec. 5, 
2012), http://www.automationworld.com/control/web-based-scada-gathers-more-fans (describing how 
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Governments both hold sensitive information and deliver vital services 
such as law enforcement, emergency services, and national defense.387 
Moreover, holding governments to the same cybersecurity requirements as 
the private sector should help ensure that burdens are manageable and that 
government entities do not become a threat to more secure private entities.  
Lastly, hospitals and medical centers maintain highly sensitive infor-
mation and provide critical services. They, too, have been increasingly 
targeted by hackers.388 These six core economic sectors present the highest-
value targets for cyberattacks and are vital to both society and U.S. national 
security. Accordingly, regulation mandating disaggregation and heterogeneity 
should concentrate on them. 
2. Sticky Defaults 
The most difficult question is this: What default requirements should 
Congress establish for disaggregation and heterogeneity? Legislation should 
set somewhat stringent defaults for two reasons. First, the notice-and-
comment process described below can alter these settings if regulators are 
convinced that the cost–benefit calculus is incorrect. But setting stronger 
security mandates initially has a helpful anchoring effect.389 Second, strong 
defaults usefully address information asymmetry. Regulators do not have 
access to private information held by regulated entities that could make 
their rules more effective and efficient.390 This occurs because of both costs 
 
accelerating implementation of “Web-based networks [for utility companies] increase[s] the risk of 
tampering by unauthorized people”); Paul Roberts, Homeland Security Warns SCADA Operators of 
Internet-Facing Systems, THREATPOST (Dec. 12, 2011), http://threatpost.com/homeland-security-
warns-scada-operators-internet-facing-systems-121211/75990 (“[I]ndustrial control systems are given 
access to the Internet[, and] . . . critical infrastructure operators frequently fail to secure such 
systems . . . .”). 
387 See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., THE COMPREHENSIVE 
NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY INITIATIVE, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
cybersecurity.pdf (highlighting the initiatives established by the security council to help secure the 
U.S. government and its role in carrying out public services in cyberspace). 
388 See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Health Systems at Risk of Hacking, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2012, 
at A1; Neal Ungerleider, Medical Cybercrime: The Next Frontier, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 15, 2012), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3000470/medical-cybercrime-next-frontier (noting the trend of cyber-
attacks on hospitals to steal or damage medical records). 
389 See Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law, Computer 
Science, and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 583, 602 (2006) (explaining the 
cognitive bias toward “status quo” settings). 
390 See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in a Digital Age, 88 
TEX. L. REV. 669, 678 (2010) (“Regulators, moreover, lack a clear vantage point for identifying . . . 
private information about firm organization necessary for developing top-down requirements of 
risk-mitigating behavior.”). 
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and strategic behavior. It is expensive for regulators to gather information, 
even when it is offered willingly by firms.391 In addition, firms may be 
unwilling to share since inexact information may let them evade the rules.392 
However, unattractive defaults can force their hands. This method parallels Ian 
Ayres and Robert Gertner’s approach to contract doctrine.393 They suggest 
setting default contract rules to force the revelation of private information; by 
making those defaults sufficiently unattractive, parties will bargain around 
them.394 Penalty defaults can work equally well for cybersecurity. 
Statutory defaults should address data stores for disaggregation and 
hardware and software for heterogeneity. For disaggregation, legislation 
should impose a rule of halves: a breach of any given data center or data 
warehouse should expose no more than half of an entity’s data to unauthor-
ized access or alteration. This mandate should be manageable for organiza-
tions since mirrored data centers are standard practice for corporations.395 
However, this requirement could create significant additional costs. A firm 
seeking to mirror its data warehouse would need to move from two data 
centers at present to four under this requirement, since each location would 
house half the entity’s information. But organizations can mitigate these 
costs by introducing separation (such as via isolated networks and buildings) 
into their IT systems—in effect, subdividing a single data center into 
multiple units. Regulation should thus require entities to, at minimum, 
bifurcate their data stores. 
For heterogeneity, legislation should impose a rule of thirds: at least 
one-third of covered hardware and software must be from a different vendor 
than the other two-thirds. Covered hardware should include servers, 
workstations, and network hardware. Covered software should include 
operating systems and applications (including antivirus programs, firewalls, 
and intrusion-detection systems).396  
 
391 Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 325, 
366-67 (2011) (describing resource constraints that prevent the SEC from effectively monitoring 
securities risk factors). 
392 Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (noting parties’ incentives to structure transactions to avoid regulation). 
393 See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). I thank Endre Stavang for this insight. 
394 Id. at 96-100. 
395 See Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 645-46 (providing examples of data security 
practices that allow businesses to quickly return to normal operations after a breach). 
396 I do not include network protocols in the heterogeneity requirement. While it would be 
valuable to use multiple protocols, the near-ubiquity of TCP/IP makes implementing such a rule 
extremely difficult and costly. See id. at 598-601. 
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The hardware requirement should be comparatively easy for firms to 
meet, since there is already robust competition in the relevant markets—a 
company running IBM Blade servers can readily purchase HP Proliant 
ones. Firms will sacrifice some purchasing power through decreased volume, 
at least slightly increasing costs. The software requirement, however, is 
more difficult. Microsoft dominates workstation operating systems with 
Windows, and office productivity software with Office.397 Moreover, as 
described above, organizations running ERP software or custom applica-
tions could incur significant costs when adding another option.  
For some niches, though, there are readily available (and sometimes low-
cost) alternatives. Companies can use workstations running Apple’s Mac 
OS, or a Linux variant (which is free to acquire).398 They can install 
OpenOffice (another open-source program) for word processing or spread-
sheet work. Nevertheless, the rule of thirds recognizes the software bind. It 
seeks to leave firms with a sizeable minority of functional or uncompro-
mised systems if an attacker exploits a vulnerability in the majority operat-
ing system or application. And it further tries to minimize the market 
effects of a rule that would, in effect, drive purchases away from dominant 
vendors such as Microsoft.399 Such a rule of thirds is manifestly imperfect, 
but it is workable. 
3. Due Dates 
Firms should be given an aggressive deadline for implementing divide 
and differ. A useful analogy is the effort to address the Year 2000—or 
Y2K—problem in the last years of the twentieth century. The Y2K problem 
resulted from a programming shortcut intended to conserve memory: 
software and hardware frequently stored the year portion of a date as a two-
digit number, so 1999 would be represented as “99.”400  
Policymakers slowly realized the uncertainty inherent in the change to a 
new century.401 No one could reliably predict how software would handle 
 
397 Rosenblatt, supra note 339 (illustrating Windows’ market-share dominance); see also Trefis 
Team, An Overview Why Microsoft’s Worth $42, FORBES (Jan. 9, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/greatspeculations/2013/01/09/an-overview-why-microsofts-worth-42 (documenting Office’s 95% 
market share). 
398 See RAYMOND, supra note 68, at 19-25. 
399 See Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, supra note 143, at 53 (noting the risk of market-
making effects if one technology is selected for regulatory compliance). 
400 See Farhad Manjoo, Apocalypse Then, SLATE (Nov. 11, 2009), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/technology/technology/features/2009/apocalypse_then/was_y2k_a_waste.html. 
401 John Quiggin, The Y2K Scare: Causes, Costs and Cures, AUSTL. J. PUB. ADMIN., Sept. 2005, 
at 46, 48-49 (describing government programs adopted to mitigate IT failures due to Y2K). 
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date calculations. A massive remediation effort was launched, involving 
testing, updating, and verifying nearly every extant piece of hardware and 
software.402 Nearly all of that effort occurred in less than two years’ time, 
during 1998 and 1999.403 The cost of Y2K remediation during those two 
years was enormous—estimated at $500 billion worldwide and $100 billion 
in the United States.404 Some of those costs could have been reduced had 
organizations begun remediation earlier. Yet, Y2K is proof that firms can 
successfully undertake large-scale IT restructuring in a relatively short 
period of time.405 
One factor that should be included in setting a deadline is the typical 
life cycle of computer systems. A roughly three-year depreciation cycle is 
common: on average, hardware is replaced every three to four years.406 This 
means that companies can, by shifting their procurement strategies, achieve 
significant heterogeneity quickly—they replace an average of 25% to 33% of 
their computers each year. The heterogeneity requirement mandates that at 
least 33% of an entity’s computers be from a different vendor than the 
others. An organization could achieve this goal in about a year if it pur-
chased its replacement machines from a different manufacturer. In combina-
tion with the Y2K case study, this suggests that a three-year deadline for 
compliance with the disaggregation and heterogeneity requirements is 
practicable—challenging, but manageable. 
4. Another Bribe 
The government should lessen the burden of implementing divide and 
differ with generous funding. While increased spending is politically 
difficult in a time of economic downturn and rising expenditures on enti-
tlement programs, better cybersecurity is a vital matter of national security. 
Break-ins at defense contractors, cyberattacks on the Federal Reserve, and 
 
402 Id. at 47. 
403 Id. at 49. 
404 U.S. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE YEAR 2000 TECH. PROBLEM, Y2K AFTER-
MATH—CRISIS AVERTED: FINAL COMMITTEE REPORT 11-12 (Feb. 29, 2000), available at 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps90964/y2kfinalreport.pdf. 
405 Manjoo, supra note 400 (“[W]ithin just a couple years, small and large companies were able to 
review completely and fix computer code that had been kicking around in their systems for decades.”). 
406 See, e.g., TIMOTHY MOREY & ROOPA NAMBIAR, INTEL CORP., USING TOTAL COST OF 
OWNERSHIP TO DETERMINE OPTIMAL PC REFRESH CYCLES 11-12 (updated Jan. 2010), available 
at http://www.intel.com/content/dam/doc/white-paper/pc-upgrade-industry-study-using-total-cost-of-
ownership-to-determine-optimal-pc-refresh-lifecycles-paper.pdf; Leslie Meredith, How Often 
Should Company Computers Be Replaced?, BUS. NEWS DAILY (July 18, 2010), http:// 
www.businessnewsdaily.com/65-when-to-replace-the-company-computers.html. 
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hacks of critical infrastructure make plain the character of the risk.407 
Spending on disaggregation and heterogeneity is an investment, not only 
against cyberattacks and espionage, but also against more mundane threats, 
such as natural disasters.  
Specifying the level of funding that the federal government should dedi-
cate to the problem is likely impossible, as it depends upon too many 
contingent factors. Instead, the government should concentrate on several core 
objectives. First, legislation should be attentive to easing demands on smaller 
entities.408 The burdens of added cost and technological complexity may be 
particularly acute for small businesses. Nearly 40% of reported cyberattacks in 
the first part of 2012 targeted businesses with fewer than 500 employees, yet in 
a survey of small businesses conducted in September 2012, “60% of respond-
ents admitted they have no plan” to deal with data breaches, and “66% said 
they are not concerned about cyber threats.”409 The federal government has a 
history that should be continued of easing burdens for small firms.410  
Second, the funding should be transitional—it should ease the cost of 
moving to a disaggregated data environment that runs on heterogeneous 
components. Once organizations have undertaken the necessary structural 
changes, they should support the ongoing costs of this new environment. In 
the Broadband Technology Opportunity Program, for example, the federal 
government funded the costs of building additional network capacity but 
left the ongoing operational costs to the companies operating those net-
works.411 In the short run, though, the government should underwrite a 
share of the overhead costs for the changeover, perhaps with a bonus for 
early movers via a phaseout in subsidies. To keep recordkeeping burdens 
manageable, the legislation could structure financial support as a refundable 
tax credit. Such a credit would both provide supporting documentation for a 
firm’s expenses through the standard reporting process and ensure that even 
 
407 See supra notes 380-86 and accompanying text. 
408 Cf. Frances Robinson, EU to Set Out Proposals for New Rules on Cybersecurity–Draft, WALL ST. 
J. (Feb. 4, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20130204-708228.html (exempting “micro enter-
prises” from sanctions for failure to comply with new cybersecurity rules “to avoid an excessive 
administrative burden on small businesses”). 
409 John Fontana, On Cybersecurity, Small Businesses Flirting with Disaster, Survey Finds, 
ZDNET (Oct. 17, 2012), http://www.zdnet.com/on-cybersecurity-small-businesses-flirting-with-
disaster-survey-finds-7000005891. 
410 Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 651-52. 
411 Notice of Funds Availability, Broadband Technology Opportunities Program (BTOP), 75 
Fed. Reg. 3792, 3794-95 (Jan. 22, 2010) (listing requirements for BTOP funding). 
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firms without net tax liability would benefit, since they could obtain refunds 
where eligible.412  
Lastly, the government should not cap total expenditures on cybersecu-
rity funding, since the program is a form of social insurance against cyberse-
curity risks. The government already spends significant funds on similar 
insurance. In 2012 alone, the government spent $1 billion on food safety and 
inspection,413 up to $7 billion on flood insurance claims (along with hundreds 
of millions of dollars in interest payments on loans),414 and $3.2 billion in 
crop insurance.415 A one-off investment in cybersecurity may be costly 
initially, but it will pay dividends in reduced risk in the long term. This can 
be fiscally sensible: consider, for example, that the federal government spent 
approximately $150 million on flood mitigation efforts in 2013, thereby 
avoiding roughly $1.7 billion in flood-related losses.416 The government 
should spend now to save later. 
5. Bespoke Regulation 
The legislation that implements divide and differ should tailor its re-
quirements to permit regulators to alter terms after notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. The statutory mandates for disaggregation and heterogeneity 
should act as defaults, but since they are likely to be crude ones, Congress 
should empower regulators to make more refined demands.417 The rulemaking 
should fall upon the federal agency or agencies already responsible for the 
particular sector. For some economic sectors, the relevant regulator is straight-
forward: for example, requirements for utilities should be set by the Depart-
ment of Energy (probably by the Federal Energy Regulatory 
 
412 Ruth Mason, Federalism and the Taxing Power, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 975, 1015-16 (2011) (dis-
cussing advantages of refundable tax credits); cf. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE AMERICAN 
OPPORTUNITY TAX CREDIT 4-6 (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-
policy/Documents/American-Opportunity-Tax-Credit-10-12-2010.pdf (describing the American 
Opportunity Tax Credit’s advantages over previous nonrefundable tax credits). 
413 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FY 2012: BUDGET SUMMARY AND ANNUAL PERFORMANCE 
PLAN 66 (2012), http://www.obpa.usda.gov/budsum/FY12budsum.pdf. 
414 Eric Lipton, Felicity Barringer & Mary Williams Walsh, Flood Insurance, Already Fragile, 
Faces New Stress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2012, at A1. 
415 U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., supra note 413, at 4. 
416 DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, NAT’L FLOOD INS. 
FUND, FISCAL YEAR 2013: CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION, at 1-2, 9-10 (2013), available at 
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/budget/11h_fema_nfi_fund_dhs_fy13_cj.pdf. 
417 Cf. David A. Super, Against Flexibility, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1375, 1407-08 (2011) (“The 
law often relies on default rules to respond to shortages of information, normative guidance, or 
decisional capacity . . . . These . . . effectively serve as lower-quality substitutes for the desired 
inputs.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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Commission).418 By contrast, for the financial sector, there is a congeries of 
regulators, including various elements of the Department of the Treasury, the 
Federal Reserve, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.419 As with 
the GLBA’s security requirements discussed above, these regulators should 
coordinate to issue joint regulations. 
The more refined requirements are designed to achieve appropriate levels 
of disaggregation and heterogeneity at the lowest cost.420 The legislation 
should preclude firms from seeking to substitute prevention measures for 
mitigation ones and from emphasizing their precautions. Rather, regulators 
should consider how regulated entities may best achieve resilience.421 For 
example, firms in a particular subsector might hold only nonsensitive 
information and be able to recover from cyberattacks quickly due to advanced 
backup and recovery techniques. In that case—where espionage is unlikely 
and hacking can be rapidly addressed by recovery—regulators might impose 
less stringent requirements for data separation and variegated components.  
One virtue of the rulemaking process is that it will force regulated enti-
ties to engage with the underlying goals of the statute. Firms fighting about 
“divide and differ” will have to take stock of how their computer systems 
score on these criteria. And, the notice-and-comment period may cause 
organizations to reveal information about best practices or other steps they 
take to improve resilience and mitigate the effects of attacks or spying. 
6. Respite 
Lastly, Congress should allow regulated entities to seek waivers from the 
divide-and-differ requirements if they can prove equally effective at mitigat-
ing risk through other techniques or if they can demonstrate a pressing need 
for more time to comply. For the former, the implementing legislation 
should incorporate flexibility. In unusual cases, it could permit firms to 
trade off among the two goals. For instance, a company forced to rely on a 
single, customized application might increase disaggregation of its infor-
mation and networks, such as physically separating networks or disconnecting 
 
418 See What FERC Does, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION (Jan. 20, 2014), http://www.ferc.gov/ 
about/ferc-does.asp. 
419 See supra note 271 (listing the agencies responsible for various financial regulations). 
420 Cf. Gregg P. Macey, Coasean Blind Spots: Charting the Incomplete Institutionalism, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 863, 910-11 (2010) (suggesting that the cost of regulation should be a consideration in 
developing new regulations). 
421 Cf. Burstein, supra note 299, at 181-82 & n.78 (noting that “‘grateful degradation’ of a 
network is central to the concept of resilience,” and further “defining resilience as ‘maintain[ing] a 
certain level of availability of performance even in the face of active attacks’” (alteration in 
original) (citation omitted)). 
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networks from the Internet.422 The intent is to enable individual firms to 
achieve legislative goals at the lowest cost.  
Similarly, if firms show a compelling need for more time to achieve dis-
aggregation and heterogeneity, regulators should permit a short extension of 
the deadline—perhaps by twelve or eighteen months. Ultimately, time to 
comply is a proxy for cost. Thus, waivers should be considered where the 
statutory deadline imposes costs that threaten firms’ economic viability or 
require diverting resources urgently needed for other issues (e.g., public 
safety improvements). Waivers should be unusual—the exception, rather 
than the rule. The deadline for divide and differ may be crude, but crude 
measures often suffice. And regulators should generally consider waivers on 
a wider basis than the individual firm—for example, offering them to all 
electrical utilities in rural areas, rather than a single such utility. If one firm 
deserves nonstandard treatment, its competitors likely do as well.423 This 
approach should reduce strategic behavior and avoid rewarding organizations 
that have less effective infrastructure or personnel, while penalizing their 
more effective competitors.  
7.  The Net Effect 
The combination of carrots and sticks should push firms in critical sec-
tors to mitigate the effects of cyberattacks and espionage by quickly imple-
menting the disaggregation and heterogeneity principles. 
G. Objections 
Three objections to the proposed regulatory model—the chosen mecha-
nism, technological timidity, and its cost—deserve analysis. First, why 
employ top-down specifications rather than alternatives such as best practices 
or negligence standards? Second, why is the technological timidity evinced 
by regulators not fatal to the proposal? Third, would this system impose 
unsupportable costs on firms? This Article next addresses each objection. 
The top-down regulatory model provides better notice to regulated enti-
ties than the alternatives, ensures national uniformity, and solves difficult 
 
422 See Joshua E. Kastenberg, Changing the Paradigm of Internet Access from Government Information 
Systems: A Solution to the Need for the DOD to Take Time-Sensitive Action on the NIPRNET, 64 A.F. L. 
REV. 175, 180-81 (2009) (noting the separation of networks as a cybersecurity defensive technique). 
423 Cf. Bethany R. Berger, What Owners Want and Governments Do: Evidence from the Oregon 
Experiment, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1283-84 (2009) (discussing voter repeal of Oregon 
property regulation, which provided for waivers in some cases but not others). 
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information problems. First, alternatives such as negligence424 or best-
practices425 standards provide firms notice about requirements only gradually 
and retrospectively. Technology changes rapidly. Adjudication is always 
retrospective and always slow: it tells organizations what the proper level of 
security was at the time the harm occurred, but not now. Negligence also 
uses a negative-notice model: it tells firms what precautions are inadequate, 
but not necessarily which are sufficient. Finally, negligence-focused analyses 
frequently falter in assessing harm and causation. Under this standard, insecure 
data controllers rarely face liability.426 Courts either find a lack of actionable 
harm, or a failure to link harm that occurs to insecure handling of infor-
mation.427 These hurdles are both conceptually and practically problematic. 
They suggest that a negligence standard would not effectively boost security. 
Similarly, best practices take time to disseminate and run the risk (famil-
iar from tort law) that an entire industry may take insufficient precau-
tions.428 Insecurity appears to be widespread—even sophisticated entities 
suffer successful attacks. These risks are exacerbated by cybersecurity’s 
externalities and information asymmetries. Best practices, too, respond to 
the diffuse threat of legal liability. Consumers have difficulty detecting 
laggards, and firms do not bear the full cost of insecurity. 
Moreover, a common law–negligence approach, as used in tort law, risks 
the imposition of different standards in different jurisdictions. But cyberse-
curity is a national problem: attackers do not care whether a firm is based in 
Biloxi or Boston.429 Indeed, varying standards could invite attacks against 
 
424 See Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 113, 155 (2011) (noting that negligence could be used in creating remedies to 
cybersecurity breaches). 
425 See Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1210 n.101 (2011) (discussing the limits of private best-practice agreements 
because such practices would apply only to those who agree to follow them). 
426 See Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, supra note 143, at 58 (arguing that courts largely 
exempt data owners from tort liability). 
427 See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that the plaintiffs 
had alleged only hypothetical injury and thus had no standing to file suit against the corporation 
when the plaintiffs’ personal information was exposed in a data breach); Sasha Romanosky & 
Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1078-79 (2009) (explaining the legal hurdles that plaintiffs face in 
personal-data privacy actions). 
428 See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 738 (2d Cir. 1932) (finding tugboat companies liable for failing 
to employ radios to monitor weather forecasts, even though radios were not standard in the industry). 
429 See generally U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CYBERSECURITY: NATIONAL 
STRATEGY, ROLES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES NEED TO BE BETTER DEFINED AND MORE 
EFFECTIVELY IMPLEMENTED (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652170.pdf 
(examining the national dimension of cybersecurity risks). 
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entities in relatively low-security states or locations.430 Therefore, cyberse-
curity requires a uniform national standard.  
Lastly, best practices and negligence evolve over time. Normally, this 
flexibility is a strength; however, for cybersecurity, it is a weakness: success-
ful attacks must occur to develop a standard, and refinement of that stand-
ard can occur only with subsequent breaches or hacks. Harm drives infor-
information development: regulators, including courts, learn only when 
cyberattacks cause harm. But, the harm still occurs.431 The cost of harm is 
increasingly high and outweighs whatever benefits accrue from using a 
standard rather than a rule to assess disaggregation and heterogeneity. 
The divide-and-differ system is designed to address regulators’ techno-
logical timidity. The requirements are design principles, not specific fea-
tures or capabilities. As such, regulators need little, if any, expertise to draft 
rules or evaluate compliance. They need not grapple with the relative merits 
of Linux, FreeBSD, or Windows operating systems. They must only verify 
that an organization employs more than one such system. Similarly, they do 
not have to understand the details of cloud computing; understanding that 
no single data store contains all of an entity’s information is sufficient. 
These principles are likely to endure because they describe information 
architecture rather than specific products or technologies.432 They are flexible: 
firms can implement a variety of mechanisms to meet the mandates. And 
they are clear—there is little uncertainty in how to fulfill disaggregation and 
heterogeneity goals. Divide and differ is cybersecurity regulation with 
training wheels. 
This Article’s regulatory proposal is also undeniably expensive, but those 
costs are both justified and partially offset. First, cybersecurity has been a 
top policy priority for at least fifteen years.433 President Obama even took 
the unusual step of writing an opinion piece on cybersecurity for the Wall 
Street Journal in which he described cyberattacks as “one of the most serious 
economic and national security challenges we face.”434 In his 2013 State of 
 
430 Cf. J. McIntyre Mach. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
(noting variance in plaintiff success rates in tort cases and the risks for manufacturers that result 
from forum-shopping). 
431 Cf. Gorman et al., supra note 303 (reporting a cybersecurity breach at the Defense 
Department’s fighter jet project). 
432 See Bambauer, Rules, Standards, and Geeks, supra note 143, at 52 (advocating for the use of 
general standards instead of specific rules when regulating most information technology, because 
technology develops rapidly). 
433 See Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 592 (noting cybersecurity proposals during 
the Clinton Administration). 
434 President Barack Obama, Taking the Cyberattack Threat Seriously, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 
2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444330904577535492693044650.html. 
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the Union address, he again argued, “We cannot look back years from now 
and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and 
our economy.”435 The director of the NSA estimated that cybercrime costs $1 
trillion per year, constituting “the greatest transfer of wealth in history.”436 
Further, a new National Security Estimate identifies cyberespionage as a 
major threat to the United States’ economic competitiveness.437 And former 
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has raised the frightening prospect of a 
“cyber 9/11.”438 This significant threat justifies significant expense. Since the 
9/11 attacks, for example, federal government spending has risen by $110 
billion on terrorist-related intelligence expenditures, in addition to the $200 
billion increase in local government and private-firm spending.439  
Second, insecurity creates a negative externality. Insecure organizations 
pass costs to others, even if only in the form of risk, without being penalized 
for them. This Article’s proposal would cause insecure organizations to 
spend to upgrade security, which would force them at least partly to 
internalize these costs from risk.440 Though the amount spent is unlikely to 
match precisely the amount of the externality, the regulatory mandate is 
similar in effect to a Pigouvian tax.441 The mandate’s costs are a crude means 
of mitigating the externality. 
Third, the proposal contemplates having the federal government defray 
some of the mandate’s costs. Since cybersecurity is a public good, subsidiz-
ing it from the public fisc is sensible. The lure of funding will likely reduce 
(though not eliminate) opposition to the legislation and will likely lessen its 
influence on firms’ budget allocations.442  
 
435 Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address, WHITE HOUSE (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address. 
436 See Peter Maass & Megha Rajagopalan, Does Cybercrime Really Cost $1 Trillion?, PROPUBLICA 
(Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/does-cybercrime-really-cost-1-trillion. 
437 Ellen Nakashima, Cyber-Spying Said to Target U.S. Business, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2013, at A1. 
438 See David E. Sanger & Thom Shanker, Broad Powers Seen for Obama in Cyberstrikes, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 4, 2013, at A1 (describing a cyberattack scenario that would require military involvement). 
439 John Mueller & Mark G. Stewart, Does the United States Spend Too Much on Homeland 
Security?, SLATE (Sept. 7, 2011), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2011/09/ 
does_the_united_states_spend_too_much_on_homeland_security.html. 
440 Camp & Wolfram, supra note 136, at 18-19. 
441 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs, 
19 J. PUB. ECON. 385, 385-86 (1982) (defining a Pigouvian tax and explaining the costs associated 
with its use). 
442 Cf. Ronald Brownstein, Why the GOP’s Resistance to Medicaid Expansion Is Eroding, NAT’L J. 
(Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.nationaljournal.com/columns/political-connections/why-the-gop-s-resistance-
to-medicaid-expansion-is-eroding-20130207 (describing how generous federal funding is leading states to 
expand Medicaid health insurance programs, even though doing so requires state expenditures). 
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Better cybersecurity is a sensible investment to combat a problem de-
fined by America’s leaders as grave. Firms can feel at least partly reassured 
that their government will help fund the divide-and-differ mandate and 
should realize—perhaps grudgingly—that some of its burden is warranted 
to offset externalities. 
Thus, to guard against unauthorized access and alteration of infor-
mation, cybersecurity law should mandate disaggregated, heterogeneous 
storage of information for entities in key economic sectors and for firms 
seeking government contracts. 
IV. THE UNKNOWN UNKNOWNS 
A. The Threat 
Someone picked the locksmith’s door. 
The attack began via “Spear Phishing,” a strategy where the attacker 
targets a specific set of users through a fraudulent email.443 A number of 
employees at the security company RSA received email messages with the 
subject line “2011 Recruitment Plan.”444 Attached to the messages was a 
Microsoft Excel file containing an Adobe Flash movie.445 When one 
employee opened the file, it launched the movie, which contained code that 
exploited a previously unknown bug in Flash.446 Such zero-day attacks 
cannot be prevented technologically; defenders have no knowledge of the 
vulnerability that the attack exploits, and hence cannot defeat it.447 A zero-
day vulnerability is an unknown unknown: defenders are unaware of either 
its existence or its character. 
The consequences for RSA were painful. The file installed a Remote Ac-
cess Tool (RAT) giving the attacker control over the employee’s computer.448 
The attacker monitored the computer and RSA’s network, stealing user 
 
443 Uri Rivner, Anatomy of an Attack, RSA (Apr. 1, 2011), https://blogs.rsa.com/anatomy-of-
an-attack. 
444 Elinor Mills, Attack on RSA Used Zero-Day Flash Exploit in Excel, CNET (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20051071-245.html. 
445 Peter Bright, Spearphishing + Zero-Day: RSA Hack Not “Extremely Sophisticated,” ARS TECHNICA 
(Apr. 4, 2011), http://arstechnica.com/security/2011/04/spearphishing-0-day-rsa-hack-not-extremely-
sophisticated. 
446 Id. 
447 See O’Harrow, supra note 230 (defining a zero-day as “a vulnerability in the software that 
has never been made public and for which there is no known fix”). 
448 See Riva Richmond, The RSA Hack: How They Did It, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2011), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/02/the-rsa-hack-how-they-did-it (mentioning the “stealthy 
tool” that allows hackers to control a machine from afar); Rivner, supra note 443 (describing the 
Poison Ivy tool as an Advanced Persistent Threat). 
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credentials (login names and passwords) that allowed access to sensitive 
information about the SecurID tokens.449 Though RSA detected the attack 
quickly, the damage was done: the company’s parent firm, EMC, spent $66 
million to help customers mitigate the damage.450  
RSA’s chairman stated that the compromised information “could poten-
tially be used to reduce the effectiveness of a current two-factor authentica-
tion implementation as part of a broader attack.”451 He was right. Defense 
contractor L-3 Communications was hacked by attackers who used falsified 
codes from a SecurID token that was cloned using the stolen information 
from the RSA attack.452 Around the same time, two other defense contractors 
reportedly suffered similar attacks.453 This combination of human and compu-
ting weakness—of one gullible employee and one unknown vulnerability—led 
directly to national security harm to the United States. 
A zero-day attack is akin to the Crane Kick in the movie The Karate 
Kid: if it is done properly, no defense is possible.454 Zero-days have been at 
the heart of successful attacks on Iran’s nuclear refinement facilities, 
Google’s data stores, and American defense contractors.455 This potency 
makes zero-days challenging for cybersecurity regulation. Formally, a zero-
day attack is a weaponized exploit of a significant security flaw—an exploit 
 
449 Id.; see also Bright, supra note 445 (explaining that access to SecurID converts a two-factor 
system into a single-factor, password-only system). 
450 See Hayley Tsukayama, Cyber Attack on RSA Cost EMC $66 Million, WASH. POST (July 26, 
2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/cyber-attack-on-rsa-cost-emc-66-million/ 
2011/07/26/gIQA1ceKbI_blog.html (“[EMC] incurred an accrued cost associated with investigating 
the attack, hardening our systems and working with customers to implement our remediation 
programs.”). 
451 Letter from Art Coviello, Exec. Chairman, RSA, to RSA Customers (June 6, 2011), avail-
able at http://www.ncanet.com/resources/press-releases/91-2011-06-08-art-coviello-rsa-open-letter-
customers.html. 
452 See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Northrop Grumman, L-3 Communications Hacked via Cloned RSA 
SecurID Tokens, EWEEK (June 2, 2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Northrop-Grumman-
L3-Communications-Hacked-via-Cloned-RSA-SecurID-Tokens-841662 (providing an overview of 
L-3 Communications and information about the attack). 
453 Id. 
454 THE KARATE KID (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1984). But see The Karate Kid Crane Kick—No 
Can Defense?, IKIGAIWAY (Feb. 6, 2012), http://www.ikigaiway.com/2012/the-karate-kid-crane-kick-
no-can-defense (speculating that the crane kick may, in fact, be defensible). 
455 See Fahmida Y. Rashid, Adobe Zero-Day Exploit Targeted Defense Contractors, EWEEK (Dec. 7, 
2011), http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Security/Adobe-ZeroDay-Exploit-Targeted-Defense-Contractors-
383203 (discussing attacks exploiting a vulnerability in Adobe Reader); Sanger, supra note 15 
(discussing President Obama’s secret orders to attack the computer systems running Iran’s main 
nuclear refinement facilities); Zetter, supra note 170 (discussing the zero-day attacks on Google). 
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that neither software vendors nor antivirus firms know about.456 Users 
targeted by the exploit are almost completely vulnerable to it: unless they 
can block the traffic implementing the attack—meaning they must detect 
such traffic—their systems will be compromised.457  
Zero-day exploits are the most dangerous weapons in an attacker’s arsenal, 
and security researchers have argued that commerce in such tools should be 
banned.458 They help explain why cybersecurity is partial at best: certain 
aspects of the security problem cannot be solved. If Chinese security 
services discover a zero-day attack on Microsoft Windows, Windows users 
are vulnerable to that cyberweapon until it is independently discovered, 
accidentally patched, or voluntarily shared by China.459  
Zero-days also present a disturbing dual trend: regulation of their use is 
effectively impossible, and a growing commercial market exists for their 
production, aggregation, and distribution.460 While countries may be able to 
constrain their own use of exploits, they cannot effectively limit use by other 
nation-states. Zero-day attacks blur the line between espionage and war-like 
spying, they are difficult to detect and attribute to a particular source, and like 
war, they can damage their targets (and perhaps bystanders).461 Combat can 
 
456 See Brian Krebs, Advanced Persistent Tweets: Zero-Day in 140 Characters, KREBS ON SECURITY 
(May 3, 2011), http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/05/advanced-persistent-tweets-zero-day-in-140-characters 
(analogizing zero-day attacks to ninjas due to their strength and anonymity); O’Harrow, supra note 220. 
457 See, e.g., TIPPING POINT, THE TOP CYBER SECURITY RISKS 21 (2009), available at 
http://www.dunkel.de/pdf/200909_TopCyberSecurityRisks.pdf (noting that when “a working 
exploit of the vulnerability has been released into the wild, users of the affected software will 
continue to be compromised until a software patch is available or some form of mitigation is taken 
by the user”). 
458 Ryan Naraine, “0-day Exploit Middlemen Are Cowboys, Ticking Bomb,” ZDNET (Feb. 16, 
2012), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/0-day-exploit-middlemen-are-cowboys-ticking-bomb/10294 
(warning against the danger of trading vulnerabilities); Tom Simonite, Welcome to the Malware-
Industrial Complex, MIT TECH. REV. (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/507971/ 
welcome-to-the-malware-industrial-complex (explaining that the market for zero-days remains 
unregulated). 
459 See, e.g., Gregg Keizer, Elite Hacker Gang Has Unlimited Supply of Zero-Day Bugs, COM-
PUTERWORLD (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9231051/Elite_hacker_gang_ 
has_unlimited_supply_of_zero_day_bugs (discussing an elite hacker group’s suspected 2010 zero-
day attack on Google and other Western companies that Google initially attributed to Chinese 
hackers). 
460 See Ryan Gallagher, Cyberwar’s Gray Market, SLATE (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.slate.com/ 
articles/technology/future_tense/2013/01/zero_day_exploits_should_the_hacker_gray_market_be_ 
regulated.html (“[T]here are fears that the burgeoning trend in finding and selling exploits is 
spiraling out of control.”). 
461 See, e.g., Nate Anderson, Confirmed: US and Israel Created Stuxnet, Lost Control of It, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 1, 2012), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/06/confirmed-us-israel-created-
stuxnet-lost-control-of-it (describing how the United States and Israel developed and deployed 
Stuxnet to attack Iran’s nuclear program, but the virus spread to other systems). 
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be governed because attacks can be linked to a particular country, and 
because states have an interest in a shared set of rules that protect their 
combatants as well.462 The rise of organized armed violence by nonstate 
actors, such as terrorist groups, challenges the laws of war in ways similar to 
cyberattacks.463 Terrorist attacks are harder to link to a particular entity or 
group, and terrorists are often willing to forgo the protections of the laws of 
war to more effectively pursue their goals.464 Cyberattacks are also difficult 
to attribute, increasing countries’ willingness to use them. In addition, some 
states, such as North Korea, have little to lose from cyber-retaliation, which 
undercuts adherence to legal rules or norms.465 There is still no definitive 
proof, for example, that Russia was responsible for the cyberattacks on 
Estonia in 2007, or that North Korea was behind the attacks on South Korea 
and the United States in July 2009.466 
Where there is armed conflict, there are arms merchants. In previous 
work, security researcher Oliver Day and I described the market for soft-
ware security vulnerabilities.467 That research, though, did not address one 
increasingly important consumer for exploits: nation-states.468 A new set of 
firms, such as Vupen, cater principally to intelligence services; they refuse 
to share vulnerability information with vendors, preferring to confer an 
advantage upon their clients.469 Countries pay better than software compa-
nies.470 These firms amass zero-day exploits for widely used operating 
 
462 See Scott J. Shackelford & Richard B. Andres, State Responsibility for Cyber Attacks: Com-
peting Standards for a Growing Problem, 42 GEO. J. INT’L L. 971, 984-92 (2011) (reviewing different 
standards used to hold cyberattackers more accountable). 
463 Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of 
Armed Conflict in the Age of Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 676-78 (2004) (arguing that the 
distinction between national security and domestic issues is blurred by new conflicts arising from 
globalization). 
464 Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56 VILL. L. REV. 
569, 600-02 (2011). 
465 Bambauer, Conundrum, supra note 26, at 618-19 (“North Korea ha[s] little to lose if the 
Internet goes offline.”). 
466 Id. at 596-97 (“In both cases, initial judgments that a State (Russia or North Korea) was 
responsible dissolved into uncertainty in the face of mixed evidence.”). 
467 See generally Bambauer & Day, supra note 43. 
468 I thank Chris Soghoian for helpful discussion of this point. 
469 See Andy Greenberg, Meet The Hackers Who Sell Spies the Tools to Crack Your PC (and Get Paid 
Six-Figure Fees), FORBES (Mar. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/21/ 
meet-the-hackers-who-sell-spies-the-tools-to-crack-your-pc-and-get-paid-six-figure-fees. 
470 States may offer rewards other than money. The United States obtains confidential vulnera-
bility data from firms in exchange for classified information, among other valuable data. See Michael 
Riley, U.S. Agencies Said to Swap Data with Thousands of Firms, BLOOMBERG (June 14, 2013), http:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-14/u-s-agencies-said-to-swap-data-with-thousands-of-firms.html 
(“Thousands of technology, finance and manufacturing companies are working closely with U.S. 
national security agencies, providing sensitive information and in return receiving benefits . . . .”). 
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systems and applications such as Microsoft Windows, Google Chrome, and 
Adobe Flash.471 They offer not only information about software weaknesses 
but also tools to attack them.472 In the language of security researchers, 
Vupen and its ilk sell weaponized exploits, and business is good.473 
While worrisome, companies that sell zero-days are at least subject to 
some controls. Vupen must obey the laws of France, where it is located.474 
Market pressures and the threat of potential regulation have led the company 
to declare that it will sell only to customers in NATO countries.475 By 
contrast, the underground market for zero-day exploits knows no such 
limits.476 Eliminating this market is effectively impossible: movements of 
information are too difficult to detect and interdict. Any proposal to deal 
with the zero-day problem will necessarily be incomplete, but not valueless.  
The open market in zero-day exploits presents four key worries. First, 
sellers may transact directly with unfriendly buyers. Vupen sells only to 
NATO countries, but other firms may not be so selective.477 Indeed, if there 
are fewer suppliers for non-NATO countries, those countries likely must 
pay a price premium for access, making them attractive customers. Second, 
the legitimate market may supply a gray or black market indirectly through 
secondary transactions. Purchasers of zero-days, for example, may resell 
them, knowing they are secure against those particular exploits.478 Third, 
buyers may involuntarily create risk through a lack of cybersecurity, particu-
larly if zero-day tools are shared widely within the purchasing entity or 
beyond.479 For instance, if a national security agency shares exploits with 
civilian cybersecurity agencies and those civilian agencies’ systems are 
compromised, the zero-days could spread even though the initial purchaser 
 
471 See Greenberg, supra note 469. 
472 See Naraine, Vista Exploit Surfaces on Russian Hacker Site, supra note 62.  
473 See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List for Hackers’ Secret Software 
Exploits, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23/shopping-
for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackers-secret-software-exploits (providing a list of some of the 
most lucrative prices garnered for zero-day exploits). 
474 VUPEN SECURITY, THREAT PROTECTION PROGRAM 1, http://wikileaks.org/spyfiles/ 
files/0/279_VUPEN-THREAD-EXPLOITS.pdf (last accessed Mar. 22, 2014) (listing the 
company’s address in Montpelier, France). 
475 Greenberg, supra note 469. 
476 Bambauer & Day, supra note 43, at 1066-68. 
477 See Gary Davis, Zero-Day Exploits Provide an Inside Look at the Cybercriminal Black Market, 
MCAFEE (Nov. 13, 2012), http://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/zero-day-exploits-provide-an-inside-
look-at-the-cybercriminal-black-market (describing the billion-dollar “Cyber Black Market” and 
the threat of zero-day exploits). 
478 This is an important difference between kinetic attacks and cyberattacks. A party who 
resells a kinetic weapon faces the risk of attack from it, generating some deterrence for secondary 
sales. A party with a zero-day can take precautions against it, reducing or eliminating such resale risk. 
479 I thank Chris Soghoian for this point. 
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remains secure.480 Finally, sellers present attractive targets for hacking and 
espionage.481 To someone who wants weapons, burglarizing a gun store 
likely seems sensible. Vupen’s systems are probably more secure than most, 
but they are not perfect, and a breach of its data could be catastrophic. 
Researchers have proposed regulating zero-day exploits as cyberweapons, 
such as by imposing limits on transactions and exports.482 These proposals 
are worth considering and would be consonant with past security efforts. 
For example, the United States long regulated the export of strong encryp-
tion, classifying it as a munition.483 Regulation, though, faces both legal and 
practical obstacles. Legally, transactions in information increasingly receive 
First Amendment protection against governmental regulation.484 Bans on 
zero-day sales might pass muster under commercial speech’s intermediate 
scrutiny standard, though sharing source code could potentially draw 
heightened scrutiny.485 The recent trend in Supreme Court jurisprudence on 
laws regulating information is toward skepticism. Though national security 
constitutes a government interest greater than protecting children from 
violent video games, blocking emotionally harmful protests at funerals, or 
 
480 See, e.g., Ryan Gallagher, supra note 460 (explaining the dangers of an unregulated zero-
day exploit market for national governments and agencies). 
481 Cf. Jaikumar Vijayan, Vupen Security Denies It’s Been Hacked, COMPUTERWORLD (June 7, 2012), 
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9227875/Vupen_Security_denies_it_s_been_hacked (noting 
that Vupen “find[s] and exploit[s] unpatched bugs in leading software products,” which it then sells 
“to security vendors, governments, law enforcement agencies and to corporations”). 
482 See, e.g., Taiwo A. Oriola, Bugs for Sale: Legal and Ethical Proprieties of the Market in Software 
Vulnerabilities, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 451, 521-22 (2011) (“Th[is] pa-
per . . . urges that industry and government should cease patronizing the underground market for 
vulnerabilities, and penalize illicit vulnerabilities trading.”); James Ball, Secrecy Surrounding ‘Zero-
Day Exploits’ Industry Spurs Calls for Government Oversight, WASH. POST (Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-01/world/35498227_1_exploits-researchers-security-flaws; 
Mathew J. Schwartz, Weaponized Bugs: Time for Digital Arms Control, INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 5, 
2012), http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/weaponized-bugs-time-for-digital-arms-co/ 
240008564 (“Given the shift from bug bounties to vulnerabilities being used to power digital 
espionage or offensive operations, why not regulate the sale of dangerous bugs?”). 
483 See, e.g., Thinh Nguyen, Note, Cryptography, Export Controls, and the First Amendment in 
Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 10 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 667, 671-72 (1997) (stating that an 
encryption program called “Snuffle” was classified as a “defense item” and placed on the U.S. 
Munitions List). 
484 See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (providing First Amendment 
protection to “[s]peech in aid of pharmaceutical marketing”); see also Jane Bambauer, Is Data 
Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014) (“Together, these principles suggest that state action will 
trigger the First Amendment any time it purposefully interferes with the creation of knowledge.”). 
485 See Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 176 F.3d 1132, 1145 (9th Cir.) (“Nor need we resolve 
whether the challenged regulations constitute content-based restrictions, subject to the strictest 
constitutional scrutiny, or whether they are, instead, content-neutral restrictions meriting less 
exacting scrutiny.”), reh’g en banc granted and opinion withdrawn, 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir. 1999). See 
generally Nguyen, supra note 483. 
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preventing animal cruelty, regulation of software code is likely to face 
searching judicial review.486 
Regulation of zero-day transactions also faces practical barriers. It may 
be difficult to identify a zero-day exploit as opposed to other vulnerability 
information for regulatory purposes, although computer scientists are 
confident in their ability to define the category.487 Attempts to regulate the 
sale of surveillance or censorship technology, for example, have foundered on 
the problem of defining permitted and prohibited transactions, particularly 
for dual-use goods.488 Sellers may not know whether a vendor has 
knowledge of a particular flaw, and requirements to divulge information to 
them could undercut the security research market489 (and possibly consti-
tute a taking if the exploit qualifies as a trade secret490). Moreover, intrusive 
regulation risks driving transactions underground or offshore.491 Vupen may 
be obnoxious, but at least it operates overtly. All of these difficulties may be 
worth tolerating, however, if they increase the cost of malfeasors’ access to 
zero-day exploits.  
B. Partial Defenses 
While a complete defense to zero-day attacks is impossible, policymakers 
can improve cybersecurity with three regulatory moves: (1) mandatory 
access to public zero-day markets for the federal government, (2) required 
confidential reporting on transactions by firms in those markets, and (3) a 
reward system for researchers who share vulnerabilities with the government. 
 
486 See generally Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (video games); Snyder v. 
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (funeral protests); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (animal 
cruelty). 
487 See generally, e.g., Lajos Nagy, Richard Ford & William Allen, N-Version Programming for 
the Detection of Zero-Day Exploits (Apr. 2006) (paper presented at the IEEE Topical Conference on 
Cybersecurity), available at https://www.cs.fit.edu/media/TechnicalReports/cs-2006-04.pdf (using 
an auction web application to show resilience to non-zero-day vulnerabilities, in an effort to detect 
zero-day attacks). 
488 See Derek Bambauer, Cool Tools for Tyrants, LEGAL AFF. (Jan.–Feb. 2006), http:// 
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-2006/feature_bambauer_janfeb06.msp (explaining how 
attempts to regulate each technology have given rise to ambiguous and vague crimes in nations 
like China). 
489 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention (stating 
that research is a “risky process” and removing this risk has the potential to foster inefficiency and 
misallocation since “the profitability of invention requires a nonoptimal allocation of resources”), 
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 
616-17 (1962). 
490 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 987 (1984) (holding that intangible property, 
to the extent it constitutes a trade secret, is subject to the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause). 
491 Bambauer & Day, supra note 43, at 1067-68. 
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Congress should pass legislation to implement these measures, and the United 
States should move to convert unknown unknowns to known unknowns. 
First, firms that transact in software security vulnerabilities should be 
required to permit the federal government to participate in any offerings or 
services they provide, on nondiscriminatory terms. If Vupen, for example, 
sought to sell zero-day exploits to France’s security services, but not to the 
United States’ NSA, that would be problematic. Software security firms 
should be legally bound to provide paid access to the U.S. government as a 
necessary condition of continued operation. This would enable the government 
to develop and deploy countermeasures to at least some zero-day attacks. 
Congress has taken analogous measures for other potential risks to na-
tional security. For example, one cannot obtain a patent for inventions in 
nuclear materials or weapons,492 but such inventions are eligible for a 
governmental reward scheme.493 And, the statute transfers rights to the 
invention from the inventor to the federal government.494 Similarly, export 
controls restrict private firms’ ability to engage in transactions with foreign 
countries. One may not transfer software utilizing encryption to countries 
such as Iran or North Korea,495 and one may not sell certain supercomputers 
to countries such as China or Russia.496 These rules apply to all firms within 
U.S. jurisdiction. Thus, Congress has either mandated or forbidden certain 
transactions based on national security concerns and could mount a similar 
effort for zero-day sales. 
Not all zero-day merchants fall under U.S. jurisdiction or enforcement. 
Even those operating abroad, however, likely have contacts with the United 
States. Vupen’s employees, for example, visit the United States.497 Many, if 
not all, such firms use financial or payment processing companies that are 
 
492 See 42 U.S.C. § 2181(a) (2006) (“No patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or 
discovery which is useful solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an 
atomic weapon.”); Michael Risch, Everything Is Patentable, 75 TENN. L. REV. 591, 595 n.22 (2008). 
493 See id. § 2187(b)(3) (explaining the royalty-fee reward system for nuclear-related inventions). 
494 See id. § 2183 (providing the Nuclear Regulatory Commission with a license to use any 
such product that receives a patent). 
495 See Peter Swire & Kenesa Ahmad, Encryption and Globalization, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. 
L. REV. 416, 437-41 (2012) (providing a history of the restrictions of the U.S. encryption export 
regime). See generally U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, Advisory Opinion: Downloads of Encrypted Software 
Reviewed and Classified as “Mass Market” (Sept. 11, 2009), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/ 
index.php/policy-guidance/advisory-opinions (click document title link) (prohibiting the knowing 
dissemination of encryption software to Iran, Cuba, Syria, Sudan, and North Korea). 
496 15 C.F.R. § 740.7 (2013) (creating a tiered system by which certain levels of supercomput-
ers are prohibited from being exported to certain nations). 
497 Vupen, Upcoming Events to Meet the VUPEN Team, http://www.vupen.com/english/events.php 
(last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (listing upcoming corporate events in Florida, Nevada, and Washing-
ton, D.C.). 
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subject to U.S. regulation. Some software companies, such as Microsoft, are 
eager to access U.S. government data on vulnerabilities and threats and 
have demonstrated a willingness to provide the NSA with exploit infor-
mation before making it public.498 These links provide potential leverage. 
Congress could attach provisions to this legislation that would allow the 
executive branch to designate firms that do not provide access to the govern-
ment and to require banks and payment processors to forgo transactions with 
them.499 Analogous measures have been implemented to interdict financing 
for terrorist groups500 and have been proposed to deal with websites illegally 
offering prescription drugs or copyrighted works.501 
Second, Congress should mandate a transaction-reporting system for 
firms trading in vulnerabilities. These companies should have to report, on a 
confidential basis, the purchaser’s identity in all transactions of zero-day 
exploits to the NSA. This data would remain confidential and should be 
designated as statutorily immune from discovery or other use unless the 
NSA expressly chooses to share it.502 The statute should enable auditing of 
firms’ records by the NSA if the Agency is able to demonstrate an objectively 
reasonable basis to suspect inaccuracies or falsification. To make this 
provision less objectionable for the vulnerability merchants, Congress 
should include payments to the reporting firms. While additional spending 
 
498 See Sean Gallagher, NSA Gets Early Access to Zero-Day Data from Microsoft, Others, ARS 
TECHNICA (June 14, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/06/nsa-gets-early-access-to-zero-
day-data-from-microsoft-others (detailing information swaps between the NSA and Microsoft, 
among other government agencies and private corporations). 
499 See David Adams, Analysis: U.S. Sanctions Make Cuba’s Bank Account Too Toxic for Banks, 
REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/29/us-cuba-usa-banking-analysis-
idUSBRE9AS0QE20131129. This threat is significant. After MasterCard, Visa, Discover, and 
PayPal ceased processing payments to WikiLeaks, its revenues fell by 95%. Yochai Benkler, A Free 
Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the Battle over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 311, 339-42 (2011) (explaining that Senator Lieberman requested that U.S. 
companies cut financial ties with WikiLeaks—a request with which they complied). 
500 See, e.g., Exec. Order 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 25, 2001) (imposing penalties on 
those engaging in or otherwise supporting terrorism). 
501 See, e.g., Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. § 101(21)(B) (2011) (seeking “[t]o 
promote prosperity, creativity, entrepreneurship, and innovation by combating the theft of U.S. 
property,” including copyrighted works); Mathea Falco & Philip Heymann, Fighting the Online Drug 
Corner, WASH. POST (Mar. 15, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/ 
03/14/AR2008031403018.html (arguing that “credit card companies and their sponsoring financial 
institutions should prohibit the use of their services for illicit sales of controlled substances,” 
specifically prescription drugs). 
502 Cf. Bambauer, Cybersieves, supra note 177, at 434-35 (describing disclosure requirements 
for “collect[ed] information about civil judgments, settlements, and [certain] criminal convictions 
against physicians and health care providers” that is not accessible by the general public but is 
accessible to regulators). 
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is politically difficult, this expenditure would be a small but worthwhile 
investment in security.  
Similar reporting systems are widely used to mitigate risk. NASA, for 
example, encourages confidential reporting of “near-miss incidents”—those 
that nearly resulted in aviation mishaps—to improve safety procedures and 
detect product defects.503 Similarly, insurers offering policies for medical 
malpractice liability must report judgments and settlements to the National 
Health Practitioner Data Bank.504 This malpractice information is available 
for use by state medical licensing boards and federal agencies, but is otherwise 
confidential.505 In addition, the Federal Railroad Administration is testing a 
Confidential Close Call Reporting System to identify risks in rail operations 
via confidential reporting of near-miss incidents.506 The Department of 
Veterans Affairs has a similar reporting system for patient safety.507 And 
finally, the Federal Communications Commission has one for network 
outages.508 Thus, the federal government already has well-established 
confidential reporting systems to help manage risk. 
A zero-day reporting system has several benefits. It would enable the 
government to detect problematic sales, particularly to unfriendly states and 
insecure parties. It would increase the effectiveness of countermeasures that 
mitigate zero-day exploits by providing a rough guide to how widely 
distributed a particular attack tool is. It would allow the government to 
identify whether firms follow their stated criteria for sales (such as Vupen’s 
self-imposed limit to NATO countries and clients) and to scrutinize suspect 
firms more closely. Lastly, it would provide a crude estimate of the ebb and 
flow of zero-day threats and of the platforms and applications viewed by the 
merchant as worthy of attention (and payment). 
Finally, Congress should authorize a “bug bounty” program.509 Its goal 
would be to collect zero-day exploits and encourage researchers to sell their 
 
503 Aviation Safety Reporting System, NASA, http://asrs.arc.nasa.gov/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2014). 
504 42 U.S.C. § 11131 (2006) (requiring reports on medical malpractice payments). 
505 Id. § 11137 (listing exceptions to confidentiality). 
506 Introduction: Confidential Close Call Reporting System, BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., http:// 
www.c3rs.bts.gov/index.htm (aiming to allow citizens and railworkers to report “a close call” online). 
507 VA National Center for Patient Safety, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFF., http:// 
www.patientsafety.va.gov/media/reporting.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2014) (describing the Patient 
Safety Information System—an “internal, confidential, non-punitive system” used to document 
patient safety). 
508 Network Outage Reporting System (NORS), FCC, http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/services/ 
cip/nors/nors.html (describing a “web-based filing system” to report “significant disruptions or 
outages” in communication networks). 
509 Kim Zetter, With Millions Paid in Hacker Bug Bounties, Is the Internet Any Safer?, WIRED 
(Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/11/bug-bounties (explaining how the “Google 
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findings to the U.S. government rather than to private firms or other 
nation-states. A government agency, such as the NSA or the U.S. Computer 
Emergency Readiness Team (CERT), should be provided funds to buy 
zero-day vulnerability information.510 The entity selling the exploit, such as 
a security research firm, would have to certify under penalty of perjury that 
it had not previously shared the vulnerability information with others and 
would have to agree contractually not to do so in the future.511 Congress 
should consider backing these requirements with substantial criminal 
penalties as it has done in other contexts.512 Arms dealers who sell to both 
sides are held in low esteem.  
Similar private bounty programs implemented by Google and Mozilla 
have had considerable success in identifying and remediating bugs.513 The 
funding and amount paid per bug should be generous: removing zero-days 
from the Internet ecosystem is highly beneficial. Moreover, generous 
payments will have further positive effects. First, these payments will spur 
researchers to search for additional bugs. These bugs are like latent defects 
in a product—they lurk, creating risk, until they are discovered. Second, 
paying above-market rates makes it more difficult for others to purchase zero-
days. Pushing others out of the zero-day market is useful both offensively and 
defensively. Offensively, accumulating zero-days provides the United States 
with the building blocks for future Stuxnets. Defensively, it reduces the 
likelihood that U.S. firms or government entities will fall victim to attack. 
However, the bug bounty program will create several challenges. First, 
price: more competition for zero-day exploits will drive up their cost. This 
increase will burden the public fisc slightly but will incentivize bug research. 
Second, the government will need to decide how to use exploit information. 
Congress could establish rules for what the NSA may do with the data, or it 
 
Pwnium” contest has been used successfully to encourage hackers to “bug hunt” for companies 
rather than for the black market). 
510 Cf. Bambauer & Day, supra note 43, at 1102-03 (suggesting CERT as a clearinghouse for 
vulnerabilities). 
511 Cf. Zero Day Initiative, TIPPINGPOINT, http://www.zerodayinitiative.com/about (last visited 
Mar. 22, 2014) (requiring “researchers [to] provide TippingPoint with exclusive information about 
previously un-patched vulnerabilities”). 
512 Cf. 18 U.S.C. § 175 (2012) (outlining serious penalties for possession of biological weapons). 
513 Thomas Claburn, Google Ups Bug Bounties Amid Booming Exploit Market, INFORMATIONWEEK 
(Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.informationweek.com/security/management/google-ups-bug-bounties-
amid-booming-exp/240005721 (explaining Google’s and Mozilla’s successful reward systems for 
vulnerability disclosure, including two $60,000 Google payments for impressive finds); Dennis 
Fisher, Behind the Numbers of Mozilla’s Bug Bounty Program, THREATPOST (Sept. 28, 2011), 
http://threatpost.com/behind-numbers-mozillas-bug-bounty-program-092811/75701 (finding that the 
number of bug reports received by Mozilla has dropped significantly since the implementation of 
bug bounty programs). 
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could defer to the Agency (and, by extension, the executive branch) to make 
that decision. If the Agency uses the exploits to build cyberweapons, such as 
Stuxnet, or enables others to do so, it is likely to share vulnerability infor-
mation less widely than it would without a vision of offensive use. If the 
Agency enables other government entities or private firms to safeguard 
against the zero-days, it risks having those patches shared, including with 
potential targets. There is also an ironic feedback effect: the more important 
the vulnerability, the greater the temptation to weaponize it, and thus 
withhold it from other affected parties.  
The hardest decision regarding sharing is determining whether to notify 
the affected vendor.514 This Article argues that telling the vendor about the 
vulnerable code should be the default practice, with two caveats. First, the 
NSA should work with the vendor to ensure the patch for the vulnerability 
is maximally effective and minimally visible. If the company draws attention 
to the patch’s criticality, it may signal to anyone who has independently 
discovered it that the window of vulnerability is closing, which could draw 
attacks.515 Second, the NSA should work with the vendor to include detec-
tion code in its patches. This would help the Agency estimate how often 
vulnerabilities are discovered independently, and perhaps to detect double-
dealing by researchers participating in the bug-bounty system.516  
This Article’s solutions for the zero-day problem—the unknown un-
knowns—differ in character from those for vulnerabilities with existing 
solutions (the known unknowns) in that they have a greater focus on 
prevention. Mitigation is still invaluable: disaggregation and heterogeneity 
are just as helpful for zero-days as for known bugs. Preventive steps, 
however, are more important for zero-day exploits than for known bugs. 
With known vulnerabilities, defenses are possible, though logistically 
constrained by externalities, information costs, and system complexity. With 
 
514 See Bambauer & Day, supra note 43, at 1089-90 (arguing for legislation that would create a 
safe harbor for researchers when they report a vulnerability to the vendor before publishing such 
information). 
515 Ashish Arora, Anand Nandkumar & Rahul Telang, Does Information Security Attack Fre-
quency Increase with Vulnerability Disclosure? An Empirical Analysis, 8 INFO. SYS. FRONTIERS 350, 
355 (2006) (finding that vulnerabilities are either “secret, published, or patched” and that a 
vulnerability can be a secret but still continue to get exploited (emphasis removed)). 
516 See Andy Ozment, Vulnerability Discovery & Software Security 88-95 (Aug. 31, 2007) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Cambridge), available at http://www.andyozment.com/ 
papers/ozment_dissertation.pdf (explaining the role of independent discovery in detecting vulnerabil-
ities and finding that often, multiple researchers independently find the same vulnerability).  
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zero-days, however, defenses are impossible.517 Defenders must rely solely 
on mitigation and recovery. While prevention tends to be overrated in 
cybersecurity literature, it remains useful in practice. In particular, even if 
complete prevention is impossible, defenders may be able to reduce an 
exploit’s effects—for example, by allowing a server to terminate an affected 
program, rather than having it cause the server to crash. This is similar to a 
public health approach: even if we cannot prevent people from contracting a 
virus, we may be able to make it less lethal.518 Thus, the three-part agenda 
above seeks to increase America’s access to information about zero-days, 
thereby enabling precautions and improving mitigation. 
CONCLUSION 
Something terrible is going to happen in cyberspace. That may be useful 
for cybersecurity. 
The United States suffers significant but less visible cyberattacks daily. 
Complex technology, mixed with victims’ reluctance to disclose the scale of 
harms, leads to an underappreciation of cyber-risks. This disjunction 
generates the ongoing puzzle of cybersecurity: the gap between the dra-
matic assessment of the risks the United States faces and the minimalist 
measures the country has taken to address them. America’s predictions do 
not match its bets. One of these positions is wrong.  
But the economic and structural factors that impede regulation suggest 
reform will not occur without a dramatic focusing event.519 The United 
States did not address its educational deficiencies in math and science until 
the Soviets launched Sputnik into orbit.520 Until the near-meltdown at Three 
Mile Island, America was complacent about nuclear energy safety.521 And it 
took the attacks of 9/11 for the country to address the rise in international 
terrorism, the gaps in its intelligence systems, and the weaknesses in 
 
517 Kesan & Hayes, supra note 46, at 474 (using the term “mitigative counterstriking” to 
define the core concept of an “active defense” that will not eliminate the threat but rather mitigate 
its effects). 
518 See Sales, supra note 35, at 1539-44 (describing the multifaceted public health approach 
that includes inoculation, biosurveillance, and isolation and quarantine—a model that can be 
mirrored in a cybersecurity approach). 
519 Cf. JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 165 (1984) 
(noting that it often takes a large event such as rumored regulation or deregulation, turf disputes 
over jurisdiction, or some other form of interagency “strife” to drive change). 
520 Cornelia Dean, When Science Suddenly Mattered, in Space and in Class, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
25, 2007, at F4 (explaining how the launch of Sputnik was used by scientists and researchers as a 
“warn[ing to] Congress that the cold war was being fought with slide rules, not rifles”). 
521 PERROW, supra note 88, at 15-31 (describing, in detail, the hydrogen explosion that spurred 
subsequent nuclear safety policy and cooled nuclear factory construction across the United States). 
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aviation security.522 This Article’s role is to sit on the shelf, awaiting that 
focusing event with dread. When it occurs, regulators will need a model for 
a response. This Article offers one. 
Cybersecurity offers copious challenges for future research. Two are 
particularly relevant to this Article. First, data integrity is a difficult puzzle. 
Restoring data after attacks is unhelpful if one cannot tell good information 
from bad—we must be able to distinguish authorized updates from unauth-
orized ones. This seemingly technical puzzle has important implications for 
provenance in other areas, from rules of evidence to intellectual property, 
which struggle with similar authentication problems.  
Second, nation-states are now engaged in the long twilight struggle of 
espionage and hacking in cyberspace. At present, there are neither formal 
rules nor tacit norms that govern conduct. Eventually, though, countries 
must arrive at accommodations. Spying,523 assassination,524 and armed 
combat525 all benefited from shared rules, even during the Cold War. 
Lawyers can raise awareness of these benefits and help shape the system 
that emerges. Future research can contribute to both of these inquiries. 
For now, ghosts roam the network. They cannot be driven out. We must 
lessen the effects of their touch. 
 
 
522 THOMAS H. KEAN ET AL., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 254-65 (2004) (explaining 
how executive agencies received many warnings of “near term ‘spectacular’ terrorist attacks” prior to 
9/11, but from a defense standpoint, “[f]ar less was done domestically” than internationally). 
523 See generally Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International Law, 24 DENV. J. INT’L L. & 
POL’Y 321 (1996) (analyzing the evolution of international espionage law in times of war). 
524 See generally Nathan A. Sales, Self-Restraint and National Security, 6 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. 
& POL’Y 227, 249-51 (2012) (describing the U.N. Charter rules pertaining to peacetime killings). 
525 See generally Geoffrey S. Corn, Back to the Future: De Facto Hostilities, Transnational Terror-
ism, and the Purpose of the Law of Armed Conflict, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1345, 1346-47 (2009) (stating 
that the “triggering paradigm” that spurs armed conflict has evolved with the growth of the United 
States and the development of the Laws of Armed Conflict). 
